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This thesis constructs three narratives of my experiences of Predictive Genetic Testing 
(PGT) for Huntington’s Disease. Not content with ideals of normative thought, illustrating 
the unitary subject of representation navigating the challenges of a testing process, I write 
how one might undertake the PGT process, if only to provide further possibilities 
unimaginable to me outside the limits of this thesis. Informed with Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic 
theory, the narratives are written with a multiplicity of dispersed selves forming with the 
molecular possibilities of human, non-human, and more-than-human forces and flows, 
tracing non-normative subjectivities of becoming-other. Privileging intensive differences of 
affective change and motion, nomadic narrative creates rhizomatic figurations able to 
traverse the limits of normative thought with non-linear thinking. Written with affective 
memories of my experiences of difference, narratives of the PGT process form 
multiplicities of nomadic subjects inhabiting the time of Aion, embodied with the mindless, 
generative and affirmative vitality of Braidotti’s Life as Zoe. Addressing issues of 
sustainability and endurance with nomadic ethics, nomadic narratives escape binary 
dialectics and excluded-other of representational thought, affirming a multiplicity of 
empowering witness-able accounts of the PGT process. I engage political philosophies of 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, amongst other theoretical ontologies, providing 
understandings of processes I experience writing with nomadic subjects. I explore the 
limits of nomadic narrative, in the creation of smooth space that challenges normative 
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Preface
There is a sense that I should share with you, the reader, some information with this 
Preface, assisting with guidance in the form of an introduction with how one might 
approach this thesis, advising of background information or other pertinent stories to help 
familiarise and situate yourself in this journey we are about to undertake together. 
Beginnings are a tricky business, but I trace something of a beginning to a multiplicity of 
questions, mindful I am still in processes of asking them of myself. Let’s start with a simple 
statement, though, a lingering rhetorical thought, really. 
What just happened?
Sitting together riding the bus back from class in Palmerston North, having just wrapped 
up the final day of the contact course for the Postmodernism and Psychology 
postgraduate paper in 2017, turning to my friend Moana, I remember repeatedly asking 
her this question. Having spent four days immersed in various postmodern, poststructural, 
and posthuman theories of psychology, I remember a disconcerting disquiet, and a 
comfortable togetherness, I could not explain. It felt that we, as a class, exceeded the 
bounds of what was permissible to a small group of people. Yet, Moana and I were unable 
to state what it is we experienced, sitting together in class for four days, or what we were 
experiencing then on the bus. I was nervous with a sense that things (whatever that 
meant) would never be the same. Moana and I talked, although it seemed that just sitting 
quietly together, confused with feelings of wonder, was more than adequate to share our 
experiences. I recall the feelings with a sense the firm grip of logic and reason had 
loosened, no longer solely adequate to account for a world we had just departed, with 
other possibilities I had yet to fully grasp residing outside of the limits imposed by these 
modes of thought. After arriving back in Auckland after a short flight later that evening, 
sitting in my lounge, walking around the shops in town, talking with others about the week 
away, for several days I found my self still waiting to land. I was not exactly floating, but 
more feeling an unbounded dispersal towards various places I did not recognise. No 
longer held together with logic, I was in multiple places at once. 
Returning to the requirements of a Preface, to familiarise a reader with information with 
which to approach this thesis, Braidotti (2012) reminds me a process of familiarisation 
assumes an oedipal relationship between self and other, entailing a “masculine habit of 
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taking for granted free access to and consumption of the bodies of others” (p. 81). Here, in 
these opening lines, I am pursuing other opportunities to acquaint a reader with this 
research. I understand my experiences of the bus ride home with Moana, of becoming 
aware of the inadequacy of logic and reason, as a process of defamiliarisation. As an 
evolutionary process, defamiliarisation began for me with the conditions created in our 
classroom that empowered shared transformations, felt not just in the confines of a 
classroom but also later with possibilities of futures embodied with differences felt as we 
rode the bus away. I also began to remember other events, experiences from before with 
the feelings of difference. Here, in space created with a Preface, I would like to invite you 
to join me in a gambit. Whereas a process of familiarisation is based on a sense of 
“supreme ontological entitlement” (p. 82) that one may know of the other, that I may know 
of you the reader, I approach this Preface as an opportunity “to free the process of subject 
formation from the normative vision of the self” (p. 83), permitting the reader of this thesis 
to become present in a multiplicity of locations. Although I may not know locations from 
which you have come, this thesis is a collaborative process, creating possibilities from 
which we derive new locations of subject formation together. 
What have I done?
One might expect to find specific sections such as a literature review, methodological 
outline, results, analysis, and a conclusion within a traditional thesis working with 
normative subject formation. A reader will not find these here. The normative ideals and 
expectations of a traditional thesis are here for you to encounter, though, requiring another 
"set of ears", other senses with which to listen as they are given to presenting differently 
with how one might engage this thesis. Whilst a unified theoretical framework formed from 
an extensive literature review will not be readily apparent, confined within a specific 
section, the reader will encounter moments of intrigue and consternation with elements of 
a well-researched body of work, hopefully resulting in departures of thought for a reader 
that I do not assume I am able to purposefully devise or control. The multiplicity of 
conclusions will not necessarily “follow” from a problem stipulated in an introduction, 
derived in an analysis, and affirmed with a conclusion. The work undertaken here began 
before I came to understandings of processes I experienced, and continue to experience, 
writing this thesis. The knowledge created with nomadic writings, although repetitive 
throughout, evades a linear understanding. I invite you to consider engaging aspects of 
this work differently, but always through an iterative process of re-reading the material 
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several times, much as engaging in Braidotti’s nomadic theory requires me to restate 
different iterative understandings of the concepts involved. Freed from linear expectations, 
I hesitantly suggest this research does not contain a “point”, a purpose that is easily 
reduced to something to “get”, a form of knowledge fully accounted for with bullet points 
derived with theoretical models. Other possibilities are afoot. 
How did I get here?
In the following narrative windows of undertaking a genetic test, I write processes of 
defamiliarisation, of no longer identifying with a unitary self and creating subjectivities that 
exceed the politics of normative subject formation. I cannot declare definitively what 
“happened” to me or what was “done” in the process of completing the writings; I cannot 
tell you where “here” is. Engaging in processes of nomadic thought and nomadic ethics is 
not easily accounted for with representational thought. Forming circumstances of 
possibilities I cannot imagine, this thesis is informed of processes not yet complete, and 
instead of an analysis section, I have constructed bookends entailing processes extending 
beyond limits of narrative windows and futures yet to unfold. 
Writing the final words of this thesis, I am still troubled by possibilities of unimaginable 
consequences. The writing bound within this thesis, as with processes of defamiliarisation, 
is imperfect, always partial and never complete. Should I start again, start over, or repeat 
this work, the experiences would be different, the multiplicity of memories and the 
concepts drawn upon to write narratives and bookends would inevitably vary. Yet, I am 
enthralled. Whilst I do not hope to transcend the troubling, affixing it with a set of 
outcomes, conclusions, and recommendations, I have come to know that troubling grows 
with further processes of defamiliarisation, of not forgetting but of retaking what is already 
given, forming possibilities to dance on the feet of chance and differ from oneself, and all 
that had been before. Maybe one possibility regarding how one might encounter this work, 
is that given a chance, I have a sense I would do it all over again, differently, always 
differently.  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Explaining his relationship with Michel Foucault, the philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1990) 
thought both men were on the same side as they “set out to follow and disentangle lines 
rather than work back to points…to catch things where they were at work, in the middle: 
breaking things open, breaking words open” (p. 86). Philosophy, Deleuze goes on to say, 
is always thinking of being in the middle, seeking to extend outwards along lines of thought 
towards the emergence of other formations, with the work of a philosopher the invention of 
new concepts which could be followed even further to break open yet more. Deleuze 
explains his philosophy does not privilege the surveying of a scene, deploying a singular 
beginning and end from which an individual can see a totality of what has come before or 
what will come after. One must begin in the middle where one is, Deleuze declares, and 
only hope to follow a line to somewhere else within a density of entangled lines. So, here I 
am in the middle, where I must begin again, beginning this time by remembering other 
beginnings.
A few weeks after my 17th birthday in July of 1995, my father committed suicide, as his 
father had many years before him. Both men died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the 
head, after developing debilitating manifestations of Huntington’s Disease. First described 
in 1872 by Dr. George Huntington, Huntington’s Disease is a fatal genetic disorder, 
expressed through degenerative behavioural, neurological, and psychiatric manifestations 
(Wexler, Wild, & Tabrizi, 2016). I am unable to recall a time when genetics, terminal illness, 
end of life events, and suicide have been unfamiliar terms, a time before the presence of 
intimate experiences of depression, grief and loss. Whilst I often wonder of both men dying 
differently, I have moved amongst the world seeking richly textured experiences of life, 
living with extremes of despair and joy. Although I have grown up and become an adult 
without a grandfather and a father, I feel a fortune shining brightly when I think of the 
people, places, and things with whom I have shared life, together and never alone.
Born in the state of Michigan in the United States, for most of my adult life I have resided 
in Auckland, New Zealand. In October 2010, I received results from a Predictive Genetic 
Test (PGT) for Huntington’s Disease. As I completed the final year of an undergraduate 
degree in psychology at Massey University in 2016, I began pondering the difficulties in 
providing a narrative of my experiences of the disease. I have sought ways to live 
differently, if only to die differently, than my father and grandfather, and wondered of 
sharing this with others. My efforts to provide an account of completing the PGT process 
felt inadequate, though. No matter how I told of my experiences, I could no more explain to 
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others why I undertook PGT than how my partner and I endured the consequences of 
completing the process. 
 
 
The Life of Windows
This thesis is constructed with three pieces of writing, each a window of the PGT process 
for Huntington’s Disease. Following Deleuze (1990), I have written narratives to break 
open experiences and disentangle lines of thought within these windows, if only to open 
more possibilities of thought to follow yet further. Narrative windows present a paradox in 
the context of the production of a thesis, though. How do I account for where a line began 
and where it might lead, tracing a line or the path taken as I follow these entangled 
threads? How does a narrative distinguish the middle, the beginning point of where I am 
now, to a different middle of another future temporal moment? Without a place of 
departure from where this thesis starts and a conclusion where the words no longer flow, 
within the institutional demands of a thesis, how do I demonstrate the potential 
capabilities, capacities, and outcomes of this theoretical research, without recourse to a 
survey or scene? 
With Deleuzian political philosophy, narrative need neither to be a simplified expression 
nor a complex representation of experiences. With an understanding of Deleuze’s 
processual life, Tucker (2012) extends the concept of life “to the edges of contemporary 
practices” (p. 799), to present new modes of thinking and explore the limits of such 
thought. Tucker suggests an adequate psychological understanding of the materiality of 
narratives cannot be developed temporally, as language “works as an identifier, to 
‘capture’ life according to culturally recognized patterns” (p. 777). An adequate 
understanding of individual life should instead seek to “unravel the specific pattern of 
processes that have connected previously unrelated sets of heterogeneous relations” (p. 
781). As both language and materiality are “woven into processes…definable only as and 
through their relevance to other elements” (p. 777), these windows are not drawn 
delineating points where one might begin or end. Instead, following Tucker, the windows 
themselves are broken open with narratives, that in turn break open individual experiences 
of the PGT process, in order to conceptualise life as a process and enter into the flow of 
experiences of the PGT process “rather than claiming to be able to stand back and gain 
insight from ‘outside’” (p. 781). 
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Exploring the limits of normative portrayals of life and death, Beaulieu and Ord (2017) offer 
their work in an attempt understand Deleuze’s death as a creative "pure event”, an 
affirmative “gesture” where Deleuze is thought to suffuse notions of his own death with a 
“post-mortem capacity to affect, to launch a challenge to philosophy, to circulate and 
eventually to evaluate at least partially the value of life” (p. 134). Far from being a “simple 
factuality” (p. 129) which is able to be accounted for with a date, Beaulieu and Ord remove 
the death of Deleuze from the linear time of Chronos and place it into the time of Aion, to 
create an “expression of the infinite…at once deeply moving and stimulating…such that it 
no longer remains enigmatic” (p. 122). With encouragement from Beaulieu and Ord, these 
narrative windows are presented to trace the emergence of a possibility, the generative 
capacity to affect others outside the confines of time as Chronos, whilst testing the limits of 
what a body is capable in the chaos of time. With Braidotti’s (2012) conception of Aion as 
an undifferentiated and generative “pure empty form of time” (p. 153-154), I return to 
Deleuze.
Deleuze (2001) calls the concept of the Western normative figure of thought that resides in 
Chronos, simple empiricism. Formed of a relationship between the individual thinking 
subject (you the audience, I the writer) and a coextensive object (this thesis, the death of a 
loved one), the normative subject experiences life with the linear collection and 
interpretation of experiences relating to coextensive objects. Deleuze, though, argues life 
is not enclosed, captured and stored in any single moment that requires interpretation, nor 
is life a collection of the moments of a subject caught between when “individual life 
confronts universal death” (p. 29). Colebrook (2006), following Deleuze's concept of life 
further, identifies a task of philosophy then is “to maintain the question, problem or 
meaning of life beyond any living organism” (p. 215). 
Extending a notion of life beyond where the individual becomes imperceptible, past a 
question of life demarcated by death, Braidotti’s (2012) nomadic theory of subjectivity is 
crafted with a different, yet still immanent, notion of Life as Zoe. Created with new 
understandings of difference by escaping the dialectical opposition of the one and the 
multiple, Braidotti uses Deleuze’s concept of multiplicity to “reset the concept of difference 
in the direction of a nomadic, nonhierarchical, multidirectional social and discursive 
practice of multiplicity” (p. 17). Producing the new concepts of nomadic subjectivity and life 
as Zoe, Braidotti rejects the normative subjectivity of simple empiricism that dominates in 
Western societies, creating ways of thinking life as the vitalist flow of difference in the 
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creation and construction of new possible sustainable futures. Life as Zoe becomes the 
mindless, generative and affirmative vitality of all human, non-human, and more than 
human life, a force which “actualizes a set of both social and symbolic interactions that 
inscribe the human-nonhuman bond” (p. 112). Braidotti envisages a nomadic subjectivity 
which is capable of breaking and cracking under the strain of the extremes of affect, yet 
enduring to become different from what it once was, a subjectivity sustained with the 
generative eternal return of “creative mimesis” (p. 410), not the static sameness of identity 
formed with the simple empiricism of the normative subject.
Intensive Life
Braidotti (2012) elaborates another conceptualisation of difference as a fundamental 
principle composing the nomadic subject. Resting on an ethical formation of subjectivity, 
which privileges intensive differences of affective change and motion over extensive 
notions of stable identities, the nomadic subject endures as a continuity of becomings, 
capturing the always already present intensive affective transformations brought to bear 
and embodied with the nomadic self. As I understand Deleuzian philosophy, Braidotti’s 
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Braidotti uses the Greek word Zoe, which we translate into English as life, in 
connection with the word bios. Bios also means life, but the two terms are not 
synonymous. I understand both Zoe and bios with interconnected meanings, 
not binary oppositions, which are often difficult to differentiate without 
consideration of the other. I understand Zoe with Braidotti (2013a), who 
situates an understanding with Deleuze’s concept of immanence, locating Zoe 
with “the practice of affirmation in the exteriority, the cruel, messy outsideness 
of Life itself”, describing life not as an individuating substance (bios), but as a 
generative force which “is immanent to and thus coincides with its multiple 
material actualisations” (p. 343). Elsewhere, Braidotti (2013b) describes the 
generative force of Zoe as “as the dynamic, self-organising structure of life 
itself…the transversal force that cuts across and reconnects previously 
segregated species, categories and domains (p. 6). Braidotti (2012) positions 
bios as an understanding of life within an “old hierarchy”, privileging 
“discursive, intelligent, social life”, where life is “sacralized as a preestablished 
given” (p. 92) and limited with the concept of organic death. Braidotti (2006c) 
provides a non-anthropocentric understanding of Zoe, where the human 
subject is “an autopoietic machine, fuelled by targeted perceptions and it 
functions as the echoing chamber of Zoe” to express “a profound love for Life 
as a cosmic force and the desire to depersonalise subjective life and 
death” (p. 139). Braidotti (2012) also uses the term bios-zoe to describe life 
without “brandname on it, nor does it have a price-tag attached to it. It does 
not flow within the constraints of…its old narrative: desire as lack, alterity and/
as negativity, the burden of Being that coincides with consciousness” (p. 166). 
nomadic ethics, nomadic subjectivity, and life as Zoe cannot be known through 
individualised moments of time or individualised subjects, as the concepts are without 
“subjects steering the process (or being steered by it)…and without points of origin or 
destination marking the allowed trajectory” (p. 1). Escaping the trap of an inadequate 
social critique formed of dialectical resistance and confrontation with the normative 
neoliberal subject, nomadic theory is an ethical project which seeks “to work critically from 
within in order to exceed the present frame” (p. 19). As a multiplicity of embodied affective 
difference, I understand nomadic subjectivity “as something produced from the differences 
of which they are composed” (Patton, 2000, p. 28).
Braidotti extends Deleuze and Guattari's figuration of a rhizome to inscribe a multiplicity of 
differences forming the concept of nomadic subject. To escape the oppositional thought of 
resistance and critique of the binary dialectic of self/other, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
create a rhizomatic figuration with their Maritime Model of space. As I understand it, the 
model refers to points as the forming substance of striated space whilst privileging lines 
and intervals between points as the forming substances of smooth space. Striated space 
is experienced through the perception of organised and stable forms of identity, such as 
the unified self of a normative subject and the coextensive objects of narrative stories in an 
academic thesis, whilst smooth space is formed with a multiplicity of intervals and lines 
only present through the differences formed with a change of vectors, directions, 
frequencies, and speeds. Smooth space is also created by the vectors of intensive 
differences in thinking, with what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call a nomadic “voyage in 
place” (p. 482). I understand Beaulieu and Ord’s work on the death of Deleuze as such an 
effort. Deleuze and Guattari link the “symptoms” of smooth space with experiences and 
evaluations of touch, bodily feelings, and affect, whilst striated space presents properties 
which are organised and measured, creating visible co-extensive borderlines of “formed 
and perceived things” (p. 479). 
Whilst simple empiricism delineates the striated space where the extensive normative 
subject dwells, with death articulated as a state of corporeal absence of the normative 
individual subject in the time of Chronos, Conley (2006) explains rhizomatic figurations of 
thought can be created as a tactic to make porous the already present borderlines of 
formed and perceived things within striated space. Furthermore, rhizomatic figurations can 
create a proliferation of lines of flight within striated space by “following multiple itineraries 
of investigation” (p. 98), engendering new, unbounded smooth space in the time of Aion 
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“that is neither fixed nor bears any clearly delimited borders” (p. 98). The rhizomatic figure 
molecularises striated space, making affective connections with human, non-human, and 
more than human forces “to open spaces and undo fixed mental and physical borders and 
barriers” (p. 107), allowing one to become actively engaged in the politics of the present. 
Returning to the paradox of windows, beginning and end points, this thesis is presented as 
a rhizomatic figuration within the striated space of normative academic practice, to form 
open, smooth space of molecular connections with human, non-human, and more than 
human forces no longer restricted or constricted by the rigid frames of simple empiricism. 
Formed of three pieces of writing, three narrative windows of a multiplicity of rhizomatic 
nomadic subjects which traverse both smooth and striated space, this thesis brings forth 
the possibility of felt experiences, embodied affect, and bodily sensations as symptoms to 
signal the outcomes required within the production of a thesis. With the possibilities of 
rhizomatic thinking, molecular connections and embodiment, I can begin to construct the 





I met Sam in 1997, whilst we were both employed at a summer youth camp in Michigan, 
less than an hour drive from my home town. We continued working together at the youth 
camp for four years, and as Sam was required to return to England at the end of each 
summer, we managed a precarious trans-Atlantic relationship for those four years. We 
married in 2001, and initially lived together in Michigan whilst we both went to university 
and established professional careers. With the advent of a new neo-conservative national 
political environment in the United States, we relocated to England in 2003. In 2006, 
feeling the stirrings of restlessness, we backpacked across Europe, Asia, and Australia, 
arriving in New Zealand in September. Within a few months, I began employment as a 
Probation Officer with the New Zealand Department of Corrections, and for eight years, I 
progressed through a variety of roles, with my speciality involving the supervision of high 
risk offenders in the community, mainly relating to men convicted of arson, murder, child 
and adult sexual offences. Following multiple career paths involving field work, 
management, and policy roles, I felt well-paid whilst benefitting from job security, and 
experienced trust and respect from the community in which I lived and worked. I also 
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sought opportunities to become politically active, engaging with community groups and 
governmental organisations, whilst developing Corrections practices, policies, and 
decision-making frameworks that led to safer communities. Although I found the work 
challenging and often taking a personal toll on my wellbeing, I felt privileged to be working 
with offenders and their whānau, and entrusted by the Government to manage large 
numbers of staff and the administration of government offices. 
As I recall the various roles I held in Corrections, I reflect on Garo (2008), who describes 
(Deleuzian) political activism as having a “paradoxical character, in the form of a persistent 
combination of engagement and disengagement, both equally militant, at the point where 
incompatibility axes cross” (p. 54). Whilst I experienced growing dissatisfaction with the 
hegemony brought forth by the ascendance of a specific “type” of manager, I was paid 
commensurately larger wages and given outsized responsibilities devising and developing 
offender management practices and procedures. Despite the organisation lauding a 
professional practice framework predicated on an iterative yet dynamic risk assessment of 
offenders, where difference was assessed and evaluated for the positive and negative 
possibilities it afforded an individual to make changes to their offending behaviour, I 
experienced Corrections corporate culture as rewarding practitioners and managers who 
embraced a risk-averse management style. As with the criminal justice approach towards 
cognitive and behavioural surveillance of individuals to identify appropriate interventions 
that instigate and facilitate processes of change, these same techniques paradoxically 
became a part of my day to day as a senior manager involved in policy and recruitment. 
A figure of authority within a criminal justice system which is tasked with the responsibility 
to “mold the bodies and minds of citizens in the direction of normal, constructive good 
sense” (Scott, 2009, p. 358), my employment within this culture progressively became 
intolerable, even as I and others sought to disrupt the purging of difference and create 
possibilities for professional practice to value qualitative differences in thinking. Through 
targeted internal recruitment of existing staff into managerial roles, and external 
recruitment of new staff for entry level roles, Corrections culture became intolerable of 
difference in pursuit of individuals who embodied and maintained a “brand” which 
represented the preferred normative practices. In the hunt for staff free of defects and 
errors, recruitment processes embrace governmental practices enlisting “scales of 
performance or functional ability” (Wahlberg & Rose, 2015, p. 68). Identifying difference as 
a risk to the potential of an employee’s performance absolves both the organisation and 
 8
the employee from of the burden of variability, which is seen to limit the prospects of 
maintaining a healthy functional employment history and possibilities of career 
advancement. 
Although already in a position of power, I recall responding to these experiences with what 
Garo (2008) refers to as a form of “micro-revolutionary thinking”, and engaging in practices 
of a “miniaturisation of politics” (p. 63). I feared becoming caught in a closed and circular 
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I am reflecting on the first of two governmental reports on criminal justice 
reform, in which Gluckman (2018) provides an overview of an exploding 
prison population in New Zealand. The research identifies political policies 
and social attitudes towards crime as the primary drivers of the increase in 
incarceration rates, and questions the efficacy of incarceration as a primary 
means of maintaining community safety through the removal of offenders 
from society. Gluckman challenges the perceived efficacy of “harsher” bail 
and parole legislation, which has been found to increase the number of 
individuals remanded in custody prior to conviction and extend the length of 
time individuals remain in custody (through minimum and mandatory 
sentencing requirements). Such policies, Gluckman explains, lead to no 
commensurate increase in public safety, nor a reduction in crime. 
In response to social and political attention given to the escalating financial 
and social costs of the second highest incarceration rate within the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Government 
has launched a consultation process, undertaken through The Safe and 
Effective Justice Programme/Te Uepū Hāpai i te Ora. Headed by an Advisory 
Group including a previous government minister, academic researchers, 
victim advisory experts, legal scholars, and cultural advisors, I am pondering 
the involvement (and future) of the Department of Corrections, which has 
reportedly been limited to assisting in the coordination of “listening" events of 
public consultation. I understand the programme as intending to consult with 
the wider community to move away from a punitive approach, and associated 
politicised policies, where criminals are other-ed for their actions and 
removed from society for this difference. Te Uepū Hāpai i te Ora envisages a 
process which realigns justice reforms towards victim restorative responses 
and community participation, to restore faith in a more effective system. 
Justice reforms, in a sense, will not focus on difference as a location requiring 
correction, with success measured solely on the productivity of reforming the 
criminal. Instead, success will incorporate the participation and involvement of 
all parties, in re-imagining a criminal justice system incorporating the values 
of dignity, aroha, compassion and accountability. I am hopeful in the 
possibilities of public safety through an individual’s affirmative capacity to 
become different in processes of change, with their whānau and the 
community. 
process, where I would be valued, and financially rewarded, for a privileged identity of 
becoming politically aware, whilst an identity of becoming politically active would be 
superseded and marginalised. Garo concludes, to escape this closed circuit and yet 
remain political, one must not begin with “the practices which seem to validate it”, and 
instead one must consider the “investments which define it” (p. 55). Whilst rejecting 
encouragement and entreaty from colleagues, and other more senior managers, to 
participate in reform, I declined to engage in the institutional politicisation enabled by my 
privileged status from within Corrections. It is within this intersection of entangled lines I 
began to disengage thinking of my self with risk, whilst knowing that an intimate knowledge 
of risk had become an integral part of my professional and personal subjectivity. Not only 
had knowledge of risk, risk assessments, and strategic management of risk served as 
tools to secure me gainful employment for two decades, these knowledges also became 
sites for contriving myriad devices wielded to successfully complete the PGT process. As a 
High Risk Senior Advisor for policy and practice, and subsequently the Acting District 
Manager responsible for one of New Zealand’s largest Probation areas, I had ostensibly 
achieved some measure of success with these tools. Whilst the requirement to abide the 
corporate culture became more difficult, certain identities became marginalised and others 
privileged, and all the meanwhile I became more wealthy. To become politically active, 
Thiele (2010) concludes, one must embrace “a belief in this world, as it is…to produce 
active affirmation in the face of every single result the world ever takes” (p. 35). No longer 
able to imagine a future self abiding the requirements of a Corrections manager, and 
fearing the capitalistic trap where the power of my political potential is deformed as “the 
flow of unqualified wealth encounters the flow of unqualified labor” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 366), in December of 2014, I resigned without regret and with no small measure 
of relief. 
Differences
With an employment history across three countries, working with children with violent 
behavioural disorders, adults with poly-substance misuse issues, and some of New 
Zealand’s “highest risk” offenders in the criminal justice system, I remember the tiredness 
of thinking of the world as risky, assessing and managing risk, and learning to live with risk 
whilst learning how to mitigate risk. After separating from Sam in 2012, and enduring 
several years of professional and personal turmoil and pain whilst desiring possibilities of 
living differently, I decided to risk it all. The week I resigned, I moved to the refuge of the 
Waitakere Ranges in West Auckland. On my last day of employment, I began a 
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relationship with Hannah, who worked in Corrections as well, and soon thereafter I took up 
full time study at Massey University to finish an undergraduate degree. Intending to 
complete a Master’s Degree, I began postgraduate studies in psychology whilst dwelling 
on the possibilities of academic research to provide a witness-able account of undertaking 
PGT. I enrolled in classes that covered new and unfamiliar theoretical terrain, exposing 
myself to new potential theoretical approaches to research, including feminist 
methodologies, discursive psychology, poststructural psychology, and posthuman 
ontologies. Each class brought possibilities of new understandings of the literature 
pertaining to genetic testing and Huntington’s Disease, as I became increasingly more 
familiar with the arcane biomedical explanations of Huntington’s Disease and research into 
genetic testing. 
Returning to Garo’s (2008) elaboration of micro-revolutionary thinking, molecular politics, 
and the investments which define closed and circular processes, the (risk) binary of 
“having” and “not having” a gene became a specific representation of a dilemma, a 
problem I understood as a reason for undertaking PGT for Huntington’s Disease. Given 
the unequivocal onset and presence of physical, cognitive, and psychiatric symptoms 
identified through various diagnostic tests prior to the availability of PGT, my father was 
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Prevalence studies for Western populations, involving both genetic and 
clinical diagnostic protocols, find rates of between 10.6–13.7 per 100,000 
individuals of the general population are diagnosed with Huntington’s 
Disease, with incident rates of new diagnoses per year ranging between .47–.
69 per 100,000 individuals (Bates et al., 2015). Huntington’s Disease is 
caused by an expanded repeat of a trinucleotide, cytosine-adenine-guanine 
(CAG), located within the huntingtin gene (otherwise known as the HTT gene) 
on Chromosome 4. The typical human genome consists of 13 pairs of 
chromosomes, with one chromosome from each pair inherited from each 
parent. PGT measures the number of CAG repeats present in the HTT gene 
on both chromosomes of Chromosome 4. The number of repeats varies 
across the general population, with 17 to 26 repetitions of CAG occurring 
within the healthy population, indicating these individuals will not develop the 
disease. A mutation in the HTT gene, resulting in 40 CAG repeats or higher, 
indicates the disease will inevitably establish within the individual. Variability 
occurs with CAG repeat counts of between 36 and 39, described as reduced 
penetrance, meaning the disease may or may not manifest in an individual. 
HTT mutations with a CAG repeat of between 27 to 35 are referred to as 
intermediate, meaning that although a carrier will not develop the disease, if 
the mutated HTT gene is passed on to offspring, the gene then carries the 
risk of expanding into the mutation range, and the disease may develop 
(Crozier & Dale, 2015).
diagnosed with Huntington’s Disease without genetic testing. My grandfather, and multiple 
other family members for generations before him, developed the disease and died prior to 
the emergence of both pre-symptomatic testing and predictive genetic testing. My father 
passed away prior to me asking him a single question about Huntington’s Disease or our 
shared genetic heritage, and I began to wonder, rather than thinking in terms of what 
genes I may or may not have, what other questions of genetic inheritance are enabled in 
representational thought-and how these questions are involved in the decision to end 
one’s own life.
In response to the slipperiness of explaining the complex categories of genetic 
indeterminacy, I recall the seductiveness of thinking genetic inheritance as a clearly 
delineated set of binary possibilities, genetic testing resulting in a singular piece of 
knowledge, which is produced then incorporated into life. Whilst being at-risk of inheriting 
Huntington’s Disease is perilous, genetic indeterminacy also engenders an overwhelming 
need to consider untold changes of shifting from one at-risk category to another after 
receiving a test result. 
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Huntington’s Disease is an autosomal genetic disorder, meaning a mutated 
HTT gene can be transmitted to offspring by either parent. Children of an 
individual with a single mutated HTT gene have a 50% random chance of 
inheriting the parent’s mutated gene and a 50% chance of inheriting the non-
mutated HTT gene. When an individual inherits a mutated HTT gene from 
both parents, resulting in mutations present in the HTT genes in both 
chromosomes of Chromosome 4, not only will that individual develop 
Huntington’s Disease, the individual’s offspring will also certainly inherit a 
mutated HTT gene. If an individual’s grandparent has the mutated gene, but 
the status of the respective parent is unknown, the individual is said to have a 
25% chance of inheriting the mutated HTT gene from the grandparent 
(Nance, 2016).
The first clinical trials for pre-symptomatic (PT) testing of Huntington’s 
Disease occurred in 1983, with PT protocols developed for the general public 
by 1985. PGT became available with the discovery of the HTT gene mutation 
in 1993. Whilst PGT indicates the presence of a mutated gene, and the 
certainty of developing the disease, PT is a diagnostic tool available to assess 
the presence of the disease prior to the onset and manifestation of overt 
symptoms without the need for a genetic test (Clément et al., 2015). 
Financial implications change in relation to becoming eligible for life insurance, or 
alternatively one might become ineligible for life insurance whilst hampered by a shortened 
lifetime earnings potential. The socially acceptable and comfortable explanations given to 
others, telling why my partner and I did not have any children, become strained and need 
to be rethought. The consequences of thinking with a foreshortened future when you do 
not expect to die of old age comes to bear on the present when a lifespan potentially 
increases by decades. Neglected healthcare, such as dental care, become new concerns 
when you might live to old age. For as much as I worked at preparing for both having the 
gene and not having the gene, I also recall the frustration and helplessness of not having 
any experience of living without the spectre of Huntington’s Disease and genetic 
indeterminacy. What happens when there is nothing left remaining to answer, nothing left 
to guide one’s life? How does one prepare for such things?
The identification of discriminating factors becomes important to research seeking to better 
understand who and why some individuals become, statistically speaking, the “one in a 
million” who undertake genetic testing, and those who do not, or cannot. Whilst research 
has found highly variable rates of at-risk individuals completing PGT for Huntington’s 
Disease, all reported rates are thought to be “low”.
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Prevalence and incidence rates of the disease provide quantitative data 
indicating the statistical variability of individuals who start, and complete, 
genetic testing. Researching the prevalence rates of people diagnosed with 
Huntington’s Disease over the age of 21 years old specifically within the 
United Kingdom, Evans et al. (2013) found 5.4 per 100,000 individuals were 
diagnosed in 1990, increasing to 12.3 per 100,000 individuals in 2010. The 
study highlighted that a revised incident rate of the disease from earlier 
studies was used as a benchmark, indicating the population of people living 
with Huntington’s Disease doubled in the timespan the research covered.
Changes to psychological functioning and the prevalence of correlated adverse events are 
thought to be factors influencing decision-making processes, with researchers hoping that 
improvements to genetic counselling protocols will, in part, improve testing rates by 
increasing the availability of testing to individuals who otherwise may not undertake and 
complete PGT.
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Whilst a meta-analysis of research prior to the development of PGT found 
between 40% and 79% of people at risk of inheriting the gene mutation voice 
interest in undertaking genetic testing when approached by health 
professionals (Meiser & Dunn, 2000), recent studies have found “only” 
between 3-25% of individuals at risk eventually undergo genetic testing 
(Forrest Keenan, McKee, & Miedzybrodzka, 2015). Creighton et al. (2003) 
found that 18% of the Canadian at-risk population (specifically, those 50% at 
risk of inheriting the gene) completed predictive testing over a 13 year period. 
Basing their research on an estimate, that for every person diagnosed with 
Huntington’s Disease approximately 4.2 other individuals are 50% at-risk, 
Tassicker et al. (2009) found only between 13.0–15.4% of the at-risk 
population (specifically within the state of Victoria in Australia) sought genetic 
testing. Using minimum, and therefore different, prevalence rates for 
individuals 50% at-risk of inheriting the mutated HTT gene, Morrison, Harding-
Lestera and Bradley (2011) found similar results, suggesting “only” 10.6 
individuals per 100,000 ultimately complete the PGT process. 
Correlating rates of individuals undertaking PGT, with discriminating factors 
such as marital status, gender, age, number of children, and number of 
relatives (and which relatives) affected by the disease, research differentiates 
individuals and focusses attention on the shared characteristics of individuals 
who are thought more likely to undertake PGT. Scuffman and MacMillan 
(2014) identify specific motivations, such as for family and financial planning 
for the future, career planning, and "the need to know” in order to get rid of 
uncertainty, as reasons why someone undertakes PGT. The presence and 
strength of motivational factors is also used to indicate who is more likely to 
complete the testing process once it is started. I understand a purpose of 
correlative research is to develop clinical knowledge that shapes genetic 
counselling practices, supporting the formation and development of these 
characteristics within at-risk individuals. PGT, ostensibly, is therefore made 
available to individuals who otherwise would not access the service, or fail to 
complete the process. 
Nance (2016), conducting a historical review of genetic counselling services, affirms a 
need to provide support in the most appropriate environment, at the right time, and in a 
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I understand normative research as investigating the suspected psychological 
impact of the testing process on people who have undertaken PGT, to better 
understand the lives of at-risk individuals. Wiggins (1994) measures changes 
to psychological concepts such as anxiety, depression, and well-being to 
understand the positive benefits and negative consequences of undertaking 
PGT. Almqvist, Bloch, Brinkman, Crauford, and Hayden (1999) measure rates 
of suicide, attempted suicide and psychiatric admissions to undertake an 
analysis of the consequences of undertaking the testing process. Pakenham, 
Goodwin, and MacMillan (2004) use a cognitive model predicated on an 
individual’s ability to conduct an appraisal of the perceived consequences 
(emotional, social, financial) of learning whether or not one has inherited a 
mutated HTT gene, measuring the presence and efficacy of psychological 
individual coping strategies (i.e., avoidance, wishful thinking, and problem 
solving behaviours) to predict the likelihood of negative outcomes, such as 
increased distress and anxiety levels. The research model, as I understand it, 
assumes that an individual who believes themselves able to effectively 
evaluate and manage will adapt to a changing genetic status, providing self-
belief as a discerning characteristic of individuals who undertake PGT, and 
differentiating them from those who do not to seek genetic testing.
The use of thematic analysis places individuals into larger groups with whom, 
it is assumed, embody the lived experiences of PGT similarly. For instance, 
Hagberg, Bui, and Winnberg (2011) explore experiences of individuals 
receiving a positive result from PGT, with knowledge of being a gene carrier 
understand as having possible positive and negative impacts, as a motivator 
or obstacle, in decision making for life choices. Forrest Keenan, 
Miedzybrodzka, Van Teijlingen, McKee, and Simpson (2007) examine the 
experiences of young people growing up in homes affected by Huntington’s 
Disease, to understand how some “cope” better than others to being told of 
the presence of Huntington’s Disease in their family. Similarly, MacLeod et al. 
(2014), using an interpretative phenomenological analysis, explain PGT as a 
single process in which at-risk young people have differing experiences as 
they progress through testing and become a confirmed gene carrier, whilst 
Smith, Stephenson, Jacobs, and Quarrell (2013) outline the decision to 
undertake genetic testing as a dilemma of the moral individual. Andersson, 
Petersén, Graff, and Edberg (2015) use longitudinal case studies to examine 
experiences of testing positive for the HTT gene through the PGT process, 
whilst Leotini (2006) uses a single narrative account of a woman undertaking 
PGT to highlight the informant’s poor experiences of genetic counselling 
services.
way that is right for individuals, whilst also assisting in “the thorny challenges of the 
family” (p. 84). I am struck by her conclusion, that: 
If there is a sense that we should strive to reduce the total burden of HD 
[Huntington’s Disease] in the next generation through counseling and 
educational activities…then the current approach to genetic counseling and 
testing is not succeeding. (p. 83-84)
 
Difference
The aforementioned discriminatory factors are predicated a Western normative 
subjectivity, which values what Braidotti (2012) calls a “tacit consensus about the self-
evidence of the universalizing powers of self-reflexive and self-correcting reason” (p. 210). 
The valuing of reason positions an individual who has not completed the PGT process as 
a site of difference and otherness, lacking success in the failure of an activity. My reading 
of Braidotti provides an understanding of the conflict I experienced in telling my story as a 
problem of articulation. Unable to provide a self-evidential, reflexive, and reasonable 
account of the subjects, objects, and the transcendence of specified boundaries informing 
how a choice was made and what it took to succeed, attempts at normative narrative 
accounts describing how I ultimately succeeded in completing the PGT process also result 
in a hierarchical and dialectical binary logic where my self-reflexive failure is also a site of 
difference and otherness. The binary logic of success/failure similarly reduces difference to 
a “pejoration, disqualification and exclusion” (p. 409), as I am unable to articulate 
normative behaviours and thinking. Further troubling this problem of articulation, I am 
unable to account for the time that constitutes this event, when I started and completed the 
PGT process, nor can I explain the duration of time it took to do so. Did I begin on the 
journey of undertaking PGT as a teenager, on the day I was told my father had the 
disease, with the course of my life following a path of an ever increasing active and 
conscious decision to complete the process? Did the process begin the day I initially met 
with genetic counselling services, or when I submitted a blood sample for the genetic test? 
Would I have completed the PGT process if I had given a blood sample, but, unable to 
cope with the information, declined to receive the results? Did I complete the PGT process 
by simply reading the numbers that tell of the CAG repeats present in the HTT gene within 
my cells?
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Returning to the Deleuze and Guattari’s Maritime model of space, I understand the 
normative subject privileged within striated space as constructing the binary of choice as a 
point where the individual self can dwell within a particular duration of time. A normative 
experience is required to demarcate in what terms one has “succeeded” and where one 
has “failed” in the PGT process. Normative research regarding the individual constructs 
the binary of choice by creating striations in space with formed and perceived things; 
discriminating factors, motivations, traits, and cognitive abilities that enable these 
decisions. The accumulation, usefulness and execution of these striations becomes the 
method of success or failure. A life of the individual comes to be known through a series of 
these points, of decisions and events navigated with accumulating factors along a linear 
path of time. Deleuze (2001) maintains the indefinite article of a life, though, is only the 
singularisation of immanent events by an individual, interpreted as experiences 
constitutive of and belonging to the normative self. Paradoxically, Deleuze concludes that 
whilst a life is everywhere “in all the moments a given living subject goes through”, life 
itself does not have moments, but “only between-times, between-moments” (p. 29). Life 
does not come about before, after, or because of events, nor does life happen because of 
events. 
Instead of the singularisation of life belonging to an individual, the nomadic subject is a 
“process-oriented vision of the subject” (Braidotti, 2010, p. 410), replacing the normative 
subject’s dialectical logic of simple empiricism, which cannot account for the apparent 
paradox of a life being all moments yet not reducible to these moments, with repetitions of 
Deleuze’s concept of multiplicity. Nomadic ethics addresses the paradox by embedding 
accountability within the concept of the nomadic subject, linking memory, narrative, and 
imagination to “activate the process of bringing into discursive representation that which by 
definition escapes self-representation” (p. 410). As a cartographic figuration, the nomadic 
subject provides ethical accounts of a multiplicity of differing subject positions, as well as 
empowering accounts of multiple differences within any subject position. Traversed along 
the co-ordinates of geo-political and historical locations, as a Deleuzian political construct 
a nomadic subject can be understood as an evaluative multiplicity of subject positions, 
able to navigate the striated space formed of points as well as the smooth space of 
intervals and in-between times, a subjectivity created “in order to extract from them all the 
possibilities that they carry” (Valentin, 2006, p. 193). 
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Formed by “retelling, reconfiguring and revisiting the concept, phenomenon, event, or 
location from different angles” (Braidotti, 2010, p. 412), the nomadic subject is a 
methodological construct, capable of crossing boundaries that position difference as the 
site of otherness, freeing the concept of difference as a pejoration or disqualification to be 
excluded. The role of qualitative difference, Boundas (2006) explains, is not limited or 
confined here to a multiplicity of ontologies or subjectivities. Pure difference is also 
involved in forming an ethics of a subject, with the intensities and affect of a nomadic 
subject providing always already innumerable possibilities of ethical relationships with 
human, non-human, and more than human entities. Ethics replace the moral judgements 
of a normative unitary self with the Deleuzian concept of desire. Based on a premise of 
lack, the figure of the normative subject poses a need to acquire that which is outside of 
itself, to overcome or transcend boundaries that prohibit carrying out moral duties and 
obligations, compelled with the moral imperative of reason where one acts based on “the 
transcendental ought, along with its twin bulwarks of duty and obligation” (p. 14). 
According to Boundas, Deleuze’s concept of desire “produces relations and connections 
that are real in their functions and revolutionary in their rhizomatic multiplicity”, and is an 
act where the subject lacks nothing in “facilitating the formation of adequate ideas and 
striving towards more and ‘better encounters’” (p. 16). Aligned with Braidotti’s (2012) 
concept of becoming, desire is the affirmative capacity to act with others in constructing a 
rich array of “possible worlds through a web of sustainable interconnections…a collective 
assemblage of forces that coalesce around commonly shared elements and empower 
them to grow and to endure” (p. 96).
Disentangling the risky body…
I have an interest in theory that allows me to tell my story differently, that is, theory that 
allows the telling of a story I cannot access through a normative narrative account. 
Returning to other connections, I recall a level of anger I had not associated with 
psychological research when coming across research by Titus et al. (2017). The research 
analyses the presence of nightmares as a predictive factor in a risk assessment of 
suicidality. Having experienced and endured feelings associated with suicidality and 
depression after the death of my father, as well as in the midst of the PGT process, 
dwelling on the feelings connected with this single piece of literature, I have come to 
understand the possibilities of research as both a pervasive and intrusive form of 
surveillance. Remembering my own experiences, I struggled with feelings of social 
isolation and disordered thinking, experiences of otherness inscribed with an increase in 
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uncertainty and despair, of being unable to connect with others. Re-imagining my self 
disappearing as I struggled with these feelings of loneliness, desperate to leave feelings of 
trauma from the past and the anxiety of an unrecognisable future, I understand this 
research as measuring my normativity against an ideal, the site of otherness ever 
increasing and yet reduced to manifestations of unconscious nighttime brain activity. Re-
engaging with memories of pain and sorrow, I wonder, having lost my father unexpectedly 
and inexplicably at the age of 17, how else should I have been acting? With feelings of the 
unscrupulous judgment of others, one might ask to whom and to what else should I have 
been aspiring? 
Providing critique of genetic reductionism, Lemke (2004) suggests genetic knowledge 
formation often works to “link complex behavioral patterns and social phenomena back to 
a genetic basis” (p. 552), tracing complexity to ever simpler points in which to create the 
normativeness of a “genetic consensus” (p. 553). Titus et al. (2017) similarly seeks to 
contribute towards an understanding of how nightmares serve as a mechanism which 
increases the risk of suicide, and by a similarly reductionist approach establishes 
deviations from a norm as sites of psychological intervention. As Lemke articulates, rather 
than simply criticising reductionism as being “one-sided, ill informed…solely to assert its 
reductionism or to illustrate the complexity of the problems addressed”, critical research 
also needs to take up the enterprise of showing “how this reductionism functions in 
practical terms and what social consequences it will have” (2004, p. 553). After working in 
professional settings incorporating clinical/forensic/social psychological concepts to 
implement a range of “socially just” interventions, I remember experiencing 
uncomfortableness as I became aware of the possible exploitative nature of psychological 
research, which, in making visible the neoliberal normative subject “might also allow this 
visibility to become profitable in both political and economic terms” (p. 556). 
No longer content providing a narrative to understand the experiences of the PGT process, 
an account of a normative individual surveilled and exploited through the active 
intervention of others, I began exploring the possibilities of Foucault’s theories and 
discourse analysis to attend to the “epistemo-political field of the visible and the 
expressible, which controls the diverse forms of signification, and defines the conditions for 
truth and falsehood” (Lemke, 2004, p. 553). Focussing on the conditions of life for an 
individual undertaking the PGT process, I thought discourse analysis would enable an 
understanding of “how genetic information is generated and produced, how it is circulated 
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and used, but also how it is appropriated and ‘consumed’” (p. 558) in order to navigate the 
complexities of the PGT process. Revisiting Deleuzian desire and Braidotti’s nomadic 
subject, I connect experiences of anger and painful self-reflexive experiences of particular 
limits of normative psychological research with imagining other possibilities of research, in 
order to establish unforeseen better encounters with others. My experiences of normative 
research lingered on, the anger and frustration becoming symptoms and forces of an 
interest in theory allowing me to tell my story differently, signalling the immanent formation 
of smooth space from within the striated space of normative subjectivity with the 
possibilities of research yet foreseen. 
To become-political, Braidotti (2006a) describes a process which requires a “radical 
repositioning or intensive transformation on the part of subjects” (p. 241), where the dis-
identification with familiar forms and representations makes possible the desire of new 
affirmative and productive subject positions. Although I am familiar with the individual 
subject of Huntington’s Disease research, with the focus on traits, skills, and aptitudes 
thought to “allow” one to complete the PGT process when others fail, I appreciate the 
potential for Foucault’s work on governmentalities to de-centre the subject, to better 
understand the forces at play which constrain and enable decisions that one might 
navigate to undertake PGT. I remember the tight, contortionist movements whilst 
navigating the complex spaces of emotional, social, and medical discourses which were 
just beyond my capability at times, and the requisite acts that I needed to invent, learn, 
and practice. Instead of separating those who have and those who have not completed the 
PGT process, research with a de-centred subject gives scope to provide an embodied 
account of my memories of the bruising, embodied pain and injury that I recall whilst 
completing the process.
Remembering Colebrook’s exhortation to reframe psychological research beyond the 
notion of life of an individual, with fondness, I recall engaging with Titus et al., and 
completing an assignment created immanently with new feelings of anger about normative 
psychological research. As I began work on this thesis, feelings cohered into a preference 
for experimentation, an unfamiliar affirmative oppositional political agency in search of 
possibilities, of alternative better encounters unable to be represented with simple criticism 
and the negativity of lack. Initially settling on conducting a discourse analysis, and 
embracing Foucauldian theories of governmentality, I hoped narrative interviews with 
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participants would help to make sense of how one might become one in a million with new 
ethical ontologies. But… 
…with new connections
The idea of choice, a neoliberal idea predicated on the normative unitary self, is shallowly 
answered through the constructs of personality, decision-making frameworks of cost/
benefit, and discriminatory factors. Scott (2009) is critical of knowledge production which 
stipulates specific "principled ways of remembering…as well the values of certain kinds of 
truth, method, and order” (p. 358), where sameness is treated as a threshold of success 
for the reasonable and logical, where one overcomes boundaries and barriers by being 
like others who have done similarly, against those that have not, cannot, and will not. 
Discussing the ethics of Foucault’s work, Scott points out that the different premises and 
conditions of working with an ethical ontology allowed Foucault “to understand better by 
finding a different vocabulary, changed combination of concepts, and the mutations they 
bring by connecting with aspects of experience that are barely emerging at the borders of 
his awareness” (p. 362). I understand the presence of mutations in thinking as a means to 
provide possibilities of variation, in the formation of differing, non-normative yet ethical 
subjectivities, where the priority of research turns to the political, and past the life of the 
individual. 
With a Foucauldian ethics, I understood a possibility of psychological research of the PGT 
process to illustrate how, in the creation of subversive knowledges against the normalising 
power of discourses and institutions, one can be different. Where difference in humanness 
is the creative potential of thinking problematically, difference also enables the conditions 
of change to answer a question of how one undertakes PGT. Rather than the dialectical 
question and answer of a neoliberal subject, for which normative psychological research 
has been unable to demonstrate an adequate language to describe the experiences of 
people who have undergone the PGT process, an analysis of governmentality dislodges 
the focus of research from reasonable and logical explanations of why, to privilege 
questions of how otherwise not found in the literature regarding PGT and Huntington’s 
Disease. Following Scott’s (2009) elaboration of events which shape who we become, I 
understand the PGT process as experiences of navigating the intimate and non-logical 
“structures that govern the establishment of truth”, a process composed of discontinuous 
events with “multiple strata and trajectories as well as with discontinuities of differences 
running through them” (pp. 358-359) that do not fit neatly in tidy accounts. I have come to 
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understand many of the practices, events, and trajectories of my life as a journey to bring 
about new ethical possibilities formed of new circumstances. To undertake and complete 
PGT, the ethics of mutations provide me leverage to navigate discourses not immediately 
accessible with current cultural and social practices, geographical and geopolitical 
locations, and interpersonal relationships. To succeed in undertaking a test that I knew to 
be challenging, for me and all others present with me, subversive knowledges appeared 
as a worthwhile pursuit for thesis work to understand processes of change and difference. 
In their analysis of genetic risk and the implications for personhood, Novas and Rose 
(2000) critically examine the discourses surrounding the rise of genetic technologies, and 
refute the generalisation that individuals within Western neoliberal societies face 
discrimination based on the increased availability of genetic knowledge. They determine 
an individual who is able to calculate the risk of adverse health events occurring, enabled 
with new forms of genetic knowledge acquired with technology such as PGT, results in the 
new form of personhood of the “genetically at risk individual”. This status of personhood, a 
mutation formed of new and different combinations of vocabularies and concepts 
previously unavailable prior to contemporary genetic knowledge, allows for the formation 
of “new categories of individuals” (p. 486) who utilise life strategies in the creation of new 
identities. Novas and Rose regard the normative individual as an entrepreneur. Wielding 
life strategies invested with new choices of practices not previously available, the 
entrepreneurial self thinks of life in terms of risk, assessing life strategies in terms of the 
maximisation of preferable life chances. Employment opportunities, quality of life 
determinations based on available medical knowledge of diseases and treatments, and 
the ethical responsibilities in partner formation and child rearing decisions become 
foregrounded as choices from which life chances are measured, as goals from which the 
effectiveness of life strategy practices are measured, whilst also allowing one to be 
measured by others as well. These concerns present a new form of personhood, formed of 
the relationship between body and self, which Novas and Rose identify as somatic 
individuality. New languages created by the personhood of an individual genetically at risk, 
Novas and Rose argue, articulate knowledge formations to “render visible to others and to 
oneself aspects of human individuality that go beyond ‘experience’…re-organizing it in a 
new way and according to new values about who we are, what we must do, and what we 
can hope for” (p. 488). 
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The Ethics of Mutation and Obligation
Whilst I have an immediate appreciation for research describing the affirmative possibilities 
that difference enables in the creation of new subjectivities, I am troubled by Novas and 
Rose’s (2000) determination that genetic information is an “object of positive 
knowledge” (p. 489). Novas and Rose describe a personhood of somatic individuality, 
framed by understandings of genetic risk, where the individual is neither a subject of 
domination nor a subjectivity wrought by the suppression of freedom. Somatic individuality, 
instead, constitutes a framework for “reshaping of personhood along somatic lines and a 
mutation in conceptions of life itself” (p. 485). These new conceptions of life contribute to 
an expansion of neoliberal ideals, where: 
“…new modes of subjectivity produce the obligation to calculate choices in a 
complex interpersonal field, not only in terms of individuals’ relations to themselves, 
but also in terms of their relations to others, including not only actual and potential 
kin, past and present, but also genetic professionals and biomedical 
researchers.” (p. 488)
Rose and Novas assert the affirmative, active participation of an individual in this process, 
who, in the formation of a personhood, is “free yet responsible, enterprising, prudent, 
encouraging the conduct of life in a calculative manner by acts of choice with an eye to the 
future and to increasing self well-being and that of the family” (p. 490). The calculative, 
enterprising somatic individual begets a normative, entrepreneurial consumerist approach 
to knowledge pertaining to Huntington’s Disease, to meet the needs of an “identity in terms 
of a genetic past, a genetic present and a genetic future” (p. 495). Knowledge, accordingly, 
is instrumental to the care of one’s self and pursued as an instrument to show one’s care 
for others, whilst within this form of relational personhood, professionals are no longer “the 
sole repository or mediator of knowledge”, but instead "assigned the responsibility and 
duty to produce new forms of knowledge that are available and applicable to persons” (p. 
506). I understand a personhood of somatic individuality with Rose’s (2001) 
conceptualisation of a neoliberal individual self, who, in desiring, creating, and consuming 
genetic discourse and knowledge as a form of capital, is “opened up to choice, prudence 
and responsibility, to experimentation, to contestation” (p. 20). When facing the needs of 
past, present and future genetic identities, a somatic individual uses the epistemology of a 
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“vital politics” of life, which, according to Rose, is measured “in terms of the quality of our 
individual biological lives and those with whom we identify” (p. 22).
Starting work on this thesis, seeing myself within the concept of a somatic individual, I 
recall the excitement of thinking “this might work”. In preparation for interviewing 
participants who have completed the PGT process, I began writing of my own memories of 
PGT within a framework much aligned with the somatic individual. Initially approaching 
narrative as accounts of the encumbrances evaded, the obstacles avoided, and the 
barriers overcome in an attempt to narrate a journey of presiding over one’s life in order to 
preside over one’s death, I wrote with, and within, a discursive binary of not having the 
gene or having the gene. I wrote passages of narratives with life constituted as a 
dichotomy of before and after PGT testing, with the specificity of my genetic risk forming 
both a life saving tool yet shifting liability. These feelings of excitement soon faded, though, 
with feelings of immense frustration further unsettling me when these writings stalled. 
Reflecting on the feelings emerging whilst I sat with the stalled writings, I remember 
Braidotti (2012) situates the convergence of the unitary neoliberal self engaging in 
“dialectics of recognition and lack” (p. 3) as a location where “advanced capitalism 
thrives…spinning quantitative differences into a consumerist mode” (p. 170-171). The 
somatic individual’s life strategies, to my understanding, create “a more instrumental, 
narrow logic of opportunistic exploitation” (p. 336) of life, which, envisaged as bios, is 
generically contained within an individual, and bestowed upon all equally. My 
understandings of genetic risk, providing contradictions narrative must navigate, inform 
decisions subject to debate with the involvement of others regarding economical 
functionality. Confronting narration of the obligations forming the basis of my calculative 
and prudent entrepreneurial self, I am unable to account for myriad artefacts of a 
personhood based on an identity in terms of a genetic past, present and future. Unable to 
provide the hopes, desires, and goals of a normative self, missing are the reasoned and 
justified values pertaining to decisions I had spent decades navigating. I am unable to 
account for what kind of life I sought - nor what I hoped to achieve. 
Returning to research on Huntington’s Disease and the sustainability of the relationship 
between the somatic individual and entrepreneurial self, many avenues of psychological 
research focus on suicide as a contributor to the high mortality rates for genetically at-risk 
individuals, and those who have developed Huntington’s Disease. Contemporary studies 
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have found that although less than 1% of deaths within the general population are caused 
by suicide, nearly 7% of individuals diagnosed with Huntington’s Disease commit suicide, 
making a self-inflicted death the third most frequent cause after pneumonia and other 
respiratory infections (Brogueira Rodrigues et al., 2017).
Reflecting on the perpetuation of violence within my family, mindful of circumstances of my 
father and grandfather’s deaths but also other relationships within my family that appear 
roiled with conflict, I wonder of the somatic individual’s binary formulation of having/not 
having, knowing/not knowing, and telling/not-telling the genetic information of somatic 
individuality. Braidotti (2012) provides a Derridean understanding of this binary, suggesting 
the repeated pattern “results in a productive relationship to the aporetic and the 
recognition of a fundamental double bind that ties the self to the radical alterity of 
others” (p. 31). The normative self takes as a given the difference of a genetic binary, 
forming alterity as a negativity of lack, with the unitary subject “consolidated by habits and 
flat repetitions” (p. 154) to maintain the excluded other. Braidotti encourages an evaluation 
of the unsustainable costs this form of self-representation invokes, questioning the 
schizoid logic of these repetitions as “legal forms of addiction” that “railroad us back toward 
established ways of thinking about ourselves” (p. 263). With the logic of evading and 
avoiding obstacles, and learning of new possibilities to overcome barriers and limits, I 
continue to reassess my own formulation of my family as illogical, different, and my own 
inability to recognise them in their contextual worlds. The subjectivity that stood me so well 
in the face of adversity, the difference I envisaged between my self and my father 
permitting me to thrive and enter into spaces which had no entrance, as being unlike 
others, is no longer sustainable. I am frightened by the possibility I am more like my father, 
or less different, than I have ever known. Being present with my reflexive memories of 
resistances to rationality, which Braidotti positions as a “starting point to elaborate sites of 
political resistance” (p. 278), I also recall relationships of generosity and connectivity to 
others with feelings of pain, and feelings of comfort and relief in sharing the affective 
extremes inscribing the fear of my own death. With these reflexive memories, 
understanding others through my own limitations in completing the PGT process instead 
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Research into the rates of suicide for at-risk individuals indicate suicide 
occurs at four times the levels found for the general population in the United 
States, whilst the same study also found 28% of the 831 patients with 
Huntington’s Disease who participated in the research had attempted suicide 
at least once before (Farrer, Opitz, & Reynolds, 1986). 
become “points of passage or thresholds and markers of sustainability” (p. 318). The 
shame of these reflections, though, the fallibility of my logic and reason whilst becoming 
aware of the negativity of my own knowledge systems of self-representation, is startling. 
 
 
Having come far, yet still in the middle, I begin once more with another remembered 
beginning. Although these initial writings helped develop understandings of ways around 
the limits of normative practices, I have come to understand these narratives as providing 
an account of striated space, of identified points where a unitary normative self dwells, 
enabling me to complete the PGT process where others fail. I fear the striation of space 
serving as sediment, forming particular subject positions and grounding them in place, 
reliant on the linear and logical normative subject to articulate the events of these 
strategies, privileging the perpetuation of otherness. Reflecting on my narrative efforts, and 
the requisite “expertness” required of the neoliberal normative self to articulate the life 
strategies of genetic discourse, I am uncomfortable with the binary formation of a somatic 
normative neoliberal individual as with the risky subject of discrimination they are posed 
(poised) to refute. Although fluent in the language of risk, having lived at-risk and worked 
with risk for most of my adult life, I am unable to account for my own entrepreneurial 
thinking of risk in relation to my life chances, quality of life decisions, and interpersonal 
ethical responsibilities. Having become troubled with the possibility that participants in 
narrative research would similarly be unable to provide an expert account, of once again 
failing to account for experiences of the PGT process, requiring the intervention of others 
and returning to the binary logic of self/other, I continue seeking ethical possibilities to tell 
my story. Becoming aware these troubled feelings form beginnings of further 
transformations, I recall Braidotti (2010), who holds such ethical transformations must 
“emerge out of a different set of premises, affects and conditions” (p. 413). 
Responding to questions of subjectivity as a political philosophy, I remember Deleuze 
(2001), who insists:
…what counts in such processes is the extent to which, as they take shape, 
they elude both established forms of knowledge and the dominant forms of 
power…What we most lack is a belief in the world, we’ve quite lost the world, 
it’s been taken from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate events, 
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however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, 
however small their volume. (p. 176)
Braidotti’s (2012) nomadic theory came to my attention with the premise of “an ontology of 
presence” (p. 132), where desire is not constituted by what one lacks but is “a powerful 
force in itself” (p. 21). With Braidotti’s formation of nomadic thought, nomadic narrative 
engenders new space-times through encounters with “anomalous and unfamiliar forces, 
drives, yearnings, or sensations” (p. 97). I understand this to mean embodied molecular 
human, non-human, and more than human intensities create in-exhaustive multiplicities of 
nomadic subjectivities; in other words, the possibilities of affirmative and empowering 
political philosophical activity form with narrative of a dispersed self. Working with nomadic 
theory, I began writing nomadic narratives, exploring the smooth space forming with non-
unitary nomadic selves interacting with other entities and collective assemblages. Through 
working and reworking nomadic writings, they have become the narrative windows that 
follow. They are experiments of writing from memory of difference, completed with what 
Braidotti (2010) refers to as writing “by heart” (p. 414). With no substantive requirement to 
factually check what happened, when it occurred, and to whom, I write with affective 
memories of my experiences as enabling truths. Forming from the non-linear temporality of 
nomadic thinking, molecular connections with human, non-human, and more than human 
entities, forces, and flows provide the affirmative sensorial and cognitive data from a 
“virtual totality of a continuously recomposing block of past and present moments” (p. 414). 
As an “opening-out”, these narratives are crafted of nomadic encounters with memories of 
the PGT process, the self dispersed to “express the vital energy of transformative 
becomings” (p. 415). The dispersed self is traced within these writings as etchings of 
transformative becomings within smooth space, carved from differences between points 
and spaces that no longer need to be filled, and therefore become never-lacking. 
The Posthuman
Once more in yet another remembered middle, I ponder Villani (2006), who recognises the 
possibilities of political activity in testing “how far the concepts of Deleuze’s philosophy 
may be stretched, without breaking” (p. 227). Villani argues political activity needs to 
challenge simple distinctions between striated and smooth space which “represents only a 
way of managing the territory rather than a process of deterritorialisation”, stipulating that 
“flattering the plural is never enough to understand the multiple” (p. 237). Engaging with 
the development of new ethical encounters of academic knowledge production, Braidotti 
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(2016) problematises the terms humanities and posthumanities in the age of 
Anthropocene. Situating the need to establish multiple affirmative processes of 
defamiliarisation, Braidotti implores the value of pain in processes by which the normative 
subject breaks from anthropocentric thought and enters into relationships with a multiplicity 
of human, non-human, and more than human forces. 
Stretching and deterritorialising the concept of multiplicity, Braidotti privileges the process 
of defamiliarisation as a space where “knowing subjects evolve from the vision of the self 
they had become accustomed to” (p. 388). Elsewhere, Boundas (2006) provides an 
exposition on the concept of difference, stretching Deleuze and Guattari’s subverted 
understanding of the nomad as an intensive subjectivity based on their “attempt to 
summon those who are in a position to stand against the state’s capturing forces” (p. 21). 
Creating an ethical subjectivity of difference, no longer defined in terms of repeated habits 
privileging co-extensive borderlines of formed and perceived things, situates processes of 
intensification as a subject of thought. Boundas alerts us to the unorthodox nature of this 
thinking, describing intensities as those forces “responsible for the genesis of entities…
whose mode of existence is to actualise themselves in states of affairs” (p. 4-5). 
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I understand the term Anthropocene as a (generally) agreed-upon term for the 
present geologic epic (see Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000). Colebrook (2014) 
implies the Anthropocene epic signifies when human (anthropogenic) 
habitation on the planet has become “discernible as a geological strata 
readable well after man ceases to be” (p. 12), whilst requiring that one must 
look “at our own world and imagining it as it will be when it has become the 
past” (p. 26) to do so. Referencing a need for a multiplicity of terms, Harraway 
(2015) suggests the planetary impacts of human intervention exceed the 
confines of climate change, in-exhaustively listing the “extraordinary burdens 
of toxic chemistry, mining, depletion of lakes and rivers under and above 
ground, ecosystem simplification, vast genocides of people and other critters, 
etc, etc, in systemically linked patterns that threaten major system collapse 
after major system collapse after major system collapse” (p. 159) as important 
considerations in defining the term. Braidotti’s (2016) situates her work, within 
the Anthropocene, as challenging the academic humanities “separation of 
bios, life, as the prerogative of humans, from Zoe, the life of animals and 
nonhuman entities”, where “humanistic Man—as the universal measure of all 
things—defined himself as much by what he excluded as by what he included 
in his rational self-representation…and their differences get organized on a 
hierarchical scale of decreasing social and symbolic worth” (p. 381).
Returning to academic entanglements, I understand issues of multiplicity, de-
familiarisation, and intensive subjectivity with the use of rhizomatic figurations in this 
thesis. Multiple intervals and lines only present simple accounts. Likewise, returning to the 
unsettling experiences of somatic individuality, mutations and governmentality, the 
sedimentation of particular subject positions requires more than a simple multiplication of 
subject positions to dislodge the striation of space. What is needed, following Deleuze, are 
differences formed with multiplicities of changing vectors, directions, frequencies, and 
speeds. Braidotti’s (2010) nomadic theory transforms the binary of “oppositional 
consciousness and resistance on the one hand and negativity on the other”, a form of 
thinking that produces the stability of sedimented subjectivities, with “a change of 
perspective that aims at recasting critique as affirmation” (p. 413). Reframing the concept 
of affirmation, Braidotti (2012) replaces the normative moral intentionality of a subject with 
Deleuze’s concepts of repressive (potestas) and positive (potentia) power. According to 
Braidotti, the recognition of pain, as well as joy, empowers processes of “transformative 
experimentation with new arts of existence and ethical relations” (p. 269). A nomadic 
subject creates new affective connections and affirmative processes to “increase one’s 
ability to enter into modes of relation with multiple others” (p. 286). Harm and pain, 
considered negative experiences and undesirable states of the normative subject, 
empower political action and affirm self-styling in acts of becoming. The negativity of 
potestas, a disempowerment of the self to relate to others, reduces the expression of 
interconnectivity and interdependence of the self/other in subject formation. An ethical act 
therefore increases potentia, empowering joyful acts of creation in an expression of 
freedom, challenging a norm of the “centrality of the notion of the individual to an ethical 
sense of values or to a socially well-functioning system” (p. 310). 
No longer contingent on the intentions of an individual to maintain moral norms and 
normative social systems, a nomadic ethics builds accountability with the pursuit of 
interactions which create sustainable encounters with others. Braidotti (2010) warns us, 
though, the practice of self-reflexive skills in the methodological approach of nomadic 
writing presents specific challenges to the normative practices and demands of academic 
institutional requirements. As a form of academic auto-ethnographic research, nomadic 
narrative requires consideration of normative ethical privacy principles, typically resulting in 
a practice providing anonymity or confidentiality to named or otherwise identifiable 
individuals. 
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Acknowledging her authority in creating her own subjectivity, Sam has taken opportunities 
to read these narratives prior to submission, allowing our exploration of affective 
processes as the writing progresses. This engagement has brought to the fore a tension, 
arising as we consider her privacy and our confidentiality in this writing and discuss 
theoretical underpinnings of Deleuzian philosophy and nomadic subjectivity. Differently, 
acknowledging the politics of her involvement are no less relevant with accounts of events 
occurring “before” I met her, Hannah has also read these narratives, providing for 
processes of intensive support and critical feedback in the creation of ideas, concepts, and 
experiences. An implication of writing with a nomadic subject is the methodological 
intention of providing an ethical account with the politics of location inhabited with specific 
embodied subject positions. I am troubled by the possibilities of untangling all the 
identifying traces of others, as I form the politics of location with my experiences and 
construct dispersed selves with these narratives. It is difficult to envisage nomadic 
narratives of my experiences without providing accounts partially identifying others, 
especially Sam and Hannah, in some capacity. Yet, contemplating academic requirements 
protecting privacy, whilst writing narratives irreducible to individuals yet experiences we 
share, I am troubled that any audience of this writing who knows of us will invariably 
identify the individuals of this writing. Although formation of a nomadic subject is no longer 
reliant on a mutual recognition of the self/other, I understand invoking full anonymity for 
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I am recalling a question from my mother, a reprimand of sorts, whilst we are 
in the midst of a long conversation overlooking a winery in Southwest 
Michigan. Remembering her question of why I “psychologise” everything, 
unendingly and all the time, I remember Ellis (2013), who celebrates 
autoethnography as a way “of being in the world, one that requires living 
consciously, emotionally, and reflexively…that we observe ourselves 
observing… that we rethink and revise our lives, making conscious decisions 
about who and how we want to be” (p. 10). I understand autoethnographies 
with the use of personal experiences in research, specifically the 
vulnerabilities of both myself and others in narratives, which “reflects on the 
nuances…to show how the aspects of experience illuminate more general 
cultural phenomena and/or to show how the experience works to diminish, 
silence, or deny certain people and stories” (p. 23). Authoethnographies, 
according to Ellis, demonstrates knowledge of previous research to contribute 
to future research, where “secrets are disclosed and histories are made 
known” (p. 23) to bring a multiplicity of voices to engage in collaborative 
experiences with the audience. Some of these experiences, vulnerabilities, 
silences, and voices might be seen by others as “not mine”, requiring 
consideration of privacy principles. 
identities would form possibilities of different “naked” political subjectivities, limited by the 
politics of location I am able to account for in these narratives without identifying others. 
As I understand it, not providing confidentiality in narrative would likewise form different 
subjectivities, normative or otherwise. Although concerns began with Sam fearing erasure 
of her own experiences of the PGT process should her experiences of events not be 
accounted for, the possibility of erasure also resides in not providing privacy, serving as a 
particular challenge to normative practices of thesis production. Narratives pertaining to 
some of the most frightening, challenging, and traumatic experiences of our lives together, 
to say the least, requires attending to the politics of our fears. Sam and I share the 
neoliberal construct of last names, and we attend the same medical doctor within these 
narratives. Sam, Hannah, and I share friends and family who remain integral to us and 
who may read this. Importantly, we continue to co-create politics of location with each 
other. We “hang out” socially, alone and with others. We have professional and personal 
aspirations, informed and potentially complicated by the publication of nomadic narratives. 
We continue to experience feelings of loss, grief, and anger, together. By attending to 
politics of these locations, and the embodied fear of individualised privacy and erasure, we 
continue to create together, entering into new and sustainable ethical modes of relation 
with each other in joyful acts of becoming. 
Returning to the flattery of the plural and a subjectivity of intensifications, the pursuit of 
sustainable interactions presents other challenges with the normative practice of 
authorship as well. The nomadic subject with which I write is not the creation of a singular 
self, nor an accumulation or multiplication of individuals. Simply crediting other co-authors 
to increase multiples of individuals responsible for these writings would present itself as 
another form of managing the territory of striated space created in an academic enterprise. 
If these writings are constructed with a self present with a multiplicity of interconnections 
within a shared world, how does the dispersed self also become accountable in neoliberal 
academic practice? How do I account for these interconnections whilst acknowledging the 
requirements to consider privacy and anonymity?
In response, I turn to Braidotti (2016), who asks us to rethink with “ecologies of belonging”, 
forming a self “the subject never masters nor possesses but merely inhabits and crosses 
nomadically, always in a community, a pack, a group, or a cluster” (p. 387-388). 
Considering Braidotti’s exhortation, this narrative substitutes Sam and Hannah’s real 
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names in this thesis. The identities of other individuals in these narratives are kept 
confidential in line with normative academic practices as well. Untangling the stories of 
other individuals from my own, as I understand autoethnographic methodology and 
nomadic narrative, would not be theoretically possible. Creating narrative windows, the 
voices of “others” in an individual sense do more than just add to mine, for this would be a 
different flattering of “one” to manage territory. Writing nomadically, the voices of others 
enliven my own with processes of defamiliarisation, creating ever more possibilities of 
voices that do not answer to my name. 
This continued stretching of thought comes with a warning; Boundas (2006) cautions 
multiple levels of deterritorialisation are unable to be understood with representational 
thought, as difference becomes “subsumed under similitude, opposition, analogy and 
identity” (p. 8). Whilst representational thought “belongs essentially to consciousness and 
follows the logic of solutions”, Boundas situates the possibilities of using an Idea for what 
is unrepresentable in order to go to the edges of contemporary practices and “the 
conditions that account for things, states of things and their mixtures” (p. 9). Without an 
answer to this problem, but instead with some ideas, I open up yet more smooth space 
with a rhizomatic figuration of the molecular human, non-human, and more than human 
forces no longer restricted within the rigid frames of simple empiricism. Having followed a 
density of entangled lines to this new middle, a question asking how one can become 





In the winter of 2010, after months of sleepless nights and wake-less days, I drive myself 
to Dr Readdy. As I never went to sleep that night, you might say I never really woke up that 
morning; I simply got out of bed. I cannot drive myself to work, cannot open the toothpaste 
tube and brush my teeth. Today, finally, I cannot be by myself. I have yet to give blood for 
the test. I have become overcome with feelings, fear saturating life throughout my day, 
anxiety providing movement through my night. Time is emanating from this pain, ever and 
only forward. Each day is lived dutifully as yet one more set of movements to trudge 
through, a set of hours to count, set of nerves to fray. The feelings are unbearable: this 
living has become unbearable. 
The receptionist fits me in without an appointment. When it is my turn, I collapse in tears in 
front of Dr Readdy. I am not tired; I have become exhausted. Each day feels as if more 
and more of me is reduced, and I become of less and less. Pleading, not entirely sure 
what I am crying about, what I am pleading for, I want him to know my desperation. It is the 
best I can do. I have tried. I can’t take it anymore. 
He doesn't say a word. Just a hand on my shoulder. I need his help, to survive one more 
day. He would be here with me. 
I know risk assessments. I see the questions before I hear them. Am I suicidal? I cannot 
tell. Have I had any thoughts of hurting myself? I hurt so much, I feel nothing else. I feel so 
much all the time, I do not know if it is possible I could actually hurt myself any further. 
Listening to music, tying my shoes, hiking in the mountains, hearing people talk of their 
boredom, driving, shopping for groceries, talking, sleeping…all are difficult, harsh, and only 
bring about pain. I tell him I feel like I am crumbling, within myself. There is nothing to hold 
me intact, together, except the constancy of pain and fear. I am not done with the testing 
process. I am scared that I don’t remember happiness.
I do not hear any further questions, only his listening. Consumed with fear from potentially 
having the gene, I fear a life of not having the gene. I fear the anger I feel towards my 
family, for failing to come along with me through this vast expanse of pain and fear, and I 
am overwhelmed with experiences of travelling with those to have chosen to be here with 
me through these feelings. Yet, these fears are overflowing, requiring more of me. Each 
day all over again, I am desperate to understand my pain, to abide it until tomorrow. 
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Anxiously moving forward, my efforts are too slow to fill up the hours of the day as I run out 
of minutes, before this time is up. My days have become preoccupied with treasonous 
doubt of myself. I am not sure I can continue to do this. Having begun a process that has 
yet to finish, I cannot undo what has become of me. Having put myself here, I am 
crucifying myself whilst trying to find a way through. I cannot control this. 
Somewhere in this space, we talk of antidepressants, and medication to help me sleep. 
We talk of other people with me, places I have been and yet to go, and what might 
become of me. 
‘How has it come to this? What if this doesn’t work?’
‘Let’s just do this one thing, first.’
I am not sure if this is what he said, or what I heard. I am afraid of leaving his office, afraid 
of being seen by others, yet afraid others don’t see me because I cannot let them see the 
pain. I am afraid my life is not working. Comparing my pain to Dad and Grandpa, the pain 
they both must have endured, both ultimately failing before committing suicide. They did 
not endure. I go next door to the pharmacy, with my prescription for anti-depressants and 
anti-anxiety pills. I am failing… 
As I write this…
Beginning this project with a single hour, filled with experiences of suicide, Huntington’s 
Disease and loss, of interminable choices and decisions predicated on unconscionable 
fear and terror, the results of this effort speak to me of the inadequacy of narrative 
language. I cannot express this hour adequately, and therefore have chosen not to share it 
with others until now. Unknown to all but me and Dr Readdy, I wonder of the implications 
of producing a narrative of this event, time, and place. Andrews, Squire and Tamboukou 
(2013) argue a narrative capacity constitutes me as human, my narrative a worthy subject 
of psychological study. Constituting the world through my understanding of their formation 
of normative narrative, marking a single hour, I do not know where to put the woman with 
whom so much of these feelings and experiences were shared. This narrative act presents 
itself as a harbinger of erasure, an act lacking those things of which I cannot speak. A 
normative account reliant on physical embodiment imperils the existence of my father, who 
resides in my life more in his death than in his living, and to me is still of this world. Distinct 
from the sculptural landscape of my garden, I lose the possibilities of co-constituted 
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despair and healing with the land outside of my front door, the mountains in which I spend 
my time. How might I account for the toil of digging, planting, and living with my garden, 
where Bawaka Country including Wright et al. (2015) speak to me of possibilities 
pertaining to where I buried the death of my father - and unearthed ways of enduring as I 
grieved his absence? How can I provide an understanding of myself without the plants, 
animals, and creatures too small for me to name, with whom I share this time? I wish to 
turn away from narrative that tells of absence and lack, of what I may have acquired or 
discarded in the construction of a world. Answering these questions, my responses 
become monstrous, and I am reminded of Derrida (1989):
“Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: ‘Here are our monsters,’ without 
immediately turning the monsters into pets.” (p. 80) 
Burdened by the call to constitute my humanity, I become aware that narrative seeks to set 
out an account, a ledger of sums, demarcating figures and characters and relationships. 
To account for situated knowledge, to become understandable, Tamboukou (2008) tells me 
narrative is “to express specific lines of thought interwoven around moments of being 
temporarily crystallized” (p. 3). What happened? To whom and when? How did it feel and 
what do I make of it? Did it change me? What else may have been? Pondering the value 
of humanity as a subject, as the provider of the object of study, questions of sense making 
in the retelling of this briefest of time feel inadequate. How is one to know the extent of 
how the experiences of a father and grandfather’s suicide impact on oneself, how might 
you qualify this? What, and whose input, are you willing to leave out of what these things 
mean? 
I arrive back at my value as a human, and question if my humanity parallels my 
inadequacy to account for myself. Would I be less embodied through narrative 
shortcomings unable to account for myself; are my human rights reliant on my ability to 
announce them? Countering these concerns with a feminist interrogation of narrative, 
Tamboukou (2008) provides for feelings of narrative inadequacy, creating another account 
of the objects and possibilities left out to represent the missing and the absent. Tamboukou 
contends this account can still be found, albeit only when materialised in a depository 
outside of the control of the individual, which once located, becomes useful in allowing the 
narrative to be taken along new lines of thought. Narrative accounts are fully actualised 
with the inclusion of a depository, altering the initial aim or intention, forming the possibility 
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that a single narrative can provide for a plethora of readings, meaning a multiplicity of 
different things, at differing times, to different people. With the possibilities inhered with 
incomplete or inadequate narratives, Tamboukou claims others might transcend limits of 
representation, and make more of a narrative than I. Here, I recall Latour (2008) with 
feelings of commodification and exploitation within a capitalist culture, and with it a 
“prodigious enthusiasm for seizing unbounded opportunities” (p. 8). Can I be known 
though this, an unbounded opportunity, which Lorraine (2013) suggests is formed in 
“constituting oneself as a lacking subject” (p. 62). Lorraine tells me a narrative of lack 
leaves the subject “restricted to fantasising the objects that once acquired will give her the 
satisfaction she seeks” (p. 63). I find myself disturbed with the embodied production of loss 
and lack, concerned it leaves me feeling eaten up, created for the consumption of others. I 
do not wish to participate in this endless devouring. 
Elsewhere, Hagen (2018), expanding understandings of embodied experiences of 
Huntington’s Disease, consigns the body to a discursive register. Used to show the 
“divergence between the invisible and the visible features of the body” (p. 72), a discursive 
register shows otherwise indistinct areas of an individual used in acts of meaning making. 
Likewise, Forrest Keenan, Miedzybrodzka, Van Teijlingen, McKee, and Simpson (2007) 
use normative narrative storying to account for young people’s experiences of living with 
the presence of Huntington’s Disease within their families. These accounts, formed into 
thematic representations, provide researchers with clinically relevant points of departure to 
improve clinical practice, and the social support thought to be required for individuals who 
live with Huntington’s Disease. These approaches suggest to me narrative accounts are 
understood as articulations of an individual’s problematic circumstances, for which the 
participants lack the capacity or ability to resolve on their own. Reading my opening 
narrative with Dr Readdy, do I constitute the worried well, a prominent subject position 
Forrest Keenan et al. attach to a group of participants. Does my body show the 
“detrimental impact of being at risk” (p. 124) of developing Huntington’s Disease, my body 
itself a discursive register indicating I am at risk of not finishing the PGT process? Or has 
my health been impacted further, where in becoming the worried unwell, my unwell-ness 
becomes a derivative giving value to research seeking better testing protocols? I wonder 
of the valuation of embodiment, of what these feelings of desperation are worth.
 
Returning to a looming possibility of knowing I am at risk of inheriting a fatal degenerative 
neurological disorder, according to Rose (2001), the normative subject of neoliberal 
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governmentalities experiences pain, sorrow, and anxiety, in other words all the 
unpleasantness of desperation, as alterable errors in life. The normative self, open to 
correction in dogged pursuit of cleaner and better living, seeks to be free from risk, peril, 
and disease, whilst an early death becomes synonymous with tragedy for the individual. In 
these narratives, worry of unpleasantness, pain, disease and death become fuel for what 
Braidotti (2012) calls the difference-engine of capitalism, enabling change through the 
capacity to take direct action, improving and maximising health and well-being of the 
individual. I understand worry, in this context, as an enabler, which provokes me to 
reconsider my choice to commence the PGT process, with the worry of how I am living 
possibly relieved by stopping the process, or simply put to rest for another day with 
another bottle of wine. Is worry the manifestation of a concern, that I have become what 
Deleuze (1985) calls a bad player of life? In the hope of achieving a specific desirable 
outcome, have I mistakingly undertaken a wrong combination of throws, my desperation 
caused by the failure of my repeated habits to create a particular present? Have I 
attributed repeated habits and actions with causality?
As a normative subject in these reflections, I am always already lacking and deficient, 
requiring redress through the ever more attentive gaze of others. Braidotti (2010) terms 
this normative subject the knowing subject. Formed with the specific coordinates of 
“rationality, consciousness, moral and cognitive universalism” (p. 409), the knowing subject 
also uses the possibilities of these attributes to transcend the limits of a self. Reflecting on 
the bio-politics of my story, I want to wander back to Deleuze and his good player to re-
articulate narrative of a normative self. Exploring possibilities permitted by 
“experimentation in a world of inexhaustible creative resources” (May, 2005, p. 68), I seek 
understandings of desperation that give shape and form to a self through the embodiment 
of affectivity. Experimenting with Braidotti’s (2012) figuration of the nomadic subject, I 
understand self-reflexive nomadic narrative as written with an assemblage of overflowing 
human, non-human, and more-than-human forces and passions. Never lacking, off the 
ledger, marginalised or undervalued, narrative accounts bring forth affectivity as 
empowering activators to embodied understandings of limits, offering no assurances, 
though, except the hope of sharing the inexhaustible virtual possibilities of the nomadic 
self tolerating, traversing and crossing over the limits of radically immanent flesh.
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Endurance 
Writing with Braidotti’s (2012) vision of a nomadic subject, knowledge of limits empower an 
affirmative generative capacity, so that however living had been done, tomorrow I might 
live, and die, differently. Visiting with Dr Readdy is not a signification or indicator of 
brokenness, of disrepair. My body, instead, has given notice of enough!, acknowledging a 
figuration of my subject is no longer sustainable. Desperation, no longer a problem 
requiring resolution or attention, becomes an embodied force of a limit reached, which, 
although painful, when in contact with other passions and forces gives the nomadic 
subject a form of mobility, and another throw of the dice. With Braidotti’s imagining of the 
nomadic subject residing immanently with creativity, I take a line of flight from this narrative 
of a pain and desperation that must be endured, with the mobilisation of nomadic 
resources. The nomadic subject, a multiplicity of cartographic figurations, is a method of 
creativity forming multiple virtual counter-images contrasted to the hegemony of the 
knowing subject, dependent as it is on a stable identity for subjective embodiment. 
Cartographic figurations of the nomadic subject, based on an ethics of accountability to the 
politics of place and time, bring into being a “representation that which the system had 
declared off-limits” (2010, p. 410). It is the possibilities afforded in transversal crossings of 
limits, of living past what is declared off limits, that tells of what I am capable of becoming. 
I am called to revisit the desperation of that day, of collapsing in Dr Readdy’s office. 
Unable to go any further, I imagine a singularity falling apart, my crumbled form evoking a 
folding inwards and downwards. I experience this positioning of helplessness as a 
problematic representation of diminished voice, body, and soul, where I am lessened in 
value and loosened from my rightful place as healthy and vital. I must overcome 
vulnerabilities and failures; I must transcend these feelings to be healthy. Pakenham, 
Goodwin and MacMillan (2004) describe a normative subject whose capacity to endure the 
PGT process is reliant on the individual’s ability to adjust to concerns arising from the 
genetic testing process. Success in these endeavours, the researchers’ hypothesise, 
results from three identified processes, namely “cognitive appraisal, coping style and 
coping resources” (p. 381). A failure to adjust to my circumstances, desperation becomes 
a possible warning sign that I am not coping with the stress of experiences of the PGT 
process. I am absent resources, or possessing maladaptive coping style(s), both seen as 
potentially harmful and increasing the likelihood that I will withdraw from the testing, hurt 
myself, or take other more extreme action to stop the pain. Dr Readdy’s education has 
privileged him with careful wisdom to prescribe pharmacological substances, coping 
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resources consumed for the foreseeable future and as long as this particular help helps to 
transcend desperation and worry, and prevent harm. I want to resist this unitary 
subjectivity reliant on terms of loss and lack, a neoliberal self who resorts to succeeding by 
consuming.
My feelings of being the object of a risk assessment suggest I am satisfied in the 
knowledge I am able to expose distress, to make myself vulnerable to the view of others. 
There is a ritual in this observing, providing Dr Readdy a power to coordinate experiences 
of the appointment. This ritual exists, according to Foucault (1997), as “the whole range of 
practices that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize” (p. 300) the relationship 
through which Dr Readdy and I engage with each other. He takes my blood pressure and 
checks my pulse. Proffering an arm, chest, and vital signs for his interpretation, I am here, 
in the thumps, whooshes, and patters; he listens. In this arrangement of medical attention, 
Dr Readdy requires something or someone to become the attention of his care. Is it me, 
my pain, or this body? I long to ask, “will this pain kill me”? Desperate, might I have 
become suicidal at the very point where a risk of suicide is likely to increase? How does 
this desperation correspond with the arrival of an image of thought, of what Robins Wahlin 
(2007) describes as “comprehensive view of the consequences” of a decision to get 
tested, where the normative subject’s desperation results from a lack of the “ability to 
perform as required in the situation” (p. 284)? To arrive here, I become statistical data 
points, measuring the risks and associated effectiveness of the protocol for undertaking 
the PGT process. Have I failed at something, or have I yet to succeed? I resist believing 
anything could be expected out of me, that there is a way I ought to have managed these 
circumstances better, and refuse to confuse enduring with surviving and death. Blood 
continues to pulse, and although my body is racked with pain, I still hope to throw the dice.
Immanent Variation
I begin to drift to other visits with Dr Readdy, remembering how his medicine has cared for 
me otherwise. I am thinking of variations of care and desperation in these memories. 
Outside his office and on the concrete, I see him a few years later in the sunshine. I 
become startled; we had never met in public, so far from his office. I am desperate, 
though, again struggling to endure, with problems of a different kind. 
Sam became pregnant in early 2012, just over a year after we had completed the PGT 
process together. But our baby had not grown as expected, with scans showing pictures of 
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developmental abnormalities. We were told our baby would almost certainly fail to survive 
to full term, the abnormalities resulting in a possibility of a miscarriage at any time, putting 
Sam’s life at risk as well. Should Sam carry the pregnancy to full term, the abnormalities 
would almost certainly result in a stillbirth, or, at best, our baby dying shortly after birth, 
unable to endure and survive alone, unsupported by Sam’s body. Specialist genetic tests 
identified the cause of the abnormalities. They tell me I have three abnormal 
chromosomes. Two specific chromosomes have “swapped” unequal sections of DNA, and 
in this translocation have also reversed order, leading to one chromosome containing "too 
many” genes whilst the other contains “too few”. Configured together, both chromosomes 
“match” and provide a full human genome perfectly capable of sustaining me. We are told 
that with any pregnancy where I am the father, the fertilised egg has a 50% chance of 
inheriting only one mutated chromosome, almost certainly resulting in similarly 
unpredictable congenital abnormalities, and an unviable pregnancy. By the same measure, 
a fertilised egg may inherit both mutated chromosomes from me, or both corresponding 
healthy chromosomes from the mother, resulting in a 50% chance the full human genome 
would be present with the embryo. We are told our baby inherited only one mutated 
chromosome from me, that we were “lucky” the foetus had survived this long. I am told of a 
third abnormal chromosome, mutated differently, where, inexplicably, the order of specific 
genes is similarly sequenced "back to front”. Although unrelated to the problems of the 
pregnancy, this third gene complicates any simple understanding of my genetics. How 
does one endure being told by specialists (again) of being a “one in several million” 
statistical anomaly, this time understood with a subjectivity of lacking, putting loved ones at 
risk?
We, as a couple in a marriage, did not endure. Dr Readdy knew of this, he has been with 
us throughout, and is there with me now. I tell Dr Readdy I am on leave from work, and I 
am perplexed. I am stuck. My holiday plans are foiled as my motorcycle will not run, and I 
do not own a car to take me to the places I want to visit. I need to syphon oil from the 
reservoir on the bike, and I am at a loss as to how. He says to follow. Together, we go back 
to his clinic and into his office. He rummages around with medical supplies, and hands me 
a narrow gauge tube and small plastic syringe. Beaming a smile, he describes the 
workings of a new syphon, an enema kit, to evacuate the oil from the reservoir. 
Coming back to vulnerability and perplexity, I reflect on the variations of problems, issues, 
and needs that overflow the years Dr Readdy has been my doctor. So many visits with him 
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have been in response to managing what Arrigo (2013) calls “the risk of being in-and-of 
society differently” (p. 676). Huntington’s Disease, parenthood and pregnancy, suicide, 
genetic mutation, desperation and depression all carry a defining trait that something 
undesired is in waiting, looming, hanging on, lingering. I have had tests, assessments and 
diagnoses, mechanisms of care that assist in connecting me to the appropriate treatment. 
Representations of Dr Readdy in this account thus far, are mere moments of frozen time, 
where his medicine and treatments are attempts to actualise and embody him in narrative. 
I position him as a subject in a particular point of time here, and here, and here…a series 
of points leading up to a linear understanding of the doctor he has become for me now. 
 
(Re)alliance
I am reminded here of Deleuze’s (1994) molar lines. The doctor/patient relationship, 
bedside manner, medical expertise, holistic care, all become essentialising principles in 
tracing an outline of the molar subject of doctor and the territorialisation of what he is able 
to treat, cure, and provide remedy towards. The creation of a molar aggregate dispenses 
rights and responsibilities that require abidance in order to maintain what Deleuze refers to 
as a “balance in intersubjective relations” (p. 12) between Dr Readdy and myself. Not only 
does this molar identification of Dr Readdy provide an integration of these rights and 
responsibilities we must adhere to, I am embodied as a self-contained and integrated 
whole, gazed upon and represented through constituent parts. The molar forms of doctor 
and patient, the territorialisation of care and treatment, tell us who we are and limit what 
may become of us.
Within the opening narrative of desperation, my self-contained body is positioned as 
possessing too much (anxiety and worry), too little (happiness) about having the wrong 
stuff (genes). As the normative subject of genetic discourse, I lack ability and resources to 
cope, and the capacity to adjust, seeking it elsewhere outside of myself. I am unable to 
realise goals, aspirations and objectives on my own, of my own accord, and though my 
own means. My body, mind, thoughts and feelings feel degraded throughout the day; there 
is less of me but ever more anxiety and desperation. I cannot be still or rest. I have not 
slept for days; months have passed since I last slept through the night. Anxiety keeps me 
awake in bed, accompanying me as I pace the house at night, only to greet me once more 
in the morning. The molar Dr Readdy, with his confined rituals and responsibilities, gazes 
upon me to fulfil a lack, providing what is unavailable within my immediate environment to 
reduce excesses of anxiety. For as much as I fear what has become of my(self), and that I 
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am following my father and grandfather, I fear I have yet more to endure and he must bring 
relief within reach.
I wish to concern myself with what has been declared off limits to the subject position of 
expert, the intersubjective relations that privilege Dr Readdy as an expert, the knower of 
the interconnected whole and constituent parts of the body. How might I undertake an 
alternative reading of the visit, without declarations of what must be and the delimiting of 
what can only be? Whilst it is possible to interpret Dr Readdy as providing the medicine 
and compassion instrumental to enduring and surviving through current and past 
desperation, I return to Braidotti’s nomadic ethics, to a different reading of endurance that 
permits me to become-otherwise and endure if only for one more day.
Following Deleuze, Braidotti (2006c) is not satisfied with defining a concept, and instead 
provides explanations of endurance created through an elaboration of a nomadic ethics. 
Existing spatially with an embodied “actualisation of passions or forces” (p. 134), 
endurance also has a temporal dimension as this actualisation self-perpetuates and lasts 
in time. An actualisation of forces that last in time is sustained through specific 
cartographic figurations of the nomadic self, with specific patterns of these actualised 
forces making the subject known. With a capacity to produce extremes of affectivity, the 
sustainable self also tolerates affective intensities of extreme pain, or what Bird (1999), 
quoting from Shakespeare, signifies as the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” (p. 
1289) of Huntington’s Disease. Desperation, no longer known as a condition or state of 
affective error and dysfunction requiring a lacking subject to remedy from outside of the 
self, is welcomed as an activator. A nomadic subject who cracks at the intensive limits of a 
specific figuration brings forth new possibilities of enduring through other actualised 
figurations able to tolerate these extremes of affectivity. Writing nomadically, I am no 
longer a unitary, individualised self, needing to endure the crumbling, transcending this 
experience as an act or event happening to me with the help of others. Crumbling is no 
longer violent carnage wrecked upon my self, psyche, state of mind or mental health. With 
Braidotti’s concept of endurance, desperation is no longer desiring from outside of my self, 
to acquire what I am lacking from Dr Readdy’s knowledge, services, and treatments. 
Desperate through tears, strained voice, and physical pain, having reached too much and 
gone too far, my nomadic subject becomes otherwise with new patterns and multiplicities 
of an actualised self. Sustained through the inherent positivity of affectivity in processes of 
becoming, the nomadic subject mobilises resources such as one’s unrestrained 
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imagination, transforming negative into positive affectivity, affirming alternative possibilities 
of a self able to tolerate and endure cracking at limits of the present self. 
Considering Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of desiring machine, desperation is 
longer confined as an imposition or deviation, a problem I must outlast, transcend or 
endure. Desperation becomes transformative, empowering me to last in an active process 
of the dispersal of a self. I am gathered together again through ethical forms of relations 
created with other human, non-human, and more-than human entities, connections with 
other forces and passions not actualised in the present. My present nomadic self, a 
desiring machine reaching the limit of endurance of a specific actualised self, creates new 
connections with Dr Readdy. If desperation becomes a mechanism, an actualisation of a 
nomadic subject as desiring machine, what becomes of a relationship with Dr Readdy, 
what connections, what forces and passions become of our intermingling? What becomes 
of the molar Dr Readdy as I unfreeze what was never frozen, but alive and affirmative?
Overflowing Captivity
After visiting Dr Readdy, I began taking anti-depressants, as well as anti-anxiety 
medication to help me sleep. I struggle to reject the identity of a lacking body whose 
capacity and capability to endure is diminished, needing reprieve in order to survive the 
PGT process. I am reminded of research seeking to understand the links between 
suicidality, genetic risk and the onset of Huntington’s Disease, focussing on reducing the 
risk of suicide during critical periods where the normative subject is thought to be at 
heightened risk (Paulsen, Ferneyhough Hoth, Nehl, Stierman, & The Huntington’s Study 
Group, 2005). I have become familiar with the normative subject of the research, where 
the threat of harm is managed by reducing extremes of affectivity. These figurations of the 
normative subject support Rose’s (2017) theory of post-neoliberal governmentality, which 
advances the notion that Western thought is in the process of mutating from the neoliberal 
ideal of an individualistic freedom from impediments, with an emphasis in self-actualisation 
and self-realisation through unfettered rights and empowerment, to governmentalities of 
conduct. Rose argues post-neoliberal governmentalities govern by espousing a restrictive, 
limiting form of liberty, which controls, regulates, and represses dangerous passions such 
as desperation through the “rational control of those mysterious depths and of the 
dangerous passions found there” (p. 319). These new governmentalities, according to 
Rose, produce “a controlled world where our vulnerabilities are understood and 
managed” (p. 319), where dangerous passions are a risk to the safety of the populace, 
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and managed as unplanned and troubling barriers limiting fulfilment of the normative 
subject. As I contest the consumption of pharmaceutical technologies which exchange 
freedom for security, relieving fear and terror by curbing affectivity, Rose warns 
governmentalities tend to exceed their confines, contending that those in opposition to the 
exchange may come to embody the “mutations” of the governmentalities they oppose as 
well. Possibilities of agency in decision-making appear to be closed down in post-
neoliberal theories of governmentalities, and I feel an embodied sense of loss. How else 
might I resist?
Here, in this place of decisions and explanations, reasons and rationales, I become aware 
of an attempt to narrate a story of Dr Readdy with the structures of the world. This 
narrative perceives outside of myself if only to advise what could and should be studied 
from an external position, to tell how I am to be known. Through this normative narrative, I 
wish to close some possibilities of knowing and open only those of value, denying and 
rejecting some whilst pursuing and acquiring others. Foucault (1982) characterises 
Western thought as valuing precision and explicit explanations of structures that incite, 
induce, and seduce possible actions. Normative narrative discourse relies, according to 
Tucker (2012), on the identification of formed and conceived components that are used to 
represent the world, unchangeable and inherent with a “stable essence” (p. 772). To 
understand a decision to take medication, knowledge that I have taken antidepressants 
previously, and may perceive them favourably as a way to improve my health and 
wellbeing, is implicated in the outcome of the decision. An awareness of the impact of the 
pharmaceutical industry on educational and social experiences, due to the close proximity 
of a major international drug company near my home town, elicit an appreciation of the 
extent that pharmacological practices have impacted on how I identify and resolve health 
issues. Familiarity with the particular drug’s effects, the embodiment of religious practices, 
and a cognitive capacity to understand complex medical knowledge and efficacy research 
comes to the fore in relation to understanding decision-making and agentic practices, with 
explanations of choice becoming narratives of structural identification. As a 
conceptualisation of a representational model of language, normative narratives are self-
restricted to representing only the stable concepts able to be constructed through 
structural knowledge production practices. The characteristics of the concepts produced, 
May (2005) argues, need not be stable, as stability is only inhered in the objects that come 
to identify them. I understand this to mean I am restricted to being represented in 
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normative narrative to a subjectivity formed with the concepts (re)produced with structural 
knowledge practices of normative logic and reason. 
Deleuze (1994) offers an alternative to normative representational thought, where choice 
is no longer defined as a problem with solutions restricted to particular structural 
knowledge practices. Tucker (2012), adopting Deleuze’s concept of problem-question, 
proposes a psychology which would problematise choice as a process of individuation. 
Articulated as “a recalibration of analysis” (p. 772), Tucker advocates for retooling 
psychological enquiry to explore the novelty, variation and inventiveness of thought, 
offering an “ontogenetic position of multiplicity and relationality” (p. 781) that is not 
restricted to the human realm. A psychology of individuation focusses on a processual 
analysis of choice and decision-making, in which psychology becomes a strategy and a 
tool, not simply a better conceptual psychological model. Psychological practice, therefore, 
becomes the intentional implementation of interventions enabling new modes of thought 
no longer confined to the domains of subject positions and objects of thought, where moral 
rights and responsibilities are assigned. Rethinking agency and decision-making as the 
relational encounter of a multitude of factors reinterprets the future as “open 
potentialities” (p. 782), where what will happen cannot be known with any certainty - nor 
can the future be predicted. In relation to a narrative of choosing medication, this entails a 
shift, to become aware of the webs of relationships and forces constitutive of my nomadic 
subject. Involving human, non-human, and more than human forces and flows, writing with 
Braidotti’s (2006) nomadic subject becomes a potentiality, composed of “a web of multiple 
relationships that encompass all levels of one’s multi-layered subjectivity…the expression 
of one’s continuing attachment to certain dynamic spatio-temporal co-ordinates” (p. 136).
Virtual Dispersal
Whilst the uncertainty of the nomadic subject, figured as a multiplicity of difference 
providing for the expression of the self through different co-ordinates, gives way to an 
unpredictability of future possibilities of thought and action, I wonder how these webs of 
relationships might be understood in the construction of possible futures. Returning to the 
figuration of the nomadic subject, I am curious as to how tracing relationships and 
interdependencies of forces can be put into action to form a problem-question pertaining to 
processual understandings of medication. Braidotti’s (2012) nomadic ethics provide a 
political figuration of the “transversal connections among material and symbolic, concrete 
and discursive, lines and forces”, actualising a post-human ethics “which values non-
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human or a-personal Life” (p. 171). Braidotti names this political figuration Zoe, which 
becomes a creative force of the nomadic subject from which possible futures are 
constructed. I understand Zoe as actualised dangerous passions. More than a 
vulnerability, risk, barrier, or limit, Zoe is a dangerous force of virtual possibilities, unfolding 
in unknown futures yet to come, which are sustained through the actualisation of 
affirmative values, forces, and flows. Zoe is non-representational and non-structural, whilst 
writing with Zoe recognises the affirmative generative capacity of the nomadic subject, 
where desperation and other dangerous passions come into contact with my relationship 
and history with Dr Readdy, providing for another throw of the dice. Thinking with Zoe, I 
am able to interact with and interpret, not just label or identify, the creative force with which 
I write regarding a processual understanding of decision-making. 
Zoe becomes known in narrative writing through the rhizome of forces and passions 
distributed through feelings of desperation, of the temporal nature of a longstanding 
relationship and a multitude of different experiences with Dr Readdy and his practice, of 
past experiences of taking antidepressant medication in other circumstances, and the 
embodied feelings of a totalising despair at being unable to solely care for myself. Zoe, 
always overflowing as a creative force, gives shape to a different, non-representational 
understanding of an event of individuation, where taking medication becomes a matter of 
how, rather than a question of why. With the desire of difference, to go on if only for one 
more day, Zoe informs an understanding of taking medication as a process empty of an 
individual “I” which makes decisions understood through the identification of stable forms 
of the self, choices, and outcomes. Zoe, I am reminded by Braidotti (2008), is a “vitalist 
notion of Life”, a creative force which “stresses that the Life I inhabit is not mine, it does 
not bear my name” (p. 22). Taking medication does not require a moral intention of an 
individual to defend a choice. 
Returning to Dr Readdy, memories exhaust the words afforded here and the duration of 
time I am able to spend with them. This reflective narrative storytelling is formed of an 
always overflowing capacity which exceeds my memories. A production, a dispersal, a 
gathering of connections with other forces and passions not actualised in the present, my 
nomadic self reaches a limit of endurance with Dr Readdy. Yet, meeting together as 
desiring machines creating connections, problematising desperation with questions of 
how, yields new modes of understanding through constantly and already changing webs of 
relationships. My nomadic subject as desiring machine becomes one of intermingling 
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connections, forces and passions, sustained through an ethics of endurance. With Zoe, I 
experience Dr Readdy with care and warmth, and with new coordinates my nomadic self is 
actualised with new affective potentialities, becoming otherwise to what I once was, if only 




I seek to make known a place, the Waitakere Ranges of West Auckland, where my 
nomadic subject wanders with human, non-human, and more-than-human forces. The 
Waitakere Ranges, a place of overflowing passions and flows, is where I gather new 
connections with other forces and passions not actualised in the present. This is a place of 
ancient volcanism in open ocean, of ever-changing coastlines and beaches where the sun 
bakes, rains flood, and winds sculpt. Here, the sun sets over deep blue seas at close of 
the world’s first day. Residing in this precarious land is pupurangi, a giant land snail and 
voracious predator, which lives for decades, and kauri, the venerated son of the gods and 
a towering tree which lives for thousands of years. Gentle hills, carpeted a verdant green, 
roll inwards from ocean tides and beckon into steep, formidable mountains of lush 
temperate rain forests. Sweeping sand dunes interrupt the ocean’s erosion of steep 
headlands hundreds of meters high, both of which in turn are carved out by rivers feeding 
reservoirs, providing habitat to animals and people with water. Caves along the beach 
provided shelter to tangata whenua on the path to war, and places to rest whilst collecting 
shellfish, prior to the arrival of Pākehā. The same caves, later throughout the 20th century, 
became dancehalls used by tangata whai in expressions of joy and merriment. These 
caves are now for visitors and locals alike, providing a place to visit glowworms whilst 
escaping the harshness of sun and wind.
Compiling a list of hills, rivers, beaches, and villages would not account for unseen 
taniwha, the water spirits roaming the treacherous riptides of beautiful desolate beaches, 
nor the forgotten shipwrecks strewn about by the turbulent waters along the coast. 
Mentioning kahakaha, the so-called “widow maker” known to fall and cause great harm to 
unsuspecting forest visitors, does not tell of cloistered spaces tens of meters high up in 
damp forest where this endemic epiphytic plant grows, providing for untold birds and 
insects. The scarcity of people in the small settlements of the Waitakere Ranges does not 
tell of the encroaching urban sprawl many fear, approaching their proverbial backdoor. A 
narrative account does not provide for ecological catastrophe and change, of a 
microscopic invader spread through flowing water and human movement amongst the 
forest, devastating ecosystems with the death of untold numbers of infected giant kauri. 
There is uncomfortableness and feelings of inadequacy with this approach, an immediate 
tension from always already missed opportunities to know otherwise.
Instead of aligning narrative with what Flieger (2000) calls “the central face of the 
majoritarian” (p. 46), a representative account of object identification and location, I write 
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where unknowableness gives way to possibilities of molecular forces and intensities of 
location becoming manifest and material. Describing (the Waitakere Ranges) as a thing 
yet not alive, where people and legends have a past, present and future, a majoritarian 
understanding of the Waitakere Ranges as a singular entity would close multitudinous 
possibilities of knowing, leaving nothing to fold, unfold and blossom. Instead, this narrative 
forms multiplicities of virtual possibilities of ethical encounters empowering me to act, 
brought forth by what Braidotti (2013a) calls “higher and larger forms of interrelation with 
multiple others” (p. 354). With this narrative writing, the identity of the more-than-human 
subject of the Waitakere Ranges remains unknown and never fully resolved, providing 
multitudes of possibilities of a nomadic self enduring the PGT process without embracing 
the neoliberal “commodification of the existence, culture, and genetic codes of multiple 
‘others’" (2012, p. 169). Writing nomadic narrative, fruitfulness is measured with the 
continued unfolding of difference, yielding yet more possibilities in the not-yet written. 
 
In writing ethical encounters with the Waitakere Ranges, I am reminded by Braidotti of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) plane of immanence. This non-concept, never derived from 
the identification nor differentiation of disparate parts of the world, provides a way to “find 
one’s bearings” (p. 37) within of an image of thought. Concepts and theories are not 
discovered, defined, or described, nor is a plane of immanence an ontological account of 
knowledge contained within the plane. As with Derrida’s (1989) monsters, these shall not 
be announced. Instead, a plane provides opportunities of ontological creation, to refract, 
reflect, and motivate linkages of concepts “from the thinkability of the future” (Braidotti, 
2006b, p. 207), resonating within themselves and with each other, creating ever more 
multiplicities of possibilities. 
Writing narrative of ontological creation, forming ever more possibilities of knowing, 
eschews privileging structural knowledge production practices where the Waitakere 
Ranges become known with knowledge derived through stable unitary representations. 
Instead, May (2005) suggests forming multiplicities of knowing, gaining from the 
overflowing and indeterminate nature of language itself, is akin to the medical practice of 
palpation. Using the senses of feeling and touch establishes knowledge of difference to 
discern unobservable parts of the body. In place of a knowability created from the 
identification of coextensive objects (the flora, the fauna, me) and normative subjects of 
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interest (geological science, myth, archeology), the Waitakere Ranges will be known 
through a soil of “our libérations” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 24) from sameness. Nomadic 
narrative provides knowledge through experiences of difference, created in this writing with 
material processes in the unfolding of multiplicities of becoming, where difference is also 
experienced and felt. As a liberating vitality and substance from which possibilities of life 
are lived, thinking of difference in this way sets forth the possibilities of liberations from 
conformism, and as Braidotti (2013a) reminds us, difference becomes a generative 
creative force constructing possible futures with the virtual possibilities of knowing the 
Waitakere Ranges otherwise. The material being of difference in this work will not provide 
or represent knowledge itself. Instead, narrative becomes soil from which difference and 
resonation of concepts and becomings provide further elaboration of thought always 
immediately outside of our grasp, and never fully known. 
Within a soil of difference and resonation, my nomadic subject takes form as a 
cartographic figuration. Following Braidotti’s (2017) imagining of posthuman thought, this 
figure is a “navigational tool” across the space and time of narrative writings, a subjectivity 
tracing “the actualization of intensive or virtual relations” (p. 84) with an assemblage of 
transverse rhizomatic nodes providing cartographic co-ordinates. These nodes, formed of 
concepts of difference, articulate and navigate dynamic political spaces where the 
Waitakere Ranges becomes known, overflowing and resonating with the possibilities of 
further narratives not yet written. Confronted with inter-generational suicide and the 
possibility of inheriting a terminal neurological disorder, writing with a nomadic subject 
provides cartographic figurations to navigate understandings of the Waitakere Ranges 
through my journey of undergoing PGT for Huntington’s Disease. With Braidotti’s figure of 
the nomadic subject, Life as Zoe extends past that of the individual and is determined in 
part by chance and a simple throw of the dice, transforming my outrageous fortune to 
“open up spaces of movement and of deterritorialization that actualize virtual possibilities 
which had been frozen in the image of the past” (Braidotti, 2008, p. 47). Tracing a neo-
materialist assemblage of connections, passions, forces and flows, writing with a nomadic 
subject takes form as a multiplicity of sustainable figurations able to endure constant, non-
destructive fluxes and transformations of change with the PGT process. Configured with 
the dispersal of “a unitary and rationality-driven consciousness” (Braidotti, 2013a, p. 343), 
writing narrative with a nomadic subject provides a sense of becoming-monster in 
response to asking questions of how one might know the Waitakere Ranges, how one 




I profess, this assemblage feels as if I am veering dangerously close to another 
representational space. Yet, Braidotti (2013a) suggests that in seeking to foster an 
approach where a multitude of solutions may take place within multiple and variable 
understandings, a nomadic subject neither signifies exhaustively what constitutes this 
place nor intends to coalesce a particular perspective of how (the Waitakere Ranges) must 
be known. Instead, I posit that to think nomadically helps to find one’s bearing within the 
multiplicity of possibilities created in its own formation, bringing into being what Blaser 
(2013) proposes is “a certain political sensibility” (p. 55). In other words, Braidotti (2013a) 
tells us this assemblage will provide a road map within its own reality-making, exploring 
the political spaces opened up in how one might know the Waitakere Ranges in 
undertaking the PGT process. By focussing on “transcending the present state of 
affairs” (p. 347) with affirmative “transformative experimentation” (p. 356), Braidotti’s figure 
of the nomadic subject is not an attempt at a moral judgement of whether one should 
undergo the PGT process, nor does a nomadic subject provide knowledge of how one 
might decide to do so. Engaging with nomadic ethics, as I understand it, does not provide 
an answer to how one might otherwise “succeed” in PGT process where others have 
“failed". 
There is much to be said in Foucault’s location of optimism in becoming aware of limits, 
and the limiting ways in which we live our lives, which are given rise from the political 
sensibility of our relationships with the world (Foucault & Kritzman, 1988). Foucault is 
careful not to advise or lecture on which politics one should espouse or how one might live 
life. Instead, he professes joy in an awareness of understanding how one might live in 
order to keep alive how one might live differently. Rather than the limits of how one might 
live being understood as natural and inherent to the human condition, and therefore 
requiring an individual self to remove or transcend in order to achieve freedom and 
liberation, Foucault claims optimism is situated:
“…in saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, more 
arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical 
circumstances” (p.156). 
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Returning to Blaser (2013), I understand the concept of political sensibility to mean “a 
political ontology, a problem space, and a modality of analysis or critique” (p.55). I seek to 
illuminate a problem space involving my inability to adequately answer a question using 
the normative practice of writing narrative of an individual unitary self, a question of how I 
lived with the presence of Huntington’s Disease to provide an account of undertaking PGT, 
whilst encountering secrecy, disease, and suicide within my family. To do so, this writing 
will create a political ontology of how the Waitakere Ranges might be known through 
resonating the soil of difference. With confidence of faith in Deleuze (1994), although we 
do not even know of what a body is capable, we can create and we can be optimistic with 
the presence of possibilities of what we might become. Furthermore, thinking with 
cartographic figurations of a nomadic subject can also provide a critique of how we 
constrain the possible. To think of difference differently, May (2005) extols, we may ask 
how one might live otherwise, and how we might also live differently. Although I do not 
even know of what I am capable, I can ask how one might live in undertaking PGT, 
creating further possibilities to how one might live differently to do so.
 
 
Huntington’s Disease has manifested amongst my family, across many generations and 
through many lines of descent. My father inherited the disease from his father, my 
grandfather inheriting it from his mother, who in turn inherited the disease from her mother. 
My grandfather committed suicide when I was two years old, my father approaching 40 
years old at the time. My father committed suicide many years later when he was in his 
early 50’s, a few weeks after I turned 17 years old in 1995. Both men, diagnosed with 
Huntington’s Disease, developed neurological, cognitive, and psychiatric manifestations 
associated with the disorder prior to the emergence of a predictive genetic test. Neither 
were old men at the time of their respective deaths, years apart but the same result of a 
gunshot wound to the head. This disease, their illness, their subsequent deaths through 
suicide are not discussed within my family, and whilst taboo, have become well known to 
me through absence. 
With an abundance of inspiration whilst living a few short kilometres from the Waitakere 
Ranges in Auckland, I started the PGT process for Huntington’s Disease, undertaking what 
I thought of as the endeavour of my 31-year-old life. Far from desiring knowledge of 
difference to construct an identity from which I would know "how to live", I am reminded of 
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Patton’s (2000) description of Deleuze’s concept of difference as a process which requires 
“the elaboration of an ontology in which disparity or difference is the fundamental principle 
and the identity of objects is understood as something produced from the differences of 
which they are composed” (p. 28). Although I did not know how my grandfather and father 
lived, I sought to live differently, if only to die differently. 
Configuring a process of difference, I am drawn to Braidotti’s (2000) positioning of 
embodiment as “a piece of meat activated by electric waves of desire, a text written by the 
unfolding of genetic encoding” (p. 159). Surviving the death of my father whilst a teenager, 
and of years surviving repeated struggles of becoming unraveled and lost in the aftermath 
of his death and absence, I established a narrative of being a survivor of the multiple grief 
experiences of Bartik et al.’s (2013) normative subject. My desire to devise and pursue a 
way of escaping from my father and grandfather’s escaping which had come before me, 
these escapes of mine proceeding ever onwards through life instead of death, I become 
embodied through survivor-hood and grief, and the preponderance of the term “survivor” 
swarming around me. As I enter into the Waitakere Ranges for the first time, with a genetic 
unfolding as of yet incomplete, this unitary subject is shrouded in solitude, positioned as 
lacking, yet I am motivated if not implored to undergo and endure a future PGT process by 
waves of desire, mourning a past and a future no longer possible but both requiring a 
reading of genetic coding to satisfy. It is with the Waitakere Ranges where I recall Bischoff 
(2009), remembering the lines of flight triggered by “the anomalous” survivor becoming 
otherwise, where “the other and the self become real simultaneously” (p. 123) in 
processes of becoming-monster. 
Scuffman and MacMillan (2014), outlining characteristics of a normative subject who seeks 
to complete the PGT process, identify the future an always already-formed problem. The 
normative individual is motivated by a desire to survive a history by planning for a future 
which organises the present. This image of the subject, activated by what is lacking as a 
reason why to undergo the PGT process, brings forth memories of my repeated visits to 
the Waitakere Ranges. Repetitive trips over the same mountains and hills ensue over 
several years after arriving in New Zealand. These visits, eventually reoccurring as weekly 
visits, become familiar and routine in order to claim and preserve the past, whilst fighting 
the multitude of feelings, experiences, thoughts, and calamities that may unfold in the 
future to maintain a present. Suspended between the last visit to the mountains and the 
prospects of a visit that will not come soon enough, I am again reminded of managing the 
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linearity of time, of stepping ever onwards through hours, weeks, and days…again and 
again and again, reminding me of Derrida (2003), who speaks of surviving as “the other 
name of a mourning whose possibility is never to be awaited” (p.1). Entering the Waitakere 
Ranges with feelings of fear, I am mourning the past, clinging to the present in hope of 
surviving to a future that may not come to pass.
In this narrative, I am thinking of the anxious joy in saying “I have been to the Waitakere 
Ranges hundreds of times”, announcing that few places would be unfamiliar let alone 
unknown to me, in order to encompass all that I have found, gleaned, and come to 
experience of this place. This survivor of surviving, taking on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) form, adheres to a fixed majoritarian identity of domination and exploitation of all 
available resources in order to survive. How easily this flows into a statement of duration, a 
referencing of the time spent over many years, the months of time with my toes in mud, 
boots on rocks, and feet submerged in water. Time, accumulating with each visit, contains 
the vast expansive awareness of what I know of the Waitakere Ranges and how this 
knowing helped me in my journeys. The map that serves as my guide through the 
Waitakere Ranges, accompanying me on every visit from a singular first day, testifies with 
the cuts and rips marking secret locations and track closures, of all that has been around 
me and what I have been through to tell of these hundreds of times. This representation of 
(re)visiting the Waitakere Ranges privileges my presence over my absence in the park, my 
identity secure as a journeyman of the tracks. 
Although I remember navigating these mountains with what Patton (2000) identifies as a 
“preference for the calm, ordered life of the soul governed by reason”, this calmness is 
elusive, and instead I (re)imagine memories to privilege “the disorderly and passionate life 
of the soul moved by poetry” (p. 28). Engaging Braidotti’s nomadic ethics (2012), I leave 
the secure, majoritarian identity of a normative subject, the journeyman, towards becoming 
an autopoietic, embodied nomadic subject. In the politics of life, Deleuze (1962) tells us of 
Nietzsche’s good player who prefers to roll the dice and “to dance on the feet of 
chance” (p. 26), whereas the bad player hopes to achieve a specific desirable outcome 
with repeated habits and actions, confusing chance and randomness with causality. The 
nomadic subject, a good player, embraces and lives immanently with chance, neither 
believing in the benefits of causality and probability, nor of a necessity to produce specific 
combinations of assemblages in order to achieve a desirable end. The cartographic figure 
of the nomadic subject tells ways of finding one’s bearings and avows the primacy of 
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chance in navigating a political ontology of change, rolling the dice whilst risking it all in the 
desire for becoming. 
Breathing easier, my repeated visits no longer needed to represent the normative vision of 
the Waitakere Ranges, I recall Painter (2008) describing a normative vision of geographic 
locations with the concept of a world-as-exhibition. To make knowledge knowable to 
others, I understand this figure of thought requires one to “encompass more and more of 
the unknown or, failing that, of bringing elements of the unknown inside the fortress to be 
dissected and exhibited” (p. 346). With this calm breathing, I warm my hands in my 
pockets and remember my cold feet, standing in the lounge of my old house on a winter 
morning in August. Overlooking the Waitakere Ranges and the Manukau Harbour, I am 
dressed, yet unprepared for the long car ride out to the hills. Recalling a multiplicity of 
negotiations, I am regarding the weather with a suspicious eye as the sun rises over the 
back of the house, the near freezing temperature leaving the trees etched with frost. I 
gauge my capacity to endure isolation in the cold, dark, wet forests. This figuration of 
clothing and a little hot coffee will suffice to remember the fear of venturing forth into the 
mountains once more. As I enter the mountains alone, the limits imposed by my clothing, 
boots and jacket have been tested; I know of what I am capable, of what I must endure, 
and what exceeds me, as I prepare for limits of other figurations, never seen but none-the-
less requiring negotiation.
Braidotti’s (2006c) nomadic ethics incorporates subjects structured through latitudinal 
(affects) and longitudinal (intensity/potency) forces. Coalescing into a subjectivity 
traversing these latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates, the nomadic subject is limited in 
form only by the affects sustained, and in duration by how much affect is able to be 
endured. Intervening periods of days, sometimes only hours, demarcate my visits to the 
mountains. Every visit to the mountains is followed by periods of absence, becoming 
durations of differences in intensity. Colebrook’s (2002) description of these intervals as a 
“divergent pulsation” (p. 43) speaks to my memories of the jagged running of time. No 
longer a container to be managed, time is disrupted, flowing in eddies, not lines, and 
unevenly tumultuous. The majoritarian figure of a lone individual, a conqueror with his 
hands in his pockets overlooking the requirements of the day, is disrupted by memories of 
intensities; fatigue, corruption, and strain mark out this territory as frequencies and speeds. 
No longer needing to recall the calm governed by reason, the intensification of time 
smooths out space. A life overtaken by memories both old and not yet formed, of 
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conversations with myself of how life is being lived and how might life be lived differently, 
experiences of Huntington’s Disease and death begin to deterritorialize the individual 
neoliberal management strategies of my self, my body’s capabilities, and my life. Daily life 
becomes an affective choreography of bringing people into the unfolding to help navigate 
the upwelling of pain and doubt, and I begin to wonder of an unknown future to which I 
stake claim. I share with others the suicide of those who have come before me, and the 
possibilities of death that loom large in front of me…over and over and over again. 
Experienced through occasional lapses of letting my guard down or when I fail to maintain 
them, I begin to recognise some habits as excessive responsibilities to the management of 
life. Failing to uphold and maintain my self in the politics of daily life brings feelings of 
unfaithfulness, pain, confusion and loss. The present unfolds through what Braidotti (2012) 
refers to as “a process of orchestrated demolition of the self—a long deep crack” (p. 346), 
and I begin to disperse. 
 
 
My nomadic subject re-articulates the lone individual’s negotiations on that cold winter 
morning as “cognitive and sensorial mappings” (Braidotti, 2006c, p. 137) of what he is 
capable of sustaining and how long he is able to endure. I reimagine a long deep cracking, 
a corruption of the self extending along coordinates of self-management and discipline. 
Not knowing where this process is headed, I become aware of what got me to this place in 
life, to this place in the world, and to this place in time. These things will not continue to 
sustain me through to the end, and questioning how I endure, I head to the hills to hide, to 
repair, to explore what may come. And I do it, alone. 
 
These memories remind me of primary school, all of seven years old, drawing battle tanks 
over my notebooks with care and precision. Images of tanks, my war machines, are 
inherently ready, perfectly formed with precision, with battle scars yet pristine, as if just off 
the assembly line. Situated on the paper, my tanks are foreboding and imposing, providing 
locomotion and weapons ready to enter battle at a moment’s notice, ready for what lay off 
the edge of the page. Older, a teenager, I have survived the death of my father yet need to 
survive even greater transformations. I need my own substances and forms, the most 
unassailable anchors to become weapons when I get to my own edges; the men in my 
family have a tendency to die early. I want to be different from them, and at the edges, I 
seek anchors to pull me through, over the limits of the page, to what may come next. 
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Revisiting these memories, my nomadic subject understands limits of a younger self as 
providing weapons. Now I am re-imagining the journeyman, holding a choice, course of 
action or decision in his head, visualising change as “something" which becomes 
“otherwise” by enacting a cognitive distance to visualise virtual possibilities of action. An 
intimate understanding of limits, vulnerability, chance, and risk provide the journeyman 
freedom of movement in the present towards the future. Logic and reason provide 
differentiation, specificity, and precision as tools to explain and narrate understandings of 
options, avenues, and other possibilities of action. I remember these as a spherical 
perspectival, a cognitive distance in time and place surrounding an object of attention. The 
journeyman holds in his head a decision to be made with reason, a feeling to be 
recognised with logic, a risk to be measured with precision, all seen from a distance to 
protect the self. 
Exploring the intangibility of the gene responsible for Huntington’s Disease, Hagen (2016) 
conceptualises body parts we have no direct experience of as phenomenological 
nullpoints. With a lifetime characterised by risk, the journeyman experiences nullpoints 
manifested in an extra set of fingers, variables in a new mathematical apparatus of 
knowing, and I put them to work in my employment. Safety and security for the 
journeyman is found in the grasping and gazing upon the entirety of a subject in one 
frame, rotating in time and distance, resolving accuracy and resolution to assess risk and 
make decisions. The journeyman gazes to the Waitakere Ranges with a variable-oriented 
approach to a risk assessment of life…if…then…maybe…This collage of nullpoints and 
cognitive distance becomes a social economics, a calculus of relationships, an algorithm 
of threats assessing the locations of refuges from harm. I wonder of the facilitation of life, 
contingent on the journeyman calling out answers whilst keeping the dice safely in the 
pocket. Cox and McKellin (1999) refer to this calculus of risk as the normative subject’s 
“metacommentary of what can and can-not be taken for granted” (p. 642). The nomadic 
subject feels algorithms as a bubble wrap around the virtualities of the future, protecting 
the journeyman from harm by minimising the feelings of distress that arise from chance 
and what is not known.
 
 
I resist returning to the cold of the journeyman. A heavy weight returns as I recall the 
economics of numbers wrapping the feet of the journeyman, protecting every step. With 
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the isolation of the rareness of the disease, the taboo of speaking of it, and the desire to 
become yet more anomalous and get tested, the journeyman has the odds stacked 
against him in completing the PGT process. A successful tester has skills and attributes; 
he is adaptive with high levels of effective and affective coping strategies; he adjusts and 
wants to be successful in completing the PGT process. Further success comes in a 
negative result to the test, of not having the gene, removing chance and unpredictability 
from the future. Measured with the logic of a closely guarded past, where “intelligibility 
remained tied to immutability” (Olkowski, 2012, p. 60), the journeyman’s history rears up 
into single frames and moments in time. Death. Suicide. Survival. Life. 
Travelling across continents, oceans, and countries on planes, trains, boats, automobiles, 
and crossing over and between countries on two feet, the journeyman learns the discipline 
of emotions is maintained through logic and reason. Ever in pursuit of the future, the 
present is occupied with observation and collection of assets and tools; the flotsam and 
jetsam of knowledge gleaned from everyday life lived out in the world. As the journeyman 
is unable to change his present and future figuration, both stemming from the past, what 
was once a free formed line of flight with no determined trajectory, I am reminded by 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) of subjectivities which emanate a “strange despair, like an 
odor of death and immolation, a state of war from which one returns broken” (p. 229). With 
what Thoburn (2008) calls a militant subjectivity to escape the past in the pursuit of what 
may yet be, the journeyman becomes a ‘cancerous’ body-without-organs. Dangerous with 
the power of molecular mass movement, Holland (2008) describes this figure as “off alone 
into the void, without making any connections (p. 77). Sustained only by what lies before it, 
the journeyman is intent on re-territorialising the future with “the aim of striating, securing 
and expanding territory” (p. 81).
 
 
In his essay of Why Am I Deleuzian?, Villani (2006) warns: 
…no word should be accepted without mistrust and without an effort to think it in 
depth, on Deleuzian terms. To work on Deleuze, without keeping in mind all these 
fundamentals is to enter the court without a racket, and to complain that this does 
not look at all like tennis. (p. 230)
 60
I strain to imagine this unpreparedness, reminding me to nomadically wander again. I 
return to the Waitakere Ranges, in early summer of December. I know this because the 
heat of the day is cool against the intensity of my body, and no camera is resting against 
my hip or slung across my shoulders. I am alone, and do not wish to share these 
experiences with others. A heaviness is felt for the first time again, a weight becoming 
unfettered yet tethered through my body. I am beginning to confront boundaries and 
limitations that do not yield, that I cannot see a way around. Having travelled back to 
Michigan in July after several years of living overseas, Sam and I proclaim to my family our 
intention to undertake PGT on our return to New Zealand. We visit every family member, 
intent on asking questions, we hope for conversations of coping and strategy whilst 
discussing our experiences of living with Huntington’s Disease and suicide. We meet with 
my mother, brothers, sisters, and all of their spouses, in their houses and cars, at the bar, 
over breakfast and around campfires. We turn to friends as well, visiting them to gather 
their strength. Although I thought of ourselves as prepared, I feel shame and resentment 
this summer day in the Waitakere Ranges. My family cannot, or will not, talk of these 
things. We are met with reticence, avoidance and tears, with fear permeating everything; 
no one is willing to discuss their own private problem spaces. Threats allege physical and 
emotional harm should we proceed to ask, discuss, and enquire, warning us against 
overturning what is carefully maintained by my family. Returning to New Zealand, bereft of 
rare knowledge I thought might be provided by my five older siblings, I draw my self close 
and head to the Waitakere Ranges, alone. I have told my mother I am no longer willing to 
carry my family’s pain, I write to my family and tell them we are no longer willing to abide 
the harm inflicted upon us, that we are no longer willing to be let down with their silence 
and absence. I have told them all, no more. We will go through this alone, and only 
seeking others who will stand with us, there will be no more abandonment at a moment of 
need. There will be no more contact, and no more pain, with them. I hike to leave it all 
behind in order to go forward, to mourn, to survive. 
Remembering these months with a nomadic subject, a terror erupts from the 
monstrousness of difference. The future pursued is no longer possible, changing what is 
needed in the present. I do not know what kind of son and brother to be with my family - so 
I will be none of them. Braidotti (2000) speaks of the Deleuzian nomadic subject as “a 
folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding outwards of affects…an 
enfleshed type of memory…ultimately an embodied memory” (p. 159). Rage, not yet 
unfolded, becomes tethered to the Waitakere Ranges as I begin to visit hundreds of times. 
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I do not feel the rage yet, but begin to feel the peril of mountains and rushing of rivers, 
slick mud and razor-sharp grass, dazzling palm trees and stoic giant kauri, all wrapping 
around me as I begin to return over and over. I feel the unfamiliar…of limits reached and 
the ripples of cracking, the beginnings of uncontainable rage spreading, of becoming 
unrecognisably unfaithful to myself. The journeyman, insulated from rage with the 
protection of social calculus, cracks as rage begins to evaporate language. I run through 





I must pause; I am out of breath and must breathe, there is still much heat with this rage. 
Here, in an unrecognisable form, are possibilities in the beginnings of becoming-monster. 
Villani (2006) speaks of the possibilities of Deleuzian thought, imploring: 
To not abandon this ‘too big’ – to be able first to see it (not every one can) and 
later on to bear it – therein lies a daily heroism that greatly resembles, in Kant’s 
sense, the mind’s defiance as it confronts the sublime that crashes it. The artist 
is joyful, because what crashes her also makes her live – gives her an 
insatiable appetite to create. (p. 232)
My nomadic subject resists the urge to leave the journeyman standing in the summer 
sunshine of the Waitakere Ranges, for this is when I remember first feeling difference. 
Having initially entered the Waitakere Ranges for reasons unknown, the journeyman 
returns time and time again with rage unfolding. This is his place, where he can roam the 
river valleys undisturbed, where he becomes ensnarled by undisturbed cobwebs that 
cover the tracks, where the forming cracks of the self flex and seal over, only to be 
disturbed once more with each footstep. In leaving this place and time, he will remain, 
alone, yet staying with the journeyman risks returning to the feelings of rage, wrapping and 
unwrapping, and the familiarity of containment. 
My nomadic subject continues on, for hundreds more visits at different times and with new 
figurations; I am reminded of camping trips to the glowworms in their caves, climbing rocky 
monoliths strewn along the beach, and hiking along reservoirs filled with rain. No longer 
alone, I come with others, they come with me, and we come together. The nomadic 
subject, which Braidotti (2000) positions as “counterpart and counterpoint” to the normative 
subject of the journeyman’s techniques of social calculus and bubble wrap, has become a 
monstrous body, an “indicator of the register of difference” (p. 162-163). It is here, 




Re-imagining the ethics of sustainability, Braidotti (2008) emphasises the nomadic subject 
is “not a structural limit, but rather the condition of expression…a threshold of 
transformative encounters” (p. 12) which are “grounded in full recognition of the co-
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presence of pain in and through processes of political change” (p. 17). Looking at a map of 
the Waitakere Ranges as a series of transformative encounters, time as a container of the 
hundreds of visits becomes unknowable. Colebrook (2002), reminding me affect becomes 
unrecognisable to the normative subject without a linear container of time, suggests time 
must be understood through difference to envisage affect otherwise. Searching for other 
embodied memories, I am reminded of sulphurous fumes and dazzling light displays of my 
birthday; the Fourth of July, Independence Day, the birthday of the United States. Born on 
a day where sparklers twirl in the hands of children at night, every birthday I have ever 
known has been greeted with these images and smells. With the awe of a child, I 
remember learning that although a sparkler burns as a discrete point with such intensity 
that it cannot possibly endure, when spun the sparkle becomes blurred into a “movement-
image” (Colebrook, 2002) of difference, as shapes forming in the movement in time. With 
this in mind, rage, a substance brought into existence and wielded by the journeyman, 
shifts from a singularly contained radiant point and begins to take shape differently to the 
nomadic subject. Expressed as a temporal process bound up with time, rage provides a 
generative force to the nomadic subject, bringing forth the inherent positivity of affect in 
transformative encounters. 
Engaging Braidotti’s (2008) nomadic ethics, and feeling this rage once more, I understand 
affect through the imbuing of experiences with motion and change. Whereas the normative 
unitary self of the journeyman expresses rage as an “effect of arrest, blockage, 
rigidification” (p. 22), a passion that destroys the self and damages the capacity to relate to 
others, a nomadic subject reworks the pattern and repetition of events, with rage becoming 
an affirmation of the generative force of Zoe. Writing with a nomadic subject, rage 
becomes a force of change. Delueze and Guattari (1987) envisage affect as a capacity to 
carry “the transformations of becoming or crossings of multiplicities always farther down 
the line of flight” (p. 275) towards new connections between human, non-human, and 
more-than-human subjects. In the desire to relate and connect with these others, the 
Waitakere Ranges, the pupurangi, the rocks and water over and through which I rage and 
toil, the journeyman exits from a fixed majoritarian identity of domination and exploitation, 
and becomes unrecognisable in becoming-monster.
As I try to find purchase, a place from which to write of becoming-monster, again I find 
resistance and slippage. With a desire to write of what is missing, of this time, space and 
pain, I search for a concept to enable me to write of becoming-monster carefully, signifying 
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a sameness of thought across a vastness of time. I cannot see it, the movement of 
becoming-monster appears too fast, and I seek to slow it down to implore the monster into 
being. Colebrook (2002) tells me seeing it, by grounding becoming-monster with the 
sedimentation of sameness, enables me to place it next to the journeyman, to stake its 
claim and express it as a subject position from which I can speak. Braidotti (2000) writes of 
monsters, which, “if not quite survivors, they are at least resilient in their capacity to 
metamorphose and thus survive and cope” (p. 163), to which Bischoff (2009) reminds me 
that in becoming-monster, unrecognisable transformations brought forth with rage disrupt 
and undermine my efforts to signify it. Again, Derrida (1989) recalls to me that I cannot 
name becoming-monster without turning it into a pet. Instead, I understand affective 
processes of becoming-monster with Braidotti’s (2000) references to “the potentially 
explosive social subjects for whom contemporary cultural and social theory has no 
adequate schemes of representation” (p. 171), I return to nomadic ethics and nomadic 
wondering (and wandering) to find a “stickiness" to write of becoming-monster. In a world 
immanent with itself, where transcendence is not required for language to ascribe meaning 
to referents, signs and codes are still to be found throughout life. Colebrook (2002) 
contends signs are intensive (felt), prior to being representative of objects requiring 
language to ascribe meaning. The intensiveness of signs produce investments 
(organisations of experiences), which in turn produce assemblages of bodies. An 
immanent world is one where rhythmic sounds of percussion produce intensities of affect, 
in turn producing the formation of people coming together in a drum circle. With 
Colebrook’s warning that investments can become over-coded and territorialized with 
social meaning, such as when drum circles come to signify spiritual occasions, I turn to 
Deleuze’s (1986) concept of minor-literature, where figurations of minoritarian subjects 
have the generative capacity to create an identity through intensive assemblages, whilst 
denying an underlying essence in the expression of an normative minority identity.
In order for becoming-monster to endure in this writing, I begin to trace a figuration of a 
nomadic subject of enfleshed signs, actualised intensities, and lasting investments able to 
be sustained whilst calling out and creating becoming-monster. I do not need to listen as 
my nomadic subject feels the rhythm of footsteps pounding over the hundreds of 
kilometres of hills and splashing through countless streams. My ears ring with a metallic 
pinging of hiking pole striking stone, my rasping breath rattling my chest. Layers and layers 
of feelings unevenly deposit over each other with intersecting transverse axes. Recalling 
the journeyman trying and failing to make sense of feelings of pain, leakage, erosion, and 
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erasure, suffused within an embodied whoosh, I become-monster. Feelings do not relent in 
becoming-monster, as this whoosh does not rise and fall, shift or dislodge. Instead, the 
feelings become riven from each other, forming a multiplicity of new connections. The 
embodied whoosh of feelings become embodied as differences without perceptions of 
their similarity. Never outrun, the eternal return of (differences) feelings becomes a 
distraction. Each absorption, each return, each continuous realignment of distress along 
different axes and layers, feelings of explosion and incandescence erupt, seemingly with 
each footstep, water-drop, ping, rasp, and rattle. With a throw of the dice, the nomadic 
subject engages in process of change, reconfiguring with every explosion and eruption 
with feelings of catastrophe, and Life renewed with every experience of once more 
becoming unfaithful to a self. These catastrophes not yet exhausted, out of food and 
running out of sunlight, I am hungry. With the seeds stuck to my socks, the dirt crusted 
onto my shorts, the cuts on my face, and the burning of my muscles, I am stilled in the 
repetition of catastrophic moments of becoming-monster, and come out of the hills for the 
day. Leaving December and erupting into the first days of winter, putting the dice back into 




Sharing a restful evening at the cusp of summer in Michigan, with paddling ducks floating 
in the reeds and hungry fish waiting for a fly to break the surface of the water, in June of 
1997 two people meet, forming the beginning of a relationship now spanning 21 years. 
With this narrative, I write of this relationship, formed with experiences of undertaking PGT 
for Huntington’s Disease. But as I begin, contingencies gush forth from any starting space. 
Whilst we are no longer married, Sam and I remain steadfast friends. Shall I begin at the 
end, so to speak, where only after finishing the brutality of the PGT process did the 
dissolution of our marriage follow from the tragic irony of subsequently losing a child, due 
in part to unrelated and unforeseen genetic anomalies within my cells? Or shall I return to 
a beginning, with the presence of my father, long dead and with whom Sam has never 
met, relating the influence of his death over so much of our lives together, or should I tell of 
Sam’s parents, who brought much sympathy, empathy, and compassion to my young self? 
Should I write of our place within each other’s journey, meeting whilst I was a foreigner in 
my own country but only a few miles from home, whereas Sam found herself at home in a 
foreign land with strange people, only having arrived in the American Midwest a few hours 
before? 
How might I situate the day of receiving the PGT results, of my mother in-law and her 
sister being with us in our terror, whilst my own mother was missing? How should I signify 
relationships and taboos within my family Sam helped navigate, helping me not just 
survive and endure, but to thrive? Alternatively, I might begin with an outline of our 
struggles and successes, showing the visas of our passports as we travelled the world, 
together and on our own terms, with adventure and wonder our only companions. How 
would the places where we have lived and places we have left come bare in this writing, 
and what of the friends made and love lost over these years? If I was to document this 
relationship in terms of sexuality, how do I concern myself with fears we both held, of the 
possibility of having a child and potentially passing on the gene responsible for 
Huntington’s Disease? What burdens do I take responsibility for, and what privileges do I 
bestow upon Sam; what treasures of life do I give up to improbable fate or attribute to 
dumb luck, with us as characters in each other’s stories?
 
 
With this writing of people, places and things, as representations only needing to be filled 
by some imagined message or meaning, a tension arises from narrating with what 
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Colebrook (2002) calls immobile cuts of time. As precise, accurate, numerous or 
encompassing as these cuts might be, Boundas (2007) speaks to me of their 
shortcomings, as here they can only be “responsible for the hieratic and static world of 
Being”, as a narrative in this form is devoid of the “continuity and mutual imbrications 
necessary for an adequate characterization” (p. 491) of change. Represented as unified 
wholes in Western thought, Colebrook warns the changes we undergo and the changes 
surrounding us give form to and ground the flow of time in specific, singular, and static 
perspectives. A static perspective, derived from a sequential and linear state of affairs, is 
unable to account for the physical embodiment of movement and change in time. In these 
opening lines, Sam and I are both shifting before my eyes and always on the move, 
although never straying far enough. 
 
As I begin this writing just after my 40th birthday, I am providing an account of a 
relationship that began when Sam was a few months shy of her 21st birthday and I was 19 
years old. Confirming she will be joining a group of mutual friends for dinner, in a joint 
celebration of my 40th birthday as well as my girlfriend Hannah’s birthday, Sam relates a 
kindness shared between us many times over:
“I will be here until you tell me otherwise.”
Embedded in the word here, I stumble over a multiplicity of paradoxes contained within 
this statement of location. I read this sentiment as a reply, but also an invitation to maintain 
mutually shared space. With bodies described by Kaufman (2000) as “populated with 
things and flows and movements that would belie any static or absolute essence” (p. 130), 
I am reminded of Colebrook (2006) contending life (as sense) is the potentiality of “bodies 
– crossing another – the relations of those bodies” (p. 129). With prefigured locations of 
space created by an us as embodied subjects, Colebrook goes on to describe life as “less 
a space within which we think and more the possibility of the opening of these spaces” (p. 
129). I experience comfort with these words. In divorce we continue to create new 
possibilities of space with new invented crossings of our embodied forms; we continue to 
become other than we once were, here. 
I met Sam at a local residential youth camp near my home town, where I taught archery 
classes and she worked as a lifeguard. Together, sharing our lives together every summer 
from 1997 to 2000, we eventually co-managed the day to day activities of the camp, taking 
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on a legal responsibility of care for the 150 campers, counsellors, and staff members who 
lived on site each week. I remember these summers filled with the overflowing joy and 
intrigue of a summer romance, yet a time slowly and inexorably beset with the eternal 
return of immense pain, longing, and doubt. We were only afforded a few short weeks 
together after the camp closed before Sam’s visa expired, forcing her to return to England 
whilst I remained in Michigan. As we parted ways and returned to university studies, we 
confronted the threat of an uncertain future as well. With no guarantee of future 
employment, every winter brought long distance phone calls to discuss the fraught 
negotiations of deciding if we were reapplying to the youth camp for the coming summer, 
in effect deciding if we were going to continue our relationship at all. Although each winter 
one of us would attempt to visit the other for a short holiday, to share space in these 
between-times required visas, kind friends and family with whom we would stay, and a 
large quantity of time and money neither of us seemed able to locate with regularity. 
As the summer of 2000 drew to a close, we concluded it was time to move on. After our 
initial concerns were dismissed, Sam and I jointly contacted the state authorities regarding 
what we perceived as potential ethical violations by a member of the management team, 
which was met by the board of directors for the summer camp with threats to terminate our 
employment for drawing unwanted attention to the problems. Following this, neither of us 
wanted to return the following summer, nor were we likely to be welcomed back. We had 
“aged-out”, retiring from the youth camp as many did at our age, allowing younger 
generations to take over positions vacated by older staff members. Sam remained in 
Michigan through the fall of 2000 on a student visa, studying at a university a few hours 
from my home town. Desiring more certainty in a future where we could live in the same 
country together, I proposed to Sam in January of 2001. We married in April, in a civil 
ceremony at a local court house in Michigan. Despite Sam acquiring residency in the 
United States, the complexities in sharing space did not subside. We negotiated living 
arrangements, deciding to reside in Michigan before emigrating to the United Kingdom in 
September 2002. We migrated once more in March 2006, travelling for six months over 
land through Europe, Asia, and Australia, arriving in New Zealand in September 2006. 
On each of these occasions, my experiences of American, British, and New Zealand 
bureaucracies required us to establish the merits and potential liabilities of the economic 
productivity of our union, with immigration protocols requiring obligatory medical checks, 
which tested for communicable diseases and other ailments. I remember immigration 
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matters as an obligation to give an account of my identity, measured along Butler’s (1999) 
normative heterosexual matrix, to secure immigration visas. To establish the merits and 
potential liabilities of the economic and social productivity of our union, we provided a 
performative account of our relationship, evidenced as natural, authentic and legitimate 
with photos, utility bills, and other personal narratives of our life together. We showed a 
union of two individuals becoming one, a relationship constitutive of and constituted by a 
framework of ethical and moral norms. Mindful of the comparative ease with which we 
progressed through various immigration matters, reflecting on the bureaucratic process of 
securing a permanent residence visa for the United Kingdom, I recall the playfulness of 
inventing an identity of masculinity, a performance dedicated to creating what Butler (2000) 
describes as “a compelling illusion…a performative accomplishment compelled by social 
sanction and taboo” (p. 520). This illusory heterosexual identity only noted the possibility of 
inheriting the Huntington’s gene, a legally mandated disclosure, and left unsaid 
experiences of otherness, and the thoughts and feelings with which I strove to locate a 
politics of a self capable of rejecting the hegemony of masculine ideals. With youthful 
memories of visits to consulates and immigration offices, these experiences are less 
concerned with fear of being found out, but rather feelings of exuberance whilst rejoicing in 
the success of some form of performative deception. 
 
 
As we prepared to depart Michigan in September 2003, I hear the voices of a multitude of 
others, calling me to defend my intentions, of being asked: 
Why would you want to live in England?
To account for the merits of my plans, such questions require an unflinching response 
using logic and reason, answering with accounts of how much money I would make 
compared to Michigan, if I could make more money elsewhere, and how long I would be 
away before we returned. Exasperated, the concerns of others are only apparently 
relevant to what I understand as the “oedipalized, socially productive libidinal 
economies” (Braidotti, 2012, p. 34) of normative thought. Other conversations would 
follow, demanding yet further accounts of what lies in wait, regardless of my responses. 
Unrelenting, these subsequent conversations become more antagonistic, questioning my 
patriotism and nationalism, commanding me to determine what I value that was not 
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available in Michigan, what I sought elsewhere, determining what about England is better 
than Michigan, or elsewhere in the United States. I remember the begrudging effort of 
providing a narrative of masculine heteronormativity in response to these questions, 
regaling others with a story of “following a girl” across the ocean. These accounts are often 
finished by others, surmising the thrill of the chase and adventure of romance is predicated 
on the expectation that once she was acquired or caught, I/we would return. As we 
prepared to move from the United Kingdom to New Zealand, other requests for further 
normative accounts, although less intolerable, still prevail. The accumulation of cultural 
experiences, a lifestyle blessed with better weather, and the potential of economic 
progress, is valued as an undeniable privilege worthy of pursuing, validating our plans to 
emigrate once more in pursuit of gaining what we lacked in Michigan and England. 
Many years later, after separating from Sam and taking to my “refuge” in the mountains of 
the Waitakere Ranges outside of Auckland, it is within a conversation with my sister about 
my “failed” relationship that I recall my expectations of the sustainability of my now-defunct 
marriage being admonished. Espousing the prerequisites of a productive and lasting 
relationship, my sister relates the need to share the same interests and concerns as my 
partner, qualifying these remarks by asserting a positive and productive relationship is 
predicated on similarities, and of “being in the same place” by wanting the same things. 
Compromise is only required when partners are separated by difference; giving too much 
to the other, and not getting enough in return, are signs of dysfunction. I am reminded by 
Braidotti (2012) the normative relationship my sister addresses is formed to “ensure the 
governability of the very subjects they engender” (p. 34). I recall struggling with feelings of 
shame after being rebuked by my sister and others, for daring to believe we could invent a 
relationship not defined and confined by what is taken for granted as the natural laws of 
social contracts and normative ideals. I am chastised for being a “dreamer". 
Situated amongst political, cultural, and interpersonal locations within the dominant 
discourses of materialist values and norms of several Western countries and cultures, 
these questions posed to me are formed with representations of the normative subject 
privileging specific geo-political concerns. Defined by a neo-liberal individualistic notion of 
personhood, particularly of the unified masculine heteronormative male figure, my life is 
expected to become realised through decisions and actions predicated on an autonomous 
self. Intent on perfecting a life hell-bent on achieving maximum autonomy, this self rests on 
the security of comfort and pacification of pleasure. Braidotti (2013b) positions the figure of 
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other against the normative unitary self, together forming a binary generative limit of 
knowledge production. The normative subject privileges skills in terms of assessing cost/
benefit, loss/gain, capacity/incapacity, whilst identifying, navigating, and negotiating 
knowledge production practices in research on Huntington’s Disease, and experiences of 
the PGT process (see Hagberg, Bui, & Winnberg, 2011; Pakenham, Goodwin & 
MacMillan; 2004; Smith, Stephenson, Jacobs, & Quarrell, 2013). 
Instead, recognising what Braidotti (2012) terms “the impossibility of mutual 
recognition” (p. 305) of subject and other within the philosophy of liberal individualism, I 
seek to take lines of flight from these majoritarian specificities of location premised on the 
binary knowledge production practices of self/other. Reconfiguring my relationship with 
Sam through minoritarian understandings of a marginal, barely perceptible politics of 
location based on “mutual specification and mutual codependence” (p. 305), I write 
narrative with a nomadic subject to trace outlines of processes of multiple sustainable 
selves becoming-other. Capable of tracing new locations of new relations, nomadic 
subjectivity is capable of seeing what is intolerable to a normative subject, which, 
according to Bogue (2006), offers a “critique of the received truths and realities of the 
present…that makes visible new possibilities unencumbered by the past” (p. 219). 
Disturbing the neoliberal distinction between self/other, this multiplicity of nomadic subjects 
enables the capacity to create new relations of bodies across spatio-temporal distances, 
inventing multiple here(s) no longer limited to shared spatio-temporal space. Writing 
processes of becoming-other, this narrative creates new possibilities of seeing the 
intolerable together with Sam, creating a multiplicity of sustainable selves capable of 
enduring the transformative process of PGT together.
 
 
Writing narrative of unfamiliar spaces, I am immediately drawn to memories of a 17 year 
old man-child, being lost in the wild woods of Michigan. 
Bestowed with the responsibility to guide and mentor the 12 year old son of a family friend, 
I carry a rifle suitable for killing deer and hope to be a role model. I am hunting in the stark 
surroundings of a frozen woods, but have become lost in the frozen wasteland of the 
swamp-forest of Northern Michigan. The terrain becomes unreadable and disorientating as 
the fading light quickens, the dark bark of tree trunks silhouetted by the bright 
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monochrome of the ice, contrasting against snow covering the ground and clinging to the 
naked tree limbs. Facing a long Michigan night, stumbling across frozen water-logged pine 
forests devoid of living creatures, we will not survive the low temperatures. In the fading 
light, I do not know how to guide the way back to our camp. I am relieved the air is so cold, 
the water frozen below our feet, keeping our boots from becoming wet and accelerating 
the rapid onset of hypothermia. Every 10 minutes, I fire off a round of ammunition, alerting 
others of our plight, whilst, as far as I can be sure, leading us off in one direction. 
Between these concussive moments filled with the hope, I must calm myself and contain 
fear. To be unsure of directions, and show doubt of the likelihood of being found, would 
surely panic me and doom us both. Eventually, we stumble across a barely discernible 
gravel road cut into the landscape of the frozen forest - but I still do not know where we are 
or where we are headed. Panic begins to overcome my survival skills, with the cold dark of 
nighttime beginning to crowd out hope as the temperature plummets even further, I 
wonder of keeping warm at the side of the road. Now panicking, headlights greet us, 
revealing my brother and my hunting buddy’s father. Both are clearly worried, yet, rejoicing 
in the experiences of our ordeal, both are also laughing. 
Remembering how often I have shared this story, I tell others of the one time I got lost and 
desperate in the forest. I do not remember with fondness, this story does not cause me to 
laugh. Filling this narrative is a representation of a young man progressing towards the 
identity of "the great hunter”, orientating himself through the skills and experience of 
encountering unknown terrain, navigating with wits, logic, and reason. Reminded of 
Braidotti’s (2010) figuration of the normative subject as “an abstract concept and a 
normative ideal that can be implemented across space and time, provided the right 
preconditions are met” (p. 409), the great hunter is less a subject and instead a figure of 
thought of “how to be”, particular to specific geo-political cultures. The figure of a 
masculine ideal is contrasted with the pitfalls of the other, the anxious and panic-stricken 
irrational boy for whom I was responsible, and I feared becoming. Through my 
performance in woodcraft, a training ground of learning how to be a hunter, power 
relations of this figure overlap with dominant hegemonic figures of heteronormative 
Western cultures.
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Later, drawn from fragments of a session somewhere within the PGT process during the 
winter of 2010, I recall other experiences of becoming lost. Here, I am beginning a session 
with Pat, a psychologist who worked with me over several years through the PGT process.
________________________________________________________________________




“Can you draw something to tell me where 
you are at?”
“….no…”
“What about these figures. 
Can you use these to tell me 
something?”
“…,…,…”
“It’s okay. I am here, Matt.”
“…don’t…want to…be 
here….”
“I know this hurts…”
“…where…is…this…?” 
________________________________________________________________________
Having no memory of arriving here, and left with no sense of this place’s location, I 
imagine this place only with fragments of memories. Through subsequent sessions with 
Pat, unfolded further with Sam, I do not recognise the subject with whom the narrative is 
written. No longer wanting to hold myself responsible for maintaining different narratives 
protecting from feelings of abuse and neglect, taken for granted relationships with my 
family become unrecognisable. I have come to know this particular space and time 
through the experiences of re-imagining, the amicable relationships I enjoyed with different 
family members becoming different with an anger that still startles me. Dominant 
representations of a heteronormative subject are unable to navigate the politics of this 




Against figurations of a unitary subjectivity, Braidotti (2010) situates the cartographic figure 
of the nomadic subject capable of resisting the hegemony of identity politics involving 
unitary subject formation. Nomadic subjectivity instead acts in locations formed in the 
“fleeting co-presence of multiple time-zones, in a continuum that activates and de-
territorializes stable identities” (p. 408). Braidotti’s figuration of the nomadic subject is a 
“collectively assembled, externally-related and multilayered subject” (p. 409), a 
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cartography of memories capable of providing an account of a "materialist temporal and 
spatial site of co-production” (2013a, p. 358) forming the politics of a location. I understand 
the form of a nomadic subject, expressed in terms of a rhizomatic account of locations 
born at the intersection of specific geopolitical (space) and genealogical (time) dimensions, 
as a literal figuration of a subjectivity navigating and negotiating what is otherwise off-limits 
to the hegemonic figure of the normative self. In doing so, the nomadic subject provides 
me both the “methodological navigational tools and an ethical compass” (2012, p. 29) to 
trace the boundaries and contours of a politics of location constitutive of the PGT process 
that would otherwise be unrevealed in this narrative. 
…I love the time and in between the calm inside me
As I continue to write, I am remembering exclusion and isolation, of difference and 
distance, in the lyrics of Elsewhere, a song written by Sarah McLachlan. A few weeks after 
meeting Sam in 1997, she contributed towards the purchase of a birthday present, a ticket 
for me to attend Lilith Fair, a music festival organised and headlined by Sarah McLachlan. 
I remember this concert less with the music performed, and instead with feeling discernible 
movement stemming from “thinking forces beyond the already actualised” (Colebrook, 
2006, p. 216). There was no holding hands, or sneaky kisses out of the eyesight of others, 
there was only a feeling of drifting, a desire for things to become different. Already in a 
relationship with a woman who was also present at the festival, I construct memories of 
this relationship with feelings of denigration, permeating from experiences of being wanted 
as a normative object, a boyfriend with criterion of measurement and value that I had no 
interest in fulfilling. Thinking with feelings of unexplainable possibilities with Sam, I recall 
Deleuze (1988), describing the unfolding of Superman as: 
“the form that results from a new relation between forces…the advent of a new 
form that is neither God nor man and which, it is hoped, will not prove worse than 
its two previous forms”. (p.132)
A few months after attending this concert, I am remembering visiting my mother for the first 
time that summer, intending to tell her I was breaking up with my “local" girlfriend as I had 
met someone else. I tell my mother of abandoning arrangements to join my then-girlfriend 
at a bigger, more prestigious university where I intended to resume my studies at the 
conclusion of the summer camp. Sitting in my mother’s living room, shifting in my seat as I 
announced to her I had fallen in love with a person whose name she did not know and 
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whom she had yet to meet, I tell her of my intentions to join this person in England. A 
briefest of hesitations greets me before my mother naively asks as to my sexual 
orientation, wondering if I had become involved with a man. Later, over the course of the 
following weeks, after similar pronouncements to others, including my siblings and family 
friends, these conversations also result in further enquiries if I was “coming out” as gay, 
followed by calls to defend my actions towards my by-then ex-girlfriend and explain the 
circumstances that led to this new relationship with Sam. 
Returning to the great hunter, as a linear representation of knowledge gained rationally 
through experience, incrementally and progressively over time, Braidotti (2012) describes 
the normative figure as involving a “social process of subjectivization that functions by 
binary exclusions” (p. 48). Through a binary logic of difference, normative formation 
privileges heteronormative knowledge production practices of the great hunter, whilst 
polarising and excluding as undesirable, or at least less-desirable, a subjectivity of other. 
Binary subject formation reifies “normality, normalcy, and normativity…by transposing a 
specific mode of being human into a generalised standard” (2013c, p. 26) from which all 
can be measured. Whilst aspects of the other are also included within this process, this is 
through negation and exclusion of those characteristics and traits deemed as undesirable 
to the majoritarian normative ideal. The great hunter is not anxious, refrains from irrational 
decision-making, never out of control. As a 19 year old man who had unexplainably fallen 
in love, I am positioned as irrational, and excluded from the normative experiences of 
others. My decisions and actions are unknowable, relegated to alternative subject 
positions. As I am also pushed to the furthest margins of the heteronormative experience, I 
become an other. 
Recalling the hurt of normative encounters, I sense the formation of a binary. Recoiling 
from the homophobia that attaches unorthodox and surprising behaviours to objectified 
categories of sexualised others, I also wallow in my own self-pity of not being “seen" in a 
moment of vulnerability where I have attempted to “open myself up”. Moving from what 
Braidotti (2008) terms the “rhetoric of the lament” (p. 17) of a unitary self, where I drown in 
self-pity and contempt for being subjected to this other-ing, nomadic ethics suggests 
caution. I am reminded by Braidotti that the nomadic subject “clashes” with the 
heteronormative figure, suspending the binary opposition of subject formation and critique. 
Activating the creative resources of affectivity and relationality to destabilise the conflict, 
the nomadic subject imagines the capacity of affectivity to actualise a multiplicity of 
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displaced, non-linear, and other-ed identities not afforded constituency within unitary 
normative subjectivity. Braidotti warns that such subjective transformations of change are 
processes of dis-identification and defamiliarization, through which pain and conflict may 
result from the “loss of cherished habits of thought and representation, which can produce 
fear, a sense of insecurity and nostalgia” (p. 19). Pausing, I feel resistance to giving up this 
hurt, as it equally forms subject positions I have ascribed to my family, and I risk getting 
lost once more. 
Braidotti (2012) tells me a nomadic subject is able to navigate and embody both memories 
and counter-memories “across multiple, unexpected, and often contradictory 
variable(s)” (p. 212), taking up potentially overlapping and contradictory positions of 
location. As a ”zigzagging, not linear and process-oriented, not concept-driven” (p. 217) 
figuration, the nomadic subject is an identity taking place between the binaries formed of 
the normative figure and other, the in-between of binaries of male/female, past/future, 
black/white. No longer a participant in identity politics of normative Western 
representational thought, it is the in-between zone of the static calm at the polar ends of 
the binary figuration that nomadic subjectivity takes form, between the thresholds of self/
other that become the potential locations of transformative encounters of multiple selves. 
Both relational and driven from the outside, the nomadic subject inhabits creative counter-
memories, counter-images, and counter-figures to produce alternative figurations of these 
locations. Foregoing the negativity of the rhetoric of lament, the repetition of these counter 
narratives instead becomes “a massive exercise in transformation of negativity, into 
something more sustainable, more life enhancing” (2008, p. 23) than contempt and self-
pity, fear from loss and being lost, of being unrecognised and unseen.
…the quiet child awaits the day when she can break free the mold that clings like desperation
As I approach turning 40, in moments of guarded and unguarded testimony to friends and 
family, I have related my overwhelming excitement in achieving “an age of importance" to 
the normative subject position of my specific geopolitical location. Having children, a 
partner and marriage, already educated with a vehicle, potentially owning a property and 
holding a mortgage, or if fortunate enough possessing multiple properties/children/
vehicles, these are often the encumbrances and expectations that drive the daily life of 
others around me “turning 40”. Whilst the hegemony of Braidotti’s normative subject might 
be less relevant or in crisis in different locations of Western thought, where the politics of 
the present moment may have progressed beyond these expectations, Rose (2017) reads 
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contemporary political upheavals across the United States and elsewhere in Europe to 
suggest the unitary subject of emerging post-neoliberal governmentalities, though 
mutated, indicates a rapprochement to normativity. I understand the populism of 
Trumpism, a politics bestowed with and arising from a fervour to Make America Great 
Again!, with a new realignment of individual liberty and freedom to return to a historical 
normative ideal that is felt to have been lost. Security in these new governmentalities is 
freedom from the vulnerabilities of difference, which, managed as risks, are construed as 
unplanned and troubling barriers limiting fulfilment of the normative self. 
Not content with nostalgia of the past, Braidotti’s (2006b) nomadic subject draws from the 
yearning for sustainable futures yet to come. This yearning, an affect providing the 
strength and motivation for the nomadic subject to create the possible conditions of a 
liveable present, dwells in the nomadic philosophy that to be sustainable is to think “the 
present is always the future present” (p. 206). As I return to previous birthdays, of my 32nd 
birthday in the midst of the PGT process, I recall living in Auckland, surrounded by friends 
with feelings of hopelessness, helplessness, and terror abounding on this cold, wet, winter 
day. I reimagine my 28th birthday on a similarly wet and cold day in Hobart (Tasmania), 
homeless but on my way to New Zealand with Sam, nothing but our backpacks full of 
clothing and a few well-worn books to our names. Labouring under the upheaval 
surrounding my 25th birthday, Sam and I are winding down our lives in Michigan on a 
scorchingly hot summer day, shedding ourselves of our meagre possessions in 
preparation of moving to the United Kingdom. As the eternal return of difference, Braidotti 
(2009) says the future “propels us forth and motivates us to be active in the here and now 
of a continuous present that hangs on in between the ‘no longer’ and the ‘not yet’” (p. 8). 
Reflecting on my 40th birthday, sharing the day with Hannah and Sam and a larger group 
of friends, these previous birthday celebrations draw from the uncharted territories that I 
inhabit now, of life after testing, in order to sustain my then-present self. As I approach my 
40th birthday, I am left gasping; the years of drawing heavily, of futures of a multiplicity of 
previous selves, have not reduced nor depleted the feelings of these present times. I feel 
unbounded. 
As a neo-materialist assemblage of connections, passions, forces and flows, the nomadic 
subject is a specified figuration stable enough to sustain the constant, non-destructive 
fluxes and transformations of change across these birthdays. Eschewing identity politics, 
my figuration of the nomadic subject favours positive and empowering relationships to 
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human, non-human, and more-than-human entities through “cognitive and sensorial 
mappings” (Braidotti, 2006c, p. 137) driven by affect, relishing joyful acts of subversion in 
scrambling the established status quo and normative forms of relationships. Remembering 
these birthdays as “squashed between a stolen present and a frozen past” (2009, p. 7) as 
I write with a nomadic subject and the immanence of relationships, I exist between the 
imperative of a future proceeding ever-onwards towards completing an unknown process 
of unknown duration and outcome. The death of my father, and his father before him, lie 
permanently behind as well as before me. 
Although no longer a slave to rational thought and beholden to the frozen past, Braidotti 
(2009) figures her nomadic subject as “a present-based practice, which reactivates both 
past and present” (p. 8) to acknowledge an individual’s obligations to future selves and 
sustainable possible futures. Remembering the multiplicities of complex change 
throughout the PGT process, I no longer feel alone. I envisage these birthdays with social 
relationships, emerging transformations of change resonating with collaborations of many. 
These experiences of change, as part of the PGT process, would have only occurred as 
they did whilst Sam and I come together and become together with these specific 
memories. Situated as they are in the “political and ethical agency” (p. 9) of our 
relationship, this is not always readily apparent to ourselves, let alone others. These 
birthdays are future-based as we create multiplicities of futures together. Described by 
Braidotti as the “daily practices of interconnection with others” (p. 8), our relationship is the 
affective strength of our struggles to actualise resources, imagining without being able to 
see what we visualise, informing life we share, together.
…in the space where I can breathe I believe there is a distance I have wandered
Braidotti (2013b) argues normative subjectivity institutes and regulates practices of 
exclusion and discrimination, with the generalised normative subject of Western thought 
constituting and privileging specific geopolitical power relations and concerns. The 
restrictive (potestas) and productive (potentia) forces of normative subjectivity condones 
and restricts particular political and social modes of action and representation. Specific 
rights and responsibilities are granted to the dominant normative subject, privileging the 
ideal subject “positioned at the pinnacle of a hierarchical scale”, a process which rewards 
“zero-degree of difference” (p. 28) from associated practices of a hegemonic norm. In the 
individualism of Western thought, normative subjectivity values the personal attributes and 
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skills required to traverse the hierarchical scale as well, the other-ed subject, therefore, 
expected to strive, to labour, to desire the acquisition of what it does not (yet) possess.
Braidotti’s nomadic theory is not concerned with mutual recognition and the struggle for 
sameness through rationality, negation, and exclusion. Instead, I understand Braidotti’s 
(2013a) nomadic ethics as concerned with “the ways in which otherness prompts, 
mobilises and allows for flows of affirmation of values and forces which are not yet 
sustained by the current conditions” (p. 343). Through an ethics of ontological relationality, 
affectivity and endurance, Braidotti theorises the devalued and marginalised minority 
locations of the other as a privileged, and empowering, source of affirmative qualitative 
creativity. 
Returning to conversations with my mother, the feelings of hurt trouble me in being 
positioned at the fringes of heteronormative subjectivity, with feelings of otherness at being 
thought of as unknowable. Braidotti (2006a) asserts nomadic ethics does not call for the 
avoidance of this pain, nor for one to ignore these feelings or turn the other cheek. These 
forms of self-protection are criticised by Braidotti as self-destructive, promoting a negative 
affect that arrests or blocks the potential for transformation of the self, a process in which 
vulnerability and pain are useful in understanding the “actual material conditions of being 
interconnected and thus being in the world” (p. 14). Instead, nomadic subjectivity requires 
one to become ethical in order to gain freedom associated with being aware of limits of the 
self. Braidotti’s nomadic theory embraces the affirmative positivity of affect to empower 
and sustain one’s self. The affectivity of a nomadic subject is celebrated as the capacity 
which “increases one's potentia and creates joyful energy in the process” (p. 4). To 
become ethical, Braidotti (2006c) implores one must consider pain as not only an obstacle 
but a possible ethical moment of potential transposition, to rethink the normative subject 
“in terms of affectivity, inter-relationality, territories, eco-philosophical resources, locations 
and forces” (p. 133-134). 
I do not feel a closeness in this event, of a her and I together, remembering how I have 
remembered this event as an abandonment of hope for mutual recognition. No longer 
expecting to be seen by my mother, similarly, I no longer see her as she no longer makes 
sense in the rationality of these desires with which I seek to express, demonstrate, and 
share. With that the loss of the vision of mutual recognition, equally troubling is the loss of 
mother and her role as “established references” in a “radical repositioning” (Braidotti, 
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2006a, p. 7) of subjectivity. With the affirmative imperative of yearning to move beyond the 
pain, what other guides, markers, factors or forms will help me navigate the dark of the 
night, when mothers are meant to be the comforting voice of reassurance? Braidotti’s 
(2006a) nomadic ethics suggests all subjects of becoming-other share “a common ground 
on which to negotiate the interests and eventual conflicts” (p. 4) inhered in these feelings 
of loss. Writing narrative with a nomadic subject, these feelings of pain and loss become a 
locus, a focal block of becoming-other, where pain forms a rhizomatic node and loss a 
stepping stone to traverse difference and a dispersal of the self in becoming-molecular. 
With this becoming, I hear Colebrook (2002) describing normative subjects as “unchanging 
perceivers set over and against life” (p. 128), which, to become more than itself, must 
disperse “in the flow of life’s perceptions…” (p. 128-129). Freed from a singular point of 
view of the unitary self detached from life, I am free to join Sam once more. Although not 
physically present in these conversations with my mother and other family members, Sam 
returns in the repetition of a counter-narrative. Feeling the confines of a mold adhering 
around me, the normative subject always already fails to contain me and supply the 
comfort of a form-fitting. Memories of an occasion with my mother become the cracks 
which resonate throughout the narrative of becoming-other. 
…to touch upon the years of reaching out and reaching in holding out holding in
I do not know what awaits me in England. Remembering the summer as a 19 year old, 
falling in love and choosing to leave all that he knows behind, when reimagined with a 
nomadic subject these negatives of absence are not prohibitive or restrictive, nor simply 
about gain and loss. Not having a passport only means that one might one day get his first 
passport, not having flown on a plane only means that one day one might see the azure 
sky above the clouds. I recall sitting on the dock of the boathouse at the summer camp, 
Sam and I talking our way through a summer with thoughts of the past; of death as a way 
to know of life, of dying as a way of knowing how to live, of loss if only to know of what 
may become of us as individuals with pasts and virtual futures. Sitting and sharing space 
of mutuality and hope whilst overlooking and passing through the beauty of Michigan 
summertime, these memories shoot outwards through the blossoming of friendship and 
desire to become-otherwise. I become lost in these memories of a summer of youthful 
invention and possibilities, where in the disestablishment of my self I give over to the 
possibilities of the “the unstable result of experimentation and artifice” (Boundas, 2007, p. 
499), of futures becoming unbounded.
 82
I am reminded by Bogue (2006), that to see deeply, to see the intolerable, is a process: 
…that is, to engage in a critique of the received truths and realities of the present…
but one also that makes visible new possibilities unencumbered by the past. The 
hold of history, of the forces that have shaped our present, is broken, and the 
actual of what we are becoming surges forth. (p. 219)
I remember questions from my mother and others, requiring an account of what lies in wait 
for me in England. Questions beg for me to explain what I will do for employment and 
support myself, questions asking to whom will I look to for support. Asked to forecast all 
possible future possibilities, which Colebrook (2002) reflects is a normative expectation 
that I am able to account for the total “experience of some being or some ultimate 
subject” (p. 87), I am asked what happens to me if I fail in this experiment, and plan for 
these eventualities. May (2005) tells me my mother’s inability to grasp the unbounded 
possibilities of an intolerable future is the mistake in thinking the virtual is the same as the 
possible, reminding me the “distinction between the virtual and the actual is not the same 
as the distinction between the possible and the real” (p. 48). I am unable to answer 
questions pertaining to the possibilities of failed experiments, which I am told is a sign of 
naivety and poorly thought out planning. My plans, such as they are, are unbelievable and 
scoffed at by others. But I do not desire the possible, only the virtual. In desiring virtual 
possibilities, I depart from a simple empiricism of normative subjectivity, and associated 
fear and trepidation of the “what if’s”, with safety maintained through planning for 
potentialities. Instead, I seek and desire a radical empiricism where there is only 
experience of difference, of becoming-other in what Colebrook (2002) describes as the 
“flow or multiplicity of experiences from which any being or idea is effected” (p. 87).
Here in this flow, I find my self with Sam seeing deeply, inventing and creating, no longer 
wanting to simply exist but becoming fractured with desire to become-other, dissolved and 
dispersed in becoming-molecular, entering the flow of the virtual becoming the actual. My 
mother looks towards me and asks what drives these decisions, what is inside me 
questing after these possibilities, why do I want to do these things and not others 
(preferably) closer to home…but I do not even know what a body is capable, or our power 
together as Sam and I become-together. 
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Remembering these memories of my mother with Sam’s absence and returning presence, 
writing with a nomadic subject disrupts the temporal dimension of this event, and I find a 
new, different self with each (re)membering. No longer beholden to immobile cuts of time, 
Bogue (2006) writes of the event as “a time set free from the narrative causality of history 
and undetermined in its relation to the future” (p. 219). Remembering these memories of 
my mother with my nomadic subject, I imagine futures of becoming-other with the “myth-
making power” (p. 218) of the event to create “haunting images” (p. 207) of a clairvoyant 
vision of a people yet to come, thoughts of co-becoming with Sam inducing me to action. I 
recall attempting to share how I do not know what will become of us, instead asking my 
mother if she could know the potency (potentia) of a future (conatus), of the power of an 
us that is yet to come - and a future that is more than I can imagine of what is yet to be. 
With memories of a summer of fabulation, which Boundas (2007) stipulates is only 
possible when “imagination is given the task of training sensibility, memory, and 
understanding…from the vantage point of a new life praxis…and the fair redistribution of 
the insights of discordant Reason among all faculties” (p. 501), I disperse, only to join with 
Sam, and myriad others that I cannot imagine, in the molecular flow outwards in a line of 




Sitting in Sam’s kitchen is a dining table we purchased together when we first moved into 
the house she currently occupies without me. It is a heavy table of imported wood, solid 
and firm with dense timbers pulled from shrouded rainforests of Asia. We bought it second 
hand, our consciences unencumbered by the plundering of the rainforest. Instead, we 
inherited the debt, intent on making it right, through our time spent doing good in other 
ways. In the middle of this table is a round burn mark, the exact dimension of a plastic 
bucket one might use in mopping a bathroom floor. Embedded in this burn are actual 
remnants of a plastic bucket, not used for mopping but instead the container in which ash 
from a fireplace, thought to be long cold, was deposited. Overlaid on the burn mark, a 
mosaic of small square stone tiles now functions as a hot pad for serving platters. The 
table came to be this way during the winter of 2010, as we progressed through the PGT 
process together. I still regard this table when I visit with Sam, attending to the hate and 
shame for which I cannot account, nor erase. Each time I revisit this burn mark, or attempt 
to make sense of it, the narrative changes, and I become lost in another unknown location, 
bringing me nearly to tears.
Renovations of many sorts were occurring. I began outlining walls in two bathrooms of the 
house using anti-geometric mosaics of broken pieces of tile, a response to the inadequate 
equipment used to cut the tiles but which shattered them instead. The initial efforts to retile 
the bathrooms added some texture and colour to otherwise-unbearable white plasterboard 
walls surrounding the bathtub and shower. Baths with oils and salts, whilst listening to 
music with a glass of wine in hand, had become one of the few ways of alleviating pain, of 
confronting how I had been living life as we progressed through the PGT process. Coming 
to terms with the relationships of my absent family, and realising I was more reliant on 
others than I allowed myself to be, nearly every day became filled with practices of 
revisiting my life circumstances and my father’s death, the feelings of abandonment and 
constant flows of physical hurt culminating each evening in unbearableness. 
Yet, with a renewed determination to proceed, each night I sought to do otherwise than my 
father, my grandfather, and my family before me. But, what I thought had saved me from 
despair whilst forging a way forward after my father’s suicide, what had provided me with 
employable skills, what had got me to this point in my life was beginning to erode - with no 
new skills or strategies to arriving to replace them. Despairing the possibility that things will 
only get worse, anxiously entering yet further unknown locations every day, in the winter of 
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2010 I emptied out the fireplace, putting the ashes into a bucket that was close at hand, 
moving it out of the way to empty later. 
The bathroom tiles were a masterclass in eclecticism, for randomness as much as beauty, 
and I showed off my work to those who came to visit us in our home. Explanations of the 
reasons these mosaics came about were easy. I needed a project to help me pass the 
time on the weekends, to help me cope with the strain I was feeling. I could show traces of 
my fingers literally left in the plaster on the walls in the form of fingerprints, as well as the 
traces of skin and blood left between the jagged, shattered tiles as I plastered around 
them. I was proud that I was coping. Every time I sat with people around the burn mark, 
though, as this object of pain sat uncovered for many weeks, I could not explain how the 
fire happened. I immediately began to feel hate with the smell of singed wood and burnt 
plastic, lamenting what I had left behind as I progressed with the PGT process. Setting fire 
to one’s house is something that seemingly should be remembered and explained with 
ease. Needing to “cover” it for fear of showing the anxiety troubling me, I chose stone tiles 
for a mosaic. 
In this narrative of immobile cuts, I am struggling with my identity disappearing, yet coping 
through the embellishment of the bathroom. I am unable to abide the charred remains of 
the table, testifying to some new event that I must be able to explain. I must be in control, 
narrative of life itself must be explainable. Thinking must make sense of my body, so that 
my body must be forgiven. Following Colebrook (2002), this narrative of a normative 
subject is reliant on a mutual recognition of “the limits of each thing’s duration in relation to 
other durations” (p. 51), the alternative is erasure. I write with a nomadic subject to disrupt 
the temporal dimension of time of these events, to write a narrative of durations extending 
past that of the individual with Life as Zoe, and think of the materiality of difference that 
remains unwritten in narratives of becoming-other. 
 
 
Returning to Braidotti’s (2012) nomadic theory, I understand writing with a nomadic subject 
provides alternative accounts of narratives in positive and affirmative terms, of nomadic 
becomings disentangled from the negativity of lack present with normative subject 
formation. Nomadic becomings, as I understand nomadic theory, are not reducible to a 
critique or dialectical opposition to normative subject formation, nor are they 
 86
representations of “the unfolding of an essence in a teleologically ordained process 
supervised by a transcendent consciousness” (p. 151). Whilst acknowledging the 
impropriety of strictly distinguishing certain patterns of becoming from others, narratives of 
nomadic becomings emerge from a “zigzagging itinerary of successive but not linear 
steps” (p. 35) forming thresholds and patterns of “immanently actualized 
transformations” (p. 36). Tracing the politics of changes and transformations of the PGT 
process with narratives of becoming-subjects, writing with a nomadic subject involves a 
self-reflexive process prioritising creative non-dialectical paths, repurposing memory as a 
non-linear “faculty that decodes residual traces of half-effaced presences…of leftover 
sensations and accesses afterthoughts, flashbacks, and mnemonic traces” (p. 2). Writing 
narrative with a nomadic subject, I take lines of flight from majoritarian unitary subject 
positions of self/other, and capable of undoing habitual practices without engaging in 
“discourses and practices of otherness in a mimetic or consumerist manner” (p. 34), my 
figuration of a nomadic subject is sustained with a multiplicity of non-linear, other-ed 
identities, displaced and not afforded constituency within unitary normative subjectivity. 
 
Disembarking the plane in Chicago, I recall the feelings of certainty in my motivation, 
capability, and desire to engage my family in a full-throated dialogue of how one might “live 
life” with the spectre of Huntington’s Disease on the horizon. As I approached my 31st 
birthday, Sam and I felt secure in our financial and professional circumstances in New 
Zealand, and reserved a month to visit with my family in Michigan, to share the lives we 
had started to live separately from my family. Moving to New Zealand brought greater 
financial pressures to bare on Sam and I, and greater distances to travel, to keep in touch 
and visit my family, whilst we also maintained relations with her family in the United 
Kingdom. I saw my family, and the way they lived their lives whilst being at risk of having 
the gene responsible for Huntington’s Disease, as fonts of knowledge. Although we had 
differing ideas regarding our beliefs and opinions, and filled our lives with different objects, 
activities and experiences, I sought their expertise. Using Braidotti’s (2012) figuration of 
the normative subject, I understand these experiences of my family as representational, 
treating them as “a huge data bank” (p. 31) of knowledge, with the assumption and 
expectation that this would be made available.
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My five older brothers and sisters, successful with their children, mortgages and homes, 
education and employment, with their happiness they would obviously know how these 
things came to be under the circumstances we all faced. They appear normal, which 
Braidotti qualifies as “zero degree of deviancy or monstrosity” (2012, p. 28) from the 
normative figure, although I saw each as uniquely themselves within this singularity. All of 
us were of an age where the onset of symptoms of Huntington’s Disease would become 
ever more likely. Although, to my knowledge, none of us were sick, ill, or developing 
symptoms, all six of us faced potential futures laden with the onset of Huntington’s 
Disease. We sought to explore how they got to this point and time, and how they planned 
on proceeding, ever onwards, each day bringing us closer to the possibility of our faulty 
genes becoming unavoidably known. 
It is difficult for me to recall memories of this trip without immediately launching my self 
back to the Waitakere Ranges, to run the hills of West Auckland to hide and dissipate the 
heat of remembering. The memories are still too hot. When this writing reaches them, I 
wonder of their recollections of the tears shed across campfires, coarse language and 
threats during long cross-country car trips, how do they remember the physical and 
emotional harm threatened - should their carefully maintained secrets be pursued or 
overturned? Do they remember these moments, when we enquired of them and their 
lives? Did they observe our reactions, of the hurt I felt when scolded, turned away, and 
ignored? Did they see Sam attempting to console me, ever vigilant in containing her own 
anger, yet spurring me forward? Did they see us try again with another sibling, or their 
spouse instead, resuming a search and resisting the allure of capitulation? Running to the 
Waitakere Ranges, here my rage can be dispersed in a safe place, set in a location free 
from their protests of remembering otherwise. I am fearful that my memories and 
recollections will become taboo as with the discussions of Huntington’s Disease that did 
not take place.
Whilst I understood my family were far from perfect as I landed in Chicago, on the long 
train ride from Michigan to California and through the long flight back home towards New 
Zealand, I began to see their limitations as monstrous and dangerous to my ability to 
sustain my efforts. Yet, hope was still available for me through self-regularisation and self-
actualisation; I could do more, we could do it more perfectly, the testing could still be done. 
As we rode the train across Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and 
California, the entirety of my grandfather’s photographic slide collection sat at my feet, 
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abandoned by everyone else in the family. I wondered of his choices, of him shooting 
himself in the head in my grandmother’s basement, of the choices made by all the 
individuals captured in the hundreds of slides for which I was now responsible, and how 
Sam and I might be different. 
Binary dialectics return on our arrival back in New Zealand in late July. Declaring 
unacceptable the failed phone calls or attempts at any regular contact, I began to criticise 
my family’s lack of awareness of our commitment, and casual disregard of our efforts, to 
remain involved in their lives. We sought, encouraged, and desired for them to be involved 
in ours, and spent thousands of dollars, and many months of time, returning to visit every 
few years when we may otherwise have travelled the world. They failed to take up any 
opportunity to visit Sam and I in the wondrous places we had lived, apparently not 
interested in sharing in our lives. I rejected my family’s inability to converse with me on 
terms that were mutually recognised and acceptable. 
I sought to call out the monstrousness of their continued absence from our lives in the 
closing months of 2009. With anger and rage, I felt abandoned in our moment of need, 
and could not continue to abide their inability to be with us as we sought a way of see 
deeply and greet the intolerable together. To be in charge of our relationships with my 
siblings, we would no longer be reaching out, generous with our time, money, and love, 
putting distance between us and deny them the possibility of being absent. No longer 
content to make ends meet with such meagre offerings of friendship and love, and no 
longer able to afford the pain of remaining connected and in touch of them, we had had 
enough. They would receive no more phone calls, emails, or visits back to the United 
States, until some form of reciprocal efforts were undertaken on their part. My family would 
be responsible for salvaging any future relationship. All this in a wretched email, sent to my 
family a few months after our return.
I have become troubled by the email, lost in the years since. The words describing my 
feelings, intended as a form of rebuttal and reject my self as different, become an 
embarrassing subjectivity, a closed process resulting in what Braidotti (2012) describes as 
“dialectical role reversal that usually sees the former slaves in the position of new masters” 
(p. 43). Taking on a subjectivity that “feeds structurally upon the bodies of devalorized 
others” (p. 28), the words become situated, cohere and harden into my own failure, of an 
attempt to abide the moral standards of mutual recognition and respect. I recall Sam’s 
 89
concern for the complexity and variety of the situated experiences of each of us in my 
family, of the differences of our passions and capabilities, of the needs of our spouses, 




Writing as a nomadic subject allows me to revisit these feelings of rage, embarrassment, 
and rejection. Reflecting on believing them to be moral failings to be excised, or a 
commodity to be learned from and moved past on the way to another attempt at 
transcendence of the status quo, Braidotti (2006a) reminds us a Kantian universalistic 
ideal of moral imperatives is a “more or less invented philosophical tradition” (p. 2). 
Elaborating this narrative in the terms of the negativity of moral failure, futility, and 
abandonment that requires transcendence, I understand these experiences as harming 
me as well as my family. The negativity of this harm, Braidotti (2012) says, is the reduction 
of our ability to “take in and sustain connectedness to others” (p. 95) through the “loss of 
potentia, positivity, self-awareness, and inner freedom” (p. 303). I do not wish to apologise 
for my actions, nor forgive theirs, but desire for a difference in understanding so that I 
might otherwise live, and stay connected with my family. 
Braidotti’s (2012) nomadic ethics acknowledges the impossibility of mutual recognition in 
the “persistence of emotional, irrational, spiritual elements” (p. 194), whilst embracing a 
positive ethics in an affirmation of the productiveness of all affect. Providing for 
disentanglement from the taken for granted morality strewn throughout the discourses of 
moral failure and transcendence formed within normative subjectivity, and the “dimming or 
slowing-down effect, a dampening of the intensity” (p. 95) of the self that results, narrative 
written with a nomadic subject forms from ethically accurate accounts of the embodied 
situatedness of the politics of my location. The nomadic subject enables connectedness, 
interrelationships, and the formation of community through the productive nature of 
affirmative positivity of affect, whilst not precluding the possibility and presence of conflict, 
disagreements, tension and violence. Through a process of transforming negative 
affectivity into positive passions, nomadic subjectivity is “a radical repositioning or internal 
transformation on the part of subjects who want to become-minoritarian” (2006a, p. 7). The 
productive positivity of affect thus becomes an expression of conatus, a form of self-
 90
preservation where the subject’s drive to become-otherwise is “the actualisation of one’s 
essence” (p. 240). 
To disrupt binary dialectics of normative discourses, Braidotti (2012) links nomadic 
memory (remembrance) with “a radical process of defamiliarization or disidentification” (p. 
33) with majoritarian ideals of unitary subject formation and representational practices. I 
am remembering that Braidotti (2002) elaborates remembrance as an intensive activity. 
Likened to a “choreography of flows or intensities”, the iterative nature of remembrance 
with affective memories is a generative force propelling itself, creating imaginative lines of 
flight opening up “spaces of movement - of de-territorialisation - that actualise virtual 
possibilities which had been frozen in the image of the past” (p. 13). No longer beholden to 
a unitary normative subject unable to account for the intensive memories I encounter with 
the PGT process, writing narrative with a nomadic subject I am able to trace the residual 
presences of others with remembered affectivity, a cascade of individuals on the fringes, 
positioned as the privileged other, of whom I can learn.
 
 
My professional life began in semi-secure psychiatric environments in the United States, 
working with exquisitely violent children labeled with emotional and psychiatric disorders, 
teaching them social skills to reduce the frequency of their violent behaviours. I have 
supported men with acquired brain injuries and severe mental health issues in adult foster 
care homes, all of whom endured chronic circumstances that stem from car crashes and 
suicide attempts. I have provided interventions to long-term heroin and crack users, 
arrested for drug-related crimes in some of the most impoverished areas of the United 
Kingdom. I spent many years conducting risk assessments and supervising sexual/violent 
offenders throughout New Zealand, involving mostly men released from prison into 
communities from which they did not originate. Within this body of work, however morally 
acceptable the community-oriented ethics informing my practice, Braidotti’s (2012) 
figuration of the normative subject situates me in a binary dialectic of "not them”, providing 
a “dualistic reduction of difference to a subcategory of Being” (p. 39). What is needed 
instead, Braidotti explains, are molecular political gestures to disrupt the normative 
practices and discourses of subjectivity providing for “the social construction of different 
desiring subjects…who desire differently” (p. 34).
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I pause here and consider Braidotti’s (2012) nomadic theory, which warns of the dangers 
of such political moves having a “high risk of colluding with the strategies of advanced 
capitalism” involving “homologation” and “vampiristic absorption” (p. 120). Should I pause 
here too long, I find lament. For much of my career, I have been afforded a particular 
social standing, and, for the most part, commensurately paid for my skills as a result. I 
have experienced this as desire; I have what others do not, and am valued as such. 
Proceeding to write with a cartographic figuration of the politics of location, Braidotti 
suggests becoming-nomadic requires “forms of resistance”, bringing forth activities of 
“empowerment and the enhancement of what subjects can do (their potentia) for the sake 
of nonprofit” (p. 120). These forms of resistance bring into being a sustainable nomadic 
self, able to transgress these limits and desires differently without succumbing or colluding 
with advanced capitalism and a culture of commodification. A reading of Braidotti (2010) 
suggests, in writing narrative which explores the inexhaustible virtual possibilities afforded 
to the immanent nomadic self, nomadic subjectivity tolerates a multiplicity of cartographic 
figurations as a creative method to provide counter-identities, to resist to the hegemony of 
unitary stable identity formation. Political movements which appear colluding with 
normative subjectivity, where otherness is monetised and becomes marketable, can resist 
and form innovative subjects by eschewing profit and advancing a “strategy of inserting 
motion, acceleration, and hence disruption within the processes of successive de- and 
reterritorialization that are induced by the flows of capital” (2012, p. 121).
The multiplicity understandings of cartographic figurations brings me back to the kitchen 
table once more. As Sam and I returned from the United States in 2009, I took on a new 
job as a manager in the Department of Corrections, moving from a practitioner 
(responsible for supervising child and adult sexual offenders in the community) to being 
responsible for an entire office of practitioners doing the same. Sam, meanwhile, was 
managing the crisis services of a community agency providing interventions and supports 
to survivors and victims of sexual offending. Dinner conversations would rarely converge 
on the details, but meals were frequently over-shadowed by the unspoken 
acknowledgement both of us spent our working day engaged within a chain of events 
outlined on the evening news. Conflict arose in discussions such as funding, where in the 
political climate of the day the government agency that employed me was getting very 
large funding increases, larger in fact than almost every other Government department. 
Sam, meanwhile, was consistently obligated to validate the work done with survivors and 
victims of the offending I spent my day trying to prevent, and faced budgetary extinction on 
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numerous occasions. I do not recall these conversations as competing arguments of moral 
and ethical priorities of the value of each other’s work, of pay equity between our 
respective careers, or other binary arguments and counter-arguments involving our 
professional or ethical obligations. Our conversations instead became possibilities of 
thinking of our professional worlds as territorialised and reterritorialised spaces of inclusion 
and exclusion, resonating with Conley’s (2006) elaboration of striated space as “…replete 
with barriers and borders that are part of an ‘arborescent’ mentality…cross-hatched by 
psychic or real borderlines drawn by the state (social class, race, ethnicities) or by 
institutions (family, school)” (p. 95). 
Although Braidotti (2012) puts forward the possibility of becoming-other through 
minoritarian paths of “identity politics and feminist strategic essentialism” (p. 121), I am not 
content with the limitations of such work, of seeking any such fixed unitary identity. I 
envisage our conversations as tracing barriers and borders constructed by and 
constructed within our work, preventing new ways of thinking of violence, victims, and 
offenders. Conley (2006) proposes the politics of location, carved out of striated space by 
rhizomatic thinking, is sustained by eroding inherited barriers and boundaries and re-
instituting porous borderlines from which lines of flight and becomings are made possible. 
Imagining our dinner table conversations through the construction of new territories of 
resistance, we seek to establish new open spaces from which new locations of affirmation 
sprang forth, supporting our clinical praxis and forming resistance to the incapacitating 
effects of the industries within which we worked. Concerned with possibilities of the social 
dis-ease brought forth and sustained within our work of managing and responding to risk, 
argued by Arrigo’s (2013) Society-of-Captives thesis, I am re-imagining our politics of 
location. These locations are based on mutual specification and mutual codependence, as 
unstable and vulnerable subject positions we inhabit as we continue “journeying 
nomadically as an unfamiliar people yet to come” (p. 687). My work, sense of self, and 
politics of practice become stretched and unhinged from specific normative subject 
positions of offender-centric and victim-focussed identities. Although concerned in relation 
to the normative offender and victim-related issues because of the requirements of our 
pay-cheques, we sought to find common grounds to discuss the lines of re/territorialisation 
constructing offender reintegration and victim related issues within which we felt trapped in 
our work.
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The territorialisation of space within society erects oppositions and competing needs 
between offenders, community safety issues, and the Government’s decisive, and divisive, 
portrayal of its perceived responsibilities in these areas. I recall both of us, for different 
reasons, becoming dissatisfied with the media saturation overwhelming the public 
discourse of offender rehabilitation/reintegration issues and victim rights. These groups are 
other-ed for their difference, Arrigo argues (2013), in part because this difference is “the 
presence of disease, deviance, and danger” (p. 674) from the normative subject, whilst the 
needs for recovery or reintegration, let alone the causes of this otherness, are made to 
appear "largely unimaginable, unspeakable, and uninhabitable” (p. 674) to society at large. 
Sam’s role required her to take to the media to set the terms of an array of social justice 
outcomes, including removing stigma of victim otherness, and to press the imperative of 
funding needs in order to meet these outcomes. My professional practice required keeping 
the identification, management, and elimination of risk central to all offender decisions and 
organisational policy developmment, thereby excising the possibility of catastrophic 
incidents of crime and violence the news media is all too eager to broadcast. 
I understand the normative ideas of identity saturating media messaging, providing subject 
positions of offender, victim, and community, as “axiomatic categories to be contained or 
controlled” (Arrigo, 2013, p. 684). The media coverage delineates offenders and offending 
behaviours, and the risks posed by these individuals, as well as victims and their rights, 
and the cost of compensating and/or supporting these individuals with therapy and other 
treatment. The media draws on and informs the sense making of society, determining what 
can only make sense with the envisaging of criminal justice and victim rights perspectives 
within tight, restrictive normative ideas encompassing a vast range of individuals and 
differences. Arrigo (2013) argues, as professionals confined within our ability to celebrate 
and act through our practice on the “potential of being human differently and of making a 
difference innovatively given this humanness” (p. 674), we risk becoming party to a 
totalising madness of the Society-of-Captives as both captive and captor. 
The media portrayal of constricted normative images curtails public dialogue and 
conversations of violence. Media and government messaging embed the public’s concern 
as one of whom is deserving of rights (the community but also the tax payer) and those 
whose rights are rightfully excluded (offenders as well as victims). Removed from the need 
to validate or defend differentiated positions within identity politics, Conley (2006) suggests 
in becoming-molecular we are able to travel in space created “between identities, not so 
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much to undo them but rather to question” (p. 107), permitting us to become critical of 
structures that, instead of bringing forth new connections and subject positions, confine 
dialogue and erect oppositions of thought. I feel these conversations with Sam as filled 
less with opinions and beliefs confining us to view-points, and more as movements of 
affective flows, where we struggle, resist, and reject becoming enveloped within the 
Society-of-Captives, choosing to disperse our selves instead. In writing narrative of 
becoming-molecular within a politics of location, I remember inventiveness in eroding the 
impenetrable totalising madness where difference, Arrigo (2013) explains, is “assigned the 
status of lack, deferred and postponed, and made docile” (p. 696). Sustaining the nomadic 
subject that cracks with the totalising madness, I recall with our frustration also feelings of 
joy as we create new politics of locations. This joy generates imagined possibilities brought 
forth with lines of flight, which Arrigo (2013) argues emerges with an ethics of practice 
where “dynamic potential and human productivity are celebrated innovatively” (p. 687).
 
Following along with molecular feelings of rage, and no longer needing to be morally 
repentant or ethically superior in my dealings with others, I revisit my pleas to Pat to help 
me cope in our ongoing therapy sessions through 2010, in the months after I send the now 
troubling email. Provided with her exhortation to look after my self, I can once again feel 
the effects of submerging. Baths become recurring common daily immersions in water. 
Relieved from the pressure of a morality that compresses rage as a substance from which 
I require relief, to be washed off and out of me at the end of each day, I am also no longer 
bound to the unitary identity of an other-ed subject, formed in the opposition of the morality 
of my family. Baths, no longer simply a tool or coping strategy defending and protecting 
myself from the onslaught of pain and tumult, become nomadic anti-memories, defined by 
Braidotti (2006a) as processes of negotiation and exploration “in the pursuit of active 
modes of empowerment through experimentation” (p. 5). 
Writing with a nomadic subject, Braidotti (2012) stipulates a “job of remembering is the 
capacity to engender the kind of conditions and relations that can empower creative 
alternatives” (p. 33). I recall these baths as lonely times, yet I was not alone. Water 
becomes the location where the feelings of conflict, pain and misery are met with 
compassion in “overcoming the self and stretching the boundaries of how much a body 
can take…but also an active desire to work through it and find a way across it” (p. 231). 
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The bath becomes a location without inhabitants but of multiplicities, where the forces form 
and stretch subjectivities in the folding and unfolding of the nomadic subject as “a 
collectively oriented, externally bound, multiple subject whose singularity is the result of 
constant renegotiations with a variety of forces” (p. 79). Reflecting on the singularness of 
my certainty as we arrived in Chicago, the confidence of accessing other’s knowledge for 
my own benefit, the nomadic subjectivity formed in the memories of these baths is 
materially affirmed, yet vulnerable, less defined and unstable. Expressed through the 
embodiment of becoming-molecular and becoming-animal, I understand the nomadic 
subject as a sustainable embodiment of affective flow, a molecular politics of a location of 
difference, constructed in relation to, with, and through encounters with others.
 
I recall experiences of exploration and experimentation in our efforts to inform and enlist a 
multitude of others to support us in undertaking the PGT process. We tell myriads of 
friends and neighbours, colleagues and coworkers, therapists and counsellors of our 
plans, and our fears of Huntington’s Disease and genetic risk. Enlisting others, a paradox 
arises. The more people we tell, the more I fear the process; I cannot stop, I cannot fail, I 
must proceed. Constituting assemblages of interconnected encounters and relational 
linkages, the multitudes cohere and form into a community of others. With this community, 
our journey transforms into something otherwise different to a test that one decides to 
take, as a test that one must pass or fail, a test that must proceed or stop. As we become 
community of others together expressing the flow of life, I feel my self disperse. 
As the summer of 2010 draws to an end and the PGT process becomes debilitating, I 
remember orchestrating a dinner gathering to inform my friend Bruce of my lingering 
sadness and fear, and to tell him of my need for his help. Having only met a few months 
before, everyone in the house knows of my intentions as he and I leave the house and go 
to the beach at the bottom of my road. We watch the sunset together as I divulge my 
genetic heritage, and tell him of my fears. Remembering other meetings at work, with my 
supervisors Carl and Heather, I explain the imperative of coming to work in order to do 
something I know how to do, when everything else happening around me is unknown - 
and becoming more unknowable. Marianne, a neighbour, welcomes the misery and sorrow 
that resides next door to her, contrasting these feelings with food and compassion in her 
home. Without needing to exchange words or invitations, she provides comfort to the 
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uncomfortable. I tell others that I do not know of what my body is capable, and invite them 
to become aware of the politics of these locations I am traversing, for I do not know what I 
can sustain and the limits of my endurance - but I only know I may endure more with them. 
These individuals come in from elsewhere, enfolded and involved in the unfolding of 
different figurations of my self. 
During the day, every day, I work with Joyce as a manager in the Department of 
Corrections; we work to see deeply together, providing supervision, management and 
support to those whose offending also does not represent normative ideas of humanness. 
With Wiremu, Joyce’s partner, I make picture frames, play video games and watch movies, 
whilst drinking copious amounts of alcohol. Together, my friends distract from everyday 
living, providing comfort with whatever I need to get through the day. With Sam, the four of 
us roam New Zealand on holidays, and sustained with a multitude of selves, I endure the 
“impersonal forces and intensive resonances” (Braidotti, 2012, p. 74) of affective memories 
and experiences of my family. Learning neither life nor my non-unitary self can be 
represented by normative images of thought, my nomadic self figured here becomes 
patterns of repetitions of difference, expressing a posthuman subjectivity with the “rejection 
of the principle of adequation to and identification with a normative image of thought” (p. 
84). A community of others, enfolded and involved in the unfolding of different figurations 
of sustainable selves, become-molecular with the expression of the hope, sorrow, fear and 
anxiety, propelling my different nomadic selves ever forward with Zoe. 
Returning to the mosaics of stone and tile, I re-consider the brutality of the PGT process. I 
seek to give up as insufficient the normative self’s “self-perpetuating Being” (Braidotti, 
2012, p. 29), of needing to cope and maintain a self with the repetition of existing patterns 
of logic and reason, with life as bios confined with its own governmentalities. But as I 
struggle with these processes of molecular politics and qualitative affirmation, of writing 
with multiple sustainable selves, I am beset by the speed at which these blocks of 
becoming form. I feel the sensation of becoming lost as I realise that life, no longer 
conforming to the rational, is not given nor is it simply made. Following Braidotti, writing 
nomadic narratives of molecular politics of becoming trace “transformations with multiple 
others in the flow of monstrous energy of a “Life” that does not respond to our names” (p. 
53). With undertaking the PGT process, all I can hope for is the pace of my life and 
resolution of my death, no longer bound by rational decisions made by an individual self, 
become adequate to being worthy of the present. In the present, no longer reliant on 
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reacting to events as they appear, I hope to continue to form creative concepts that 
counter-actualise events, processes, and experiences that define possibilities of futures 
yet to come. 
To endure these processes of change and transformation, my rational self becomes 
displaced, dispersed as I write of processes of becoming-monster, tracing figurations of 
enfleshed signs, actualised intensities, and lasting investments. I recall, once more, the 
rhythm of footsteps, splashing through streams, the metallic ping of a hiking pole, and the 
rasping of breath forms the language of becoming-monster as I roam (the Waitakere 
Ranges of West Auckland). Experiencing becoming-monster with an embodied whoosh, 
the eternal return of these feelings distracts me with the repeated pattern of difference. 
Patton (2000) reminds me, the eternal return of difference “favours those forms of 
interaction associated with productive, affirmative modes of interaction at the expense of 
restrictive, negative modes” associated with normative identity formation. Each return of 
rage, sorrow, and fear becomes a realignment of distress along different axes and layers, 
never predictable and never settled in place, as incandescent explosions erupt with each 
footstep, water-drop, ping and rasp. With these explosions and incandescences, each a 
throw of the dice and a joyous dance of chance, I endure as Life is not my exclusive 
property to do with how I choose; life, as Zoe, carries on regardless.
In redefining my self as a process of attachment and connection within “multiple ecologies 
of belonging” (Braidotti, 2012, p. 94), I revisit the pain, misery, and suffering gradually 
intensifying as I remember coming towards the conclusion of the PGT process. Feelings of 
being left behind leave me unable to breathe. I recall recurrent nightmares, absent when I 
was a child, from which I now wake shouting and screaming, as life carries on. I do not 
dream of death, but dream of dying. Anxiety, having made itself at home within me during 
the day, becomes sleeplessness keeping me awake in the evenings, a companion at night 
that greets me at dawn. I remember drinking, a lot, often. I think, again:
Anxiously moving forward, my efforts are too slow to fill up the hours 
of the day as I run out of minutes before this time is up. My days 
become preoccupied with treasonous doubt of myself…hurting so 
much, all the time, that I feel nothing else…I do not know if I could 
actually hurt any further…I feel my self dispersing. There is nothing 
to hold me intact, together, except this constancy of difference…and I 
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am not yet done with the testing. I am scared…Consumed with fear, 
of potentially having the gene and a life of not having the gene…I am 
overwhelmed with experiences of choosing with whom to travel the 
pain and fear, of abiding those who have chosen themselves to be 
with me, or those that cannot…I am overflowing yet the process 
requires more…Anxiously moving forward, my efforts too slow…I 
cannot control this.
I now remember the community of others around me differently, on whom I do not lean nor 
simply rely. Writing nomadically, we are not separated by “an essential distance” (Braidotti, 
2012, 332). Instead, the community of others becomes a frame of my embodied self that 
endures, and I become radically immanent with it. With the passions and forces of 
actualised multiple ecologies of belonging, forming an immanent territorial space of a 
shared world, I write of becoming-animal, expressing a posthuman subjectivity of 
transformation “in order to acknowledge the collective nature and outward-bound direction” 
(p. 224) of the nomadic self. I do not remember how, but I carry on as a community of 
others, empowering itself to endure the PGT process, and so I endure, to continue on for 
one more day. We become coextensively bound together, created upon and transmuting 
the flows of forces and transformations of our collective selves towards our possible 
futures, coalescing through the sustainability of shared interconnections.
The last vestige of rational memory is of giving blood with Sam at Greenlane Hospital in 
Auckland. I do not remember this place as a date, events are disjoined and do not flow in 
my memory. A hospital report records the day as 2 September 2010. Having no memory of 
a rational choice as we travel to the hospital to give blood and offer up my self for 
assessment, knowing we must wait and return many days later to collect the results 
printed on a piece of paper. I cannot recall how events have become realised. Thinking is 
not something done inside of myself, inside of my brain and body, or between myself and 
another. Colebrook (2002) reminds me of the possibilities of “prepersonal perception” to 
recall some of the intensities of the “common space” (p. 38) within which these events 
occurred, forming traces of affective perceptions to remember. With the dilemma of having 
nothing left to do, but the knowledge that there is yet more to endure further, I only 
remember the day through pain and struggle, my self willed forward in becoming-animal. 
Toiling to breathe in and out, I remember feelings of public distress, the warmth of the 
tears flowing down my cheeks shown to people walking by. Walking to a medical services 
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clinic in the hospital, we provide a blood sample. Although I do not recognise my self in 
these memories, I remember Sam’s physicality as a difference before me; her body heat 
and smell providing a warmth to my cold body; the depth of brown to her eyes and the feel 
of her narrow fingers grasping mine reminding me of how we got here. To follow her out 
the hospital doors to the car, I only have to remember fear.
With pain, misery and suffering, caught in processes of transformation forming with the 
complete dissolution of my self, I remember these experiences as too much and I fear I 
can do nothing more. The virtual has become the actual, the present becomes an event 
set free from the causality of history, and an unpredictable present bearing no relation to 
an undetermined future. No longer simply existing within a place and time, but dispersed 
and displaced in becoming-animal, I enter the flow of the last few weeks of the PGT 
process, trying to endure, maintain and sustain with the eternal return of a community of 
others each day.
I do not recall fear and panic, and do not know of this time at all. I do not recall 
conversations of needing others to support us, but something is communicated to Sam in 
these last few weeks. I must have communicated something more, something else, some 
otherwise nonlinguistic communication or mode of thought that suggests the current 
figuration, the present community of others, is not sustainable. In these last few days, 
Sam’s mother and aunt arrive from England. Somehow, together we wait. A desiring 
machine having become-molecular/monster/animal, in dispersing I become what Braidotti 
describes as an “embodied, affective, and intelligent entity that captures processes and 
transforms energies and forces” (p. 101). An immanent community of others, we endure, 
and continue to desire of an intolerable future not yet imaginable. It is in this space that we 
touch upon the years of intense transformations, making sense of fields and forces to deny 
the authority of the past. From the summer of fabulation, we have invented, rolled the dice, 
and danced through Life, as Zoe, together. I recall once more, as a gesture of hope, from 
Sam: 






Here, nearing the end, I begin again in the middle. Although these narratives have strayed 
far, to coordinates not easily re-found, the politics of their locations are also never the 
same on return. Writing a thesis with Braidotti’s (2012) nomadic subject creates narratives, 
which, eschewing conceptual stability, do not tell how one has lived or should live. Formed 
of multiplicities of virtual sustainable selves, nomadic narratives become our ontological 
creations of affective change. Following May (2005), in response to an ethical question of 
how one might live differently, our accounts of the PGT process privilege a multiplicity of 
“possibilities as yet undreamed of, one whose soil is far richer than those plants to which it 
has yet given rise” (p. 23). I understand the rich soil of nomadic narratives with the 
dispersal of a normative unitary self, reformed in a molecular multiplicity of the 
intermingling of human, non-human, and more than human forces and flows, setting forth 
the possibility of liberation from the polarising binary logic of difference and excluded other. 
Without the moral judgements of a unitary self, providing the imperatives, duties, and 
obligations to traverse a hierarchical scale predicated on a conforming normative subject, 
nomadic theory provides for an alternative ethical figure of thought, of a radical empiricism 
where life encompasses and exceeds beyond the individual, and inhabits the time of Aion. 
Transgressing the limits of representational thought with lines of flight, and existing in 
smooth space where life as Zoe is a generative creative force, the nomadic subject is only 
experienced in the virtual possibilities of difference, in a process of becoming-other. 
Narrative can be repetitive. Reflecting on the iterative experience of experimenting with 
writing nomadic narrative, and the vastness of the smooth space created in this process, I 
return to Deleuze (1994), who tells us: 
There is a crucial experience of difference and a corresponding experiment: every 
time we find ourselves confronted or bound by a limitation or an opposition, we 
should ask what such a situation presupposes. It presupposes a swarm of 
differences, a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences; a properly differential 
and original space and time; all of which persist alongside the simplifications of 
limitation and opposition. (p. 50)
Writing of molecular revolutions, Garo (2008) cautions that one must not measure 
Deleuzian politics “in terms of its potential descriptive pertinence or its influence, but rather 
it must be measured by its current efficacy” (p. 55). Reflecting on a multiplicity of 
possibilities created with smooth space of these narratives, new modes of thinking bring 
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forth new political gestures that occupy space forming from active disengagements with 
existing political operations. For reasons that exceed financial necessity, almost two years 
have passed since I returned to Corrections, where I now interview men in prison who 
have been remanded in custody following conviction, and prepare reports for the Court’s 
consideration at sentencing. The un-sustainability of my previous employment as a 
manager is rivalled by the joy I now experience as a Probation Officer, in one of many 
entry level roles in Corrections where I began my career. 
Situated along an axis of retreat and resistance, I understand Braidotti’s (2012) nomadic 
subject not as a metaphor or dialectical criticism of normative thought, but a methodology 
of becoming worthy of the present, embracing “the neo-vitalist immanence of life” (p. 222) 
in an effort to map and explore Deleuze’s swarm of differences “beyond the empire of the 
sign” (p. 84). The nomadic subjects emerging from these narrative windows are specific 
temporal and spatial cartographic figurations, creating “sustainable alternatives and 
affirmative modes of engagement with the present” (p. 8) enabling accounts of undertaking 
the PGT process crossing limits of normative representational thought. Reflecting on 
experiences of interviewing hundreds more men the last few years, questions of 
sustainability come to the fore in relation to my continued employment as well. No longer 
posing a question of personal alignment with political objectives, my work is not contingent 
on a normative subjectivity imbued with capacity and capability, of managing risk whilst 
molding offenders into a law-abiding and productive citizenry through recognised 
professional practice. 
Fearing a return of representational thought, I begin to hesitate; language here remains 
unfamiliar territory, not easily reproduced for others without filling the space with co-
extensive figures of thought. I understand possibilities of smooth space with my work in 
Corrections through the inducement of different understandings of joy. I understand my 
work with the co-creation of processes of change, engaging with men to (re)imagine an 
affirmative capacity to act through the invention of possibilities. These processes of 
change are wrought with co-presences expressed with interconnectivity and 
interdependence of multiple others, transforming “negative into positive passions…
reintroducing time, movement, and transformation into a stifling enclosure saturated with 
unprocessed pain” (p. 314) to crack specific figurations of the men’s present selves and 
become-other. Although the normative practice of the legal system requires that I write for 
Judges presiding over the Court proceedings, I write with the men’s whānau and other 
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willing supporters, such as employers who stand with the men as they come in and out of 
custody, and the interconnected community of others with whom the men live. No longer 
measured through the pinpoint accuracy of a risk assessment that foresees every 
conceivable possibility, joy in my work is a familiar whoosh arising as we become 
embodied together, seeking lines of flight from the identities, offender or otherwise, 
imprisoning us all. With forces and flows less conspicuous to Western thought, the men’s 
whakapapa and ūkaipō become possibilities where daily practices of interconnection can 
emerge, where limits of the men’s present selves can be explored as possibilities of 
change. To become worthy of the present with these men, my report writing emerges from 
a knowledge we must grapple with other histories, of relationships with Probation Officers 
and others who they have worked with, and will likely continue to work with in the future. I 
write reports to invent future possibilities of becomings that transgress the limits imposed 
by a Society-of-Captives.
Returning to narrative windows, the figurations that crack in these accounts indicate the 
limits of a specific figuration, yet with Braidotti’s (2012) figurations of nomadic subjects, a 
multiplicity of subjectivities endure with possibilities of different actualised becomings of 
other virtual selves. The nomadic subject is a multiplicity of differences; a desiring machine 
“facilitating interrelations, multiple connections” (p. 62) to embody affective forces and 
molecular flows of desperation; the “field of forces, a quantity of speed and intensity” (p. 
85) coalescing in the non-representable becoming-animal through the sustainability of 
shared interconnections with a community of others; and becoming-monster, a 
“fantasmagoric diversity” (2010, p. 172) of intensive differences which “simultaneously 
attract and repel” (p. 166) in processes of transformation. These narrative accounts evoke 
yet further multiplicities of subjectivities, opening up possibilities of a sustainable self 
unrepresentable in conventional narratives. 
Formed in the fabulation of “untimely visions, becomings and powers…and hence 
temporal forces that may generate stories” (Bogue, 2006, p. 220), a nomadic subject 
emerges from the possibilities of intensive differences and affective flow. By actively 
deterritorialising thought, a nomadic subject creates smooth space in order to “break the 
continuities of received stories and deterministic histories” (p. 221). Nomadic subjectivity is 
not produced from normative history and time as Chronos, but is an affirmative 
embodiment of affective change, which Lundy (2009) suggest, acts “in order to serve life, 
in order to activate the healthy life of a person, a people and culture" (p. 200). History is 
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not the inescapable past, for it is only the points in space and set of conditions from where 
the nomadic subject can emerge as an interval, a line, a change of vectors, directions, 
frequencies, and speeds. Following and extending Deleuze’s formulation of fabulation, 
Mengue (2008) warns the deterritorialisation of thought is never absolute. In a loop of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, the nomadic subject who takes a line of flight, 
forming new smooth space, must always bring “some code, some land, some stable 
segment” (p. 232) of thought with it, to “connect itself, in actuality, to absence and to what 
is ‘to come’” (p. 229). 
Writing narrative with a nomadic subject is a process of contending with these codes, 
where one must embrace the frustration of recalcitrant residues whilst wistfully desiring 
vanishingly familiar remnants of a normative self. Remembering with feelings of 
embarrassment, I recall initial supervision exchanges beginning with (what seem to be) 
small processes of change, emails beginning iterative processes of learning how to 
remove the I’s and my’s denoting extensive objects within a sentence structure. From 
these small spaces, the possibilities of smooth space emerge. I am now thinking of how 
Sam, Hannah, and I celebrate possibilities of resisting the normative subjectivities imposed 
with the terms of husband, wife, girlfriend, marriage, and divorce. Startled with feelings of 
other-ing brought forth when I am asked to compare the strangeness of my girlfriend being 
friends with my ex-wife, I ponder Sam and Hannah’s friendship, a process that now 
involves a fabulated origin story of intrigue and adventure, describing how they met in a 
place, time, and with circumstances not involving me. I do not understand this anecdote as 
a story of my erasure, but an account of creation with affective flow emerging from our 
interconnectivity in the time of Aion. 
Remembering how we were recently invited to participate in a programme for an asylum 
seeker and refugee resettlement community, Sam and I are no longer current and former 
partners, divorced or currently together. Sam and I teach Hannah folk dances we learned 
at the youth camp in Michigan, the three of us, in turn, teaching folk dancing to dozens of 
young adults involved in the resettlement programme. Remembering the tiredness, 
breathlessness, and joy of creating new political gestures of coming together as a ‘dance 
company’, smooth space forms from active disengagements with the normative 
subjectivities that others have expected of us. I notice the feelings of difference mingling 
with our folk dancing, a process of becoming-other with the possibilities of affective flow, 
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and in the dispersal of a self embodied once more with the familiar feelings of an 
unbounded whoosh.
With nomadic writing, I understand smooth space is created with powerful departures 
towards other becomings, formed with a fullness of a multiplicity of selves dispersed in 
molecular flows. I recall writing with lines of flight following suicidal trajectories, orphaned 
when thought no longer wanders nomadically. I remember these too as processes of 
transformation, remembered as stifling enclosures, trajectories seeking the smallest 
psychological moments of individual life. My body becoming immobile with feelings of lack, 
I remember seeking recognisable elements of shared interconnections with others whilst 
writing narrative of becoming-animal. I struggle(d) against a neoliberal imperative to striate 
space as I remember unrepresentable processes of capturing affective flow with precise, 
rational and conscious memories. Goodchild (1996) suggests this is a struggle brought 
forth by the capacity of capitalism to “fragment, privatize, and segment the socio-economic 
field” (p. 196) in the process of over-coding memories, to turn the past into capital for the 
purposes of consumption. I understand the work undertaken in writing nomadic narratives 
is not in remembering facts and being certain of chronological events, instead these are 
reflexive exercises in remembering affective change and the creation of new smooth 
space. It is here the nomadic subject can resist capitalistic striations with the transposition 
of memories into “material for a new mode of expression” (p. 200). The possibilities that 
spring forth from nomadic narrative windows form with experiences of dangerous 
passions, such as desperation and incandescent rage, remembered in the process of 
writing the dispersal of a unitary self and becoming-imperceptible with a multiplicity of 
others. Always returning to a new middle along entangled lines, these memories are not 
axiomatic nor must they be capitalised; nomadic memories become the past only as I 
remember events of the testing process with the possibilities of affective change, enacted 
through a subjectivity of intervals, lines, frequencies and speeds.
Braidotti (2012) speaks to the pain involved in becoming unfamiliar with, and unfaithful to, 
self-prescribed normative identities, processes necessary of becoming “worthy of all that 
happens to us—in order to affect qualitative changes” (p. 19). I am reminded of struggling 
against no longer identifying with the subjectivity of a young man who confronts the suicide 
of his father as an object of trauma. This subjectivity is now unsustainable, yet familiar 
traces in practices of how this young man knew the world remain - and are difficult to give 
up. Writing nomadic narratives of a dispersed self forming in the politics of location, I have 
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become familiar with the bodily strain felt in the quickness of the heart and slowness of 
breathing, the present self cracking and fracturing as I write of unrepresentable processes 
of affective change. Yet, the stillness of the hand and the whoosh of rushing towards other 
becomings become themselves enabling, yet problematic, processes in that they are not 
representable. My memory, no longer coherently linear, destabilises in these processes as 
the past becomes “the seed which can actualise itself only in memory” (Grosz, 2000, p. 
223), reconfigured in a history of difference, change, and transformation. In these late 
hours, as I wander into bed with nervousness and confidence in an abundance of 
possibilities, I have been kept awake. Am I doing this right? What are these feelings that 
still me? Where has this come from, and where will this lead me? What am I meant to be 
writing of and is this what I am meant to be doing? How have my words brought this forth? 
I cannot help but to ask myself, again and again, are these the right questions? 
As this thesis concludes, I return to the feelings of fear as I began this writing process, of 
repeatedly asking who am I to write of theory and what makes me think I can do this. I 
understand fear as an affective extreme marking the limits of normative subject’s 
knowability in undertaking a theoretical research project. Past these limits is unknowability, 
from which difference becomes the soil that gives forth swarms of virtual cartographic 
figurations of different selves. Writing with a nomadic subject, fear can become comfort to 
a self no longer reliant on reason or logic to cross these limits. A nomadic self can 
embrace fear with imagination, transforming virtual possibilities of difference not yet 
envisaged into new cartographic figurations of a self who endures, to carry on, if only for 
one more day, in writing a theoretical thesis. Fear becomes an ethical activator of the past, 
mobilising resources sustained with untimely visions of limits to a nomadic subject’s 
radically immanent flesh, the untamed differences of affective flow creating possibilities of 
“alternative social relations and other possible worlds” (Braidotti, 2008, p. 12), becoming 
the politics of locations where virtual nomadic subjects roam. I once again remember 
Mengue’s (2008) warning that the deterritorialisation of thought always returns to codified, 
striated spaces, even as an I becomes a we.
No longer predicated on knowledge as a static and stable object to be lacked, desired and 
obtained, I struggle with other limits of a dispersed self whilst writing narrative windows 
with embodied processes of difference and repetition. Writing nomadically, each revision of 
a window becomes an iterative process of accounting for the work done in disentangling 
threads and maintaining affective flow, a process never complete. Wondering how well I 
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have resisted untangling each ungainly thread, leaving a multiplicity of spaces left 
unexplored, a tension arises with normative expectations of academic practices. Reflecting 
on writing nomadically, the work involved only appears in the form of one revision of a 
bookend or narrative. Bounding incomplete processes involves reading and rereading the 
literature, “cleaning” narrative to remove errant representations, eliminating inaccuracies 
and polishing sections, and including more robust theoretical understandings as the writing 
process proceeds. Again, writing nomadically is a process never complete, and I fear 
judgement. Others may see these traces of thought as discernible, yet incomplete, 
narratives, or understood as partial, and therefore lacking, representational accounts of my 
experiences. 
Instead of a representative measure of how one might successfully account for the 
possibility of resisting, I hope the audience of this thesis might find other possibilities of 
“success” in the creation of further ethical encounters. Challenging the insurmountability of 
capitalism and the limits of representative thought, Valentin (2006) describes a possibility 
of Deleuze’s political philosophy as creating “a political reflection that will no longer be 
pursued in terms of application or representation…but a creation for nothing” (p. 199). 
Neither error nor omission, the uncontrollability of creating for nothing is an ethical 
encounter to be worthy of the present, with narrative windows of this thesis an experiment 
in creating possibilities of open smooth space outside of what is imaginable to me. Writing 
with a nomadic subject, these narratives leave space unexamined, opportunities unsaid, 
and possibilities unexplained, left for others to break open, untangle, and follow further on 
other lines of flight. Writing with a nomadic subject, the surprise of finding comfort 
alongside doubt, fear and uncertainty has not dissipated as I near the end of this thesis 
work. 
Working with the molecular possibilities of Deleuzian philosophy and Braidotti’s nomadic 
theory, I understand the becomings of narratives yet written, or narrative yet able to be 
told, with the possibilities of persistently disrupting “segregational majoritarian 
patterns” (Braidotti, 2017, p. 92) of knowledge production. Sharing experiences of writing 
nomadic narratives with my family, we reflect on the unfolding possibilities of theoretical 
philosophies of difference, and the joyful life of embodied reflexive processes of change. 
Yet, crucially, I have not shared the narrative writings, for I fear the work will not be 
tolerated. I hear their quietness as I share the work’s importance to me, feeling the limits of 
what they find tolerable with their absence of participation in conversation. We talk of their 
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now, and rarely of their future, whilst I do not know how to talk to them of my present, only 
the possibilities of other becomings. Feeling the return of categories of risk, I do not know 
what might result from sharing, and hesitate to proceed any further, staunching a process 
of affective flow. 
Writing politics of becomings, I am reminded by Valentin (2006) that care must be taken in 
creative processes of change, as “involuntarism is often thought to be the cause of 
paralysis (p. 195), whilst Thoburn (2003) warns of a threat, that in confronting the 
majoritarian, one may “carve out an autonomous identity against them, shoring up their 
own particularity against the world” (p. 86). Both caution against processes resulting in a 
reterritorialized identity of excluded-other. To sustain deterritorialized becomings and 
creation of smooth space, Thoburn describes the possibilities of an “'incessant bustle’…a 
continuous process of interrogation, intrigue, and invention” to overcome the threats of 
reworked minority identity formations, and the paralysis of involuntarism. Responding to 
the limits of normative representational thought, Morgan (2013) arouses hope that 
experiences with my family can continue to be embodied differently. Engaging 
cartographic figurations of a nomadic subject, Morgan disrupts discourses inscribing the 
normative unitary figure of academic scholarship, exploring the limits of collaboration with 
the creation of a relational nomadic ethics. Thinking nomadically, Morgan attends to 
“moments of resistance to a whole: remembered moments that connect” (p. 172), creating 
new sustainable possibilities of collaboration with others in the time of Aion whilst evading 
the binary logic of self and excluded-other. I understand the moments of resistance and 
connection as rhizomatic nodes figuring a nomadic subject, forming the politics of locations 
with nomadic ethics to create smooth space and molecular becomings, warding against 
the paralysis of involuntarism to create new forms of thinking collaboratively.
Reflecting as I write of possibilities of collaboration, I become weary contemplating the 
continued pursuit of normative relationships with my family, recognising the 
unsustainability of being either present together or absent apart. Nomadic ethics 
challenges normative discourses of absence, leaving the self vulnerable to paralysis, 
immobility and sameness of thought, allowing me to resist the neoliberal normative 
expectation that the pacification of lack and acquisition of a desired relationship will 
provide comfort. Writing nomadic narratives of the PGT process, following Deleuze (1985), 
I have tended to shy away from specificity to “hijack speech…to create vacuoles of non 
communication, circuit breakers” (p. 175), precipitating events that elude control. 
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Untangling these lines further, exceeding past the limits of a thesis, I am imaging nomadic 
thought providing openings for departures toward smooth space, where a nomadic subject 
listens to a quietness I experience with my family, creating possibilities of breaking a stasis 
imposed by hesitation and sameness of thought. To create new ethical encounters with my 
family is to invent new modes of thinking relationships, formed with the forces and flows 
created together, where I embody multiplicities of relationships as I find my way towards 
other new embodied becomings. The dispersal of a unitary self brings forth a figure of 
thought cohering with multiplicities of intensive concepts of affective difference, which 
Boundas (2006) affirms need only be “adequate to what ought to be thought and 
sensed” (p. 11). With nomadic thought, I imagine changing limits of tolerability I experience 
with my family becoming a soil of difference, a resonating source and location of 
knowledge. The possibilities of affective flow form differences, affirming new spatial and 
temporal coordinates of cartographic figurations capable of enduring past these limits with 
other becomings. Experiencing joy with the possibilities of writing ethical encounters with 
others, I find comfort with the incessant bustle of keeping all things open, creating 
possibilities of unimaginable future becomings. In this new middle, I continue asking how 
one can become worthy of the present, and begin again. Listening and writing, I still do not 
even know of what a body is capable. 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